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ABSTRACT 
This thesis provides a comparative analysis of the problems of fraud and the abuse of 
the corporate form under UK and Nigerian company laws. The twin doctrines of 
separate legal personality and limited liability for members shield shareholders and 
directors from personal liability for the debts of the company with far reaching 
implications for creditors and wider society. Although this position is not immutable 
as demonstrated in Salomon v Salomon, an analysis of case law and statute within 
the general rubric of ‘lifting the veil’ or ‘piercing the veil’ in the two jurisdictions 
reveals that veil piercing approaches have for several reasons remained 
fundamentally flawed. There is no coherent principle upon which the courts may 
find exceptional circumstances to impose liability on shareholders and directors. Veil 
piercing approaches have been premised on loss allocation analysis and used only as 
a means to discard limited liability. No effort has been made to deny controlling 
shareholders and directors the benefits derived from fraud, an omission that is 
detrimental to the interest of creditors and thus demonstrates the need for a new 
approach. 
This thesis therefore argues that gains made by fraudulent shareholders or directors 
constitute an unjustified enrichment which must be disgorged for distribution to 
creditors. To this end, the thesis proposes a ‘responsible corporate personality 
model’ which gives the creditors wider rights of action to initiate claims against 
corporate controllers to deny or prevent wrongful benefits or proceeds of unjust 
enrichment when the company is insolvent or approaching insolvency. The model 
addresses questions such as the role of constructive trust in combating fraud, tracing, 
fraudulent transfer of company’s assets to third parties and obstacles imposed by the 
requirement of fiduciary relationship. It supports the approach to unjust enrichment, 
suggesting lessons for both the UK and Nigeria in order to preserve equity and 
prevent improper conduct of corporate controllers. A key argument is that the 
responsible corporate model can address certain socio-economic peculiarities of 
Nigeria and similar developing countries.  
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CHAPTER 1    INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Context 
The concepts of corporate personality and limited liability are two key attributes of 
the corporate form. The corporate form is considered one of the best and most 
efficient forms of business organization for the modern commercial and industrial 
sectors of both developed and developing countries because of the separation of the 
company and shareholders and the limitation of liability which encourage 
enterprenuership.
1
 In particular, it is the dominant form of business in Nigeria and in 
the United Kingdom, two countries who share a common legal heritage and are 
members of the commonwealth.
2
 However, the corporate form has sometimes been 
abused by corporate controllers (i.e. shareholders, directors and corporate officers). 
This prompted the courts and the legislature to provide for exceptions to corporate 
personality and limited liability in an attempt to redress any injustice which may 
result from strict application of both concepts. These exceptions are better known as 
lifting, or piercing, of the corporate veil – a method employed to hold shareholders 
and directors liable for corporate obligations in certain cases of misbehaviour.
3
 
Abuse of the corporate form, which has largely arisen from fraudulent, manipulative 
and opportunistic acts of shareholders, directors and corporate officers, appears to 
have been on the increase in Nigeria during the last few decades.
4
 This has been 
explained, in part, as a consequence of the protection offered to these categories of 
persons by the principles of corporate personality and limited liability,
5
 which make 
a company, once incorporated, legally recognised as a distinct person from its 
members and officers, and further limits the liability of members for the debts of the 
company.
6
 It has also been attributed to the inadequacy of Nigerian corporate laws 
and the bureaucracy of those charged with regulatory responsibilities, particularly 
                                                          
1
 D. Singh, ‘Incorporating with fraudulent intentions: a study of differentiating attributes of shell 
companies in India’ (2010) 17:4, Journal of Financial Crime, 459. Corporate form of business 
structure implies, inter alia, any form of business duly incorporated with the state following enabling 
legislations by the state. In Nigeria, a company incorporated under the Company and Allied Matters 
Act 2004 would qualify for the corporate form and the same applies for a company incorporated 
under the Companies Act 2006 in the UK.  
2
 O. Akanki, ‘The Relevance of the Corporate Personality Principles’, (1977-80) N.L.J, 10. See also 
Marina Nominees Ltd v. Federal Board of Inland Revenue (1986) 2 N.W.L.R (pt.20) at 48. 
3
 Ibid. See also Atlas Maritime Co SA v Avalon Maritime Ltd (No 1) [1991] 4 All ER 769. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Salomon v. Salomon [1887] AC 22 
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the Nigerian Corporate Affairs Commission, as well as the laxity and non-
implementation of disclosure rules.
7
 For example, it takes on average one month to 
get feedback on any inquiry about the status of a company in Nigeria.
8
 This is likely 
to be because of over centralisation, inefficiency of the work force and poor 
technology in the activities of the Corporate Affairs Commission
9
 – the body 
responsible under the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2004 for incorporating 
companies.
10
  
In Nigeria, as in most countries, it is possible that persons who have few resources 
and lack good business knowledge and education can incorporate companies without 
substantial assets which can be used to defraud creditors and the general public.
11
 
Such persons, while misrepresenting their scope and objects, purport to be 
establishing companies which are carrying out legitimate and substantial business 
when, in real terms, there is no business activity going on. They thus fail to comply 
with the requirements for those seeking to do business in the corporate form in terms 
of the decision-making process, the board, and directors and officers, as well as 
accounts and reports. They appoint themselves directors and control the affairs of the 
company. In recent example among several others in Nigeria concerned the defunct 
Oceanic bank in Nigeria which was controlled by a single family. A top member of 
that family who was the managing director was convicted of fraud of such a serious 
nature that led to the collapse of the bank.
12
 Similarly, a UK court found a former 
managing director of a Nigerian bank who was also a controlling shareholder liable 
for fraud which was one of the issues that led to the collapse of that bank as well.
13
 
As they assume the position of shareholder, director and officer, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to demarcate the company from such persons, even when the 
formal features of legal personality as recognised by law are present.
14
 The company 
may obtain credits with fictitious documents about its solvency, while its controlling 
directors and shareholders may provide phony personal guarantees with no intention 
                                                          
7
Akanki, n.2 above. 
8
 This is borne out of my experience as a legal practitioner in Nigeria. 
9
 Company and Allied Matters Act 2004 s.1   
10
 Ibid. 
11
 See Alade v Alic (Nigeria) Limited & Anor. (2010) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1226) 111 
12
 Federal Republic of Nigeria v Dr (Mrs) Cecilia Ibru, FHC /L/CS/297C/2009 (Unreported) 
13
 Acess Bank Plc v Erastus Akingbola and others, [2012] EHWC 2148 (Comm) 1680 
14
 Alade v Alic (Nigeria) Limited & Anor. (2010) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1226) 111 
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of repayment. The term ‘phony’ has been defined as counterfeit, fake; unreal.15 
Something not genuinely derived from the “old practice of tricking people...”16 In 
this context, ‘phony’ approximates to the submission of fake and non-existent 
guarantees in order to obtain credits.
17
  
Therefore, rather than being an independent and autonomous person acting in its 
own corporate interests though with directors and officers in place as agents, 
corporations may become what one commentator described as a mere ‘sham’ or 
‘dummies’.18 Such a corporation may be seen as the instrument or indeed puppet of 
its controllers, manipulated by them purely in order to promote their own interests. It 
may then be correct to say that the corporation has “no separate mind, and will or 
existence of its own and is anything but a business conduit for its principal.”19 Thus, 
rather than being a legal instrument for transacting business and dealing genuinely 
with investors and  creditors, the company is used as a vehicle of deceit, concealment 
and misrepresentation. This blurs the true spirit and intent of giving a separate legal 
personality to the company and limiting the liabilities of its members. 
Abuse of the corporate form is linked more to close corporations,
20
 or what may be 
termed ‘small companies’, where shareholders are heavily involved in the control of 
the business and tend to misuse that control to undermine third parties and 
creditors.
21
 This is unlike large firms where shareholders are dispersed, and 
ownership and control are typically separate.
22
  
On this note, Jianlin
23
 has argued that the artificiality of the company’s separate legal 
personality is made glaringly obvious when the company has only one 
                                                          
15
 I. Brookes (ed.,) The Chambers Dictionary, Chambers Harrap Publishers Ltd, Edinburgh, 2003 at 
1130. 
16
Ibid. 
17
 See Singh, n.1 
18
 R B. Thompson, ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study’,(1991) 76 Cornell L. Rev., 
1036. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid. In his empirical studies Thompson found out that most veil piercing claims occasioning abuse 
of the corporate form succeeded exclusively more against close corporations than in public 
corporations and that veil-piercing claims arose and prevailed more often in Contract than in Tort.  
21
 Ibid. 
22
 F. H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, ‘Limited liability and the Corporation’, (1985) 52 U. CHI L. 
REV., 89, 109; See also Henry G. Manne, ‘Our Two Corporations Systems: Law and Economics’, 
(1967) 53 VA. L. REV., 259, 262. 
23
 C. Jianlin, ‘Clash of Corporate Personality Theories: A Comparative Study of One- member 
Companies in Singapore and China’, (2008) Hong Kong Law Journal, 425. 
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owner/member, which raises several legal issues including concerns about the risk of 
possible abuse, fraud and the concentration of powers, particularly to third party 
creditors.
24
 While creditors may protect themselves by asking for personal 
guarantees from directors or shareholders,
25
 this may not apply to small creditors or 
involuntary creditors.
26
 Commercial expediency dictates that small trade creditors 
are unlikely to expend time and money on making checks on the borrowing 
company, and may be in a perilous position in a Salomon- type situation of a 
company granting debentures to its de-facto owner.
27
 
The use of a company for purposes such as fraud or opportunism other than what it 
was set up for whilst simultaneously exploiting corporate personality for escaping 
sanctions has become increasingly problematic.
28
 A fraud, according to Singh, is a 
misrepresentation or suppression of facts made for personal gain or to cause damage 
to others.
29
 A corporate fraud has been construed as a deliberate act of deception or 
misrepresentation for an illegal gain or benefit (otherwise not available) or to cause 
damage to another, by a corporation, or by someone using a corporate vehicle.
30
 
In any event, abuse of the corporate form does not dwell only within the domain of 
close corporations. It is also likely to occur in public companies or even in holding – 
subsidiary groups as well.
31
 Holding-subsidiary corporate groups is defined under 
the Companies Act 2006, as including the holding company which has a majority of 
voting shares in the subsidiary and/ or the holding company who is a member of the 
subsidiary and has the right to appoint or remove a majority of the board of directors. 
                                                          
24
 Ibid. 
25
 P. Davies & S.Worthington, Gower & Principles of Modern Company Law, 9
th
 ed., Sweet & 
Maxwell, London. 2012. 211. See also H. Anderson, ‘Directors’ Liability to Creditors – What are the 
Alternatives?’ (2006) 18 Bond L.R, 2, 1-46. 
26
 Ibid.  
27
 S. Griffin, Company Law Fundamental Principles, 4th ed., Pearson Longman, London. 2006. 9. 
28
 Shareholders can use their control over a corporation to act opportunistically toward corporate 
creditors. Opportunism in the contract setting implies deliberate efforts by one party to benefit itself 
by defeating the bargained-for expectations of the other party. Various tactics are possible. In each 
case, the corporation’s inability to meet its obligations results from the efforts of shareholders 
deliberately or recklessly to impose losses on creditors that the creditors did not voluntarily accept. 
For a general discussion, see R. A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (5
th
 ed. 1998) at 101-103 
(explaining that purpose of contract law is to deter opportunistic behaviour). 
29
 Singh, n.1; For common law definition of fraud see Gagne v Bertran, (1954) 43 Cal. 2d, 481, 487. 
30
 Singh n. 29 above. 
31
 P. Blumberg, The Multinational Challenge to Corporation Law: The Search for a new Corporate 
Personality, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 1993. 55 
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32
 For companies of this nature, it has been seen in many cases such as in Adams v. 
Cape Industries Plc,
33
 that the separate legal personality of a company can be used to 
circumvent liabilities by holding companies, particularly in high risk ventures 
undertaken by their subsidiaries in order to evade tax obligations.
34
 
For the first arm of the definition, this includes the holding company being a member 
of the subsidiary and controlling ‘alone’ pursuant to agreement with other members, 
a majority of voting rights in it.
35
  The requirement of being a member’ would be 
satisfied by holding a single share or (in companies without a share capital) by being 
a single member. This provides a way to sidestep the definition of holding and 
subsidiary even though there is effective control of the board or of a majority of 
voting rights. 
36
 The fact of control means, inevitably, that the corporation may not 
be truly independent from its members even if scrupulous attention is paid to legal 
formalities establishing separate existence. 
 Nevertheless, when fraudulent controllers are caught and prosecuted for fraud, or 
subjected to civil actions, they often
37
 put up a defence to the effect that they were at 
all times acting on behalf of the company, and therefore the company should be held 
liable and not them individually. Consequently, corporate controllers exploit 
corporate personality as a shield against (personal) liability even when the corporate 
form is meant to act as catalyst for economic development.  
Apart from outright fraud, the abuse of the corporate form may be manifested in the 
opportunistic tendencies of corporate controllers who engage in behaviour which the 
law does not endorse. For instance, opportunistic behaviour that derives from the 
conflict between fixed and equity claimants may consist in the abandonment of 
investment projects that were in place when credit was extended in favour of riskier 
                                                          
32
  See Companies Act 2006, s.1159 (a) and (b). See also s.338 of Nigerian Companies and Allied 
Matters Act (CAMA) 2004 which defines a holding company as one which is a member of another 
company and controls the composition of its board of directors, or holds more than half in nominal 
value of its equity share capital. That other company is its subsidiary.  
33
 [1991] 1 All E.R.  929. In this case the parent English company denied liability in respect of its 
American subsidiary in an action brought against the subsidiary in the United States. However the 
recent decision of Court of Appeal in Chandler v Cape plc [2012] EWCA Civ. 525 has shown that in 
appropriate circumstances liability may be imposed on a parent company for breach of duty of care to 
employees of its subsidiary based on assumption of responsibility. 
34
 S. Ottolenghi, ‘From Peeping behind the Corporate Veil, to ignoring It Completely’ (May 1990), 
Modern Law Review, 338-339. 
35
 See  CA s.1159(1)(a) and (b). 
36
 J. Birds et al., Boyle & Birds Company law, Jordan Publishing Ltd, Bristol, 2009. 71 
37
 See Alade v Alic (Nig) Ltd [2010] 19 NWLR (Pt 1226) 111 
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investments that creditors could not take into account or foresee and which may have 
been only undertaken to exploit creditors.
38
 They may violate contractual restraints 
against risky ventures and trading in a particular area – all to the detriment of third 
parties. Controllers can divert assets
39
 from the company, by means of share buy-
backs, distribution of dividends, excessive salaries, and so on. This especially holds 
true in small private companies where dominant shareholder participation in 
management is more prevalent. In the same vein, a company may, in order to defeat 
creditors’ claims, engage in claim dilution by issuing additional debt of the same or 
higher priority
40
by transferring the assets of the company to the controllers, 
disregarding statutory requirements. This situation tends to defeat the purpose of 
setting up a company as a vehicle for transacting business in modern society and 
ultimately erodes investors and creditors confidence in dealing with companies as 
corporate entities.  
Therefore, the abuse of the corporate form raises the question as to what extent the 
principle of corporate personality and its strict application, can protect shareholders 
and directors on the one hand and creditors on the other. There is also the question of 
whether the current regime of corporate personality and limited liability in Nigeria 
and the UK, which tends to shift the risk of business failure away from entrepreneurs 
to creditors, should be sustained or whether there is room for improvement. The re-
examination of corporate personality and limited liability has become particularly 
pertinent because of the abuse of the corporate form which has become so prevalent 
in modern society, particularly in Nigeria
41
 as demonstrated by the the two bank 
cases highlighted above. 
The thesis thus examines the application of corporate personality in Nigeria and the 
UK in the light of existing statutory, judicial and institutional mechanisms for 
mitigating corporate abuses. The thesis assesses the extent to which statutory 
measures regulating corporate controllers provide useful protection for creditors or 
whether they are unduly or unnecessarily restrictive. 
                                                          
38
 J. Armour, ‘Share Capital and Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for a Modern Company Law’, 
(2000) The Modern Law Review 63, at 360. 
39
 Such asset diversion is sometimes referred to as ‘milking the property’. Vide, S.A. Ross, R.W. 
Westerfield, J. Jaffe, Corporate Finance, 6
th
 edition, 2002, 429. 
40
 L. Enriques, J. Macey, ‘Creditors versus Capital Formation: The case Against the European Legal 
Capital Rules’, (2001) 86 Cornell Law Review, 1168 – 1169. 
41
 O.Akanki, n.2 
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The thesis examines whether the present regime of corporate personality has made it 
difficult to impose sufficient sanctions on shareholders, directors and managers of 
companies for abuses of the corporate form. It argues that statutory and judicial 
interventions for curbing abuses appear not to be far reaching enough, owing largely 
to their narrow scope, strict application and the failure, apparent reluctance or 
rigidity of the courts to deal with issues arising from corporate personality. 
The thesis proposes a ‘responsible corporate personality model’. This model 
transcends the corporation by granting the creditor/claimant the right of action 
against the corporate controller for purposes of denying possibilities of wrongful 
benefits or proceeds of unjust enrichment. This approach, which concerns gain-based 
recovery rather than loss-based recovery,
42
 is built around restitutionary
43
 and 
equitable principles of disgorgement
44
 of assets for fair redistribution and can only 
avail claimants when the corporation is unable to satisfy original claim against loss. 
Unlike the orthodox approach of limited liability framed on loss allocation,
45
 the 
proposed model is detached from the underlying claim and thus operates 
independently of limited liability. As a result, courts are relieved of the strict 
application of corporate personality, but instead have equitable discretion to weigh 
the compelling merits of claims. This approach – which appears to  be what veil 
piercing was originally designed to do – results in the application of tracing rules46 
operating independently of the corporate structure typology.
47
 This presupposes that 
the ultimate holder of the misappropriated assets, whether money or property, can be 
identified and made subject to proprietary claims. The potential of what is being 
                                                          
42
 The orthodox approach defines the scope of shareholder liability according to its distributive impact 
on different types of creditors/claims, corporations, and shareholders. For this see Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 41(2001). 
43
 See Robert Chambers, ‘Constructive Trusts in Canada’, 37 ALBERTA  L. REV , (1999) 173, 181-
182. 
44
 See R.B. Grantham & C.E.F. Rickett ‘Disgorgement for Unjust Enrichment?’ (2003) Cambridge 
Law Journal, 62(1), 159-180. Disgorgement has been defined as a repayment of ill-gotten gains that 
is imposed on wrong-doers by the courts. Funds that are received through illegal or unethical 
transactions are disgorged, or paid back, with interest to those affected by the action. Disgorgement is 
a remedial civil action, rather than a punitive civil action. 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 A.J. Oakley, Constructive Trust, 2
nd
 ed. Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1996 at 8. The imposition of a 
constructive trust gives rise to the relationship of trustee and beneficiary which on any view is 
sufficient to satisfy the prerequisite of such an equitable tracing claim. See also Lionel D. Smith, The 
Law of tracing 10 (1997). Smith relates tracing to consist of two distinct processes: following and 
claiming. 
47
 Ibid. Unlike all other trusts, a constructive trust is imposed by the court as a result of the conduct of 
the trustee and therefore arises quite independently of the intention of any of the parties.  
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proposed lies in the fact that abuse of the corporate form disentitles the corporate 
controller from the benefit of protection offered by the corporate shield. In Nigeria, 
the model has the capacity to both reinforce and enhance corporate responsibility by 
providing adequate mechanisms for tackling fraud and other misbehaviour.  
Notwithstanding the novel approach proposed above, the thesis outlines further 
measures to deal with abuses of the corporate form through the adoption of a liberal 
approach to veil piercing by the courts. This may improve personal accountability 
and avoids a formalistic view of corporate personality and limited liability. The 
proposals are made with a view to protecting creditors’ funds and transactions with 
the company in the event of a collapse.  
This thesis advocates that, rather than abolishing limited liability for close 
corporations, additional requirements in terms of capital contribution and subsequent 
operations may be imposed. This should take the form of requiring individual 
incorporators of such companies to provide personal guarantees for incorporation.  
Further, if a company becomes insolvent because of the sole shareholder, where it is 
a one person company as could be seen in the UK or shareholders (if they are more 
than one) as could be seen in two or more member companies in Nigeria, the 
creditors shall have the right to sue the shareholders who may have personal liability. 
This proposed approach requires a new legislative framework to make it operational 
and will add a new impetus to finding solutions to the abuse of corporate personality. 
The proposal can promote scholarly efforts in the developing world with similar 
characteristics to Nigeria and beyond by highlighting difficulties and suggesting 
appropriate measures for tackling corporate fraud and abuses.   
1.2 Research Problems 
This thesis therefore identifies three fundamental problems with existing approaches 
to corporate form: 
1.2.1 Negative Impact of Salomon v Salomon
48
  on creditors.  
The presumption of limited shareholder liability is a “bedrock” principle of corporate 
law as espoused by the Salomon’s case.49 The principle presupposes that in the event 
                                                          
48
 [1897] A.C. 22.H.L. 
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of business failure, shareholders will not lose more than they have invested by way 
of shareholding. This has consequences as it merely transfers the risk of loss from 
shareholders to creditors. It may be undesirable, since if shareholders
50
 reap benefits, 
they ought to accept corresponding losses, yet this is what limited liability 
shareholding as espoused by Salomon prevents. This may be difficult to justify 
particularly for unsecured or tort creditors who receive little or nothing when 
undercapitalised limited liability companies collapse simply because they never 
bargained with the company. 
1.2.2 Misuse of the corporate form 
The corporate form may be misused for fraud, excessive risk taking and 
opportunistic behaviour by those who manage the affairs of companies. The misuse 
of a corporate form to perpetrate fraud depicts the failure of the regulatory system. 
The rigid application of the Salomon principle; coupled with limited liability 
shareholding, which extends the scope for fraud and opportunistic behaviour, may 
further institutionalise corporate irresponsibility.  
1.2.3 Inadequacy of laws and measures to deal with abuse of corporate 
personality. 
There has been a general tendency by the courts and legislatures in Nigeria and the 
UK to rigidly follow corporate personality, as manifested in their reluctance to pierce 
the veil of corporation except in limited circumstances.
51
 The result is that those who 
have dealings with the company or who are affected by corporate actions may be left 
unprotected. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
49
 Ibid. See also Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited and others, [2013] UKSC 34; VTB Capital Plc v 
Nutriek International Corporation & others, [2013] UKSC 5; [2013] 2 W.L.R. 398; Alliance Bank 
JSC v Aquanta Corpn [2013] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 175; Ben Hashem v Al Shayif [2009] 1 FLR 115. 
50
 Small private company shareholders are usually directors, and cannot be said to be merely passive 
investors. 
51
 See Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited and others, [2013] UKSC 34; N.R.I. Ltd v Oranusi [2011] 
All FWLR (Pt. 577) 760. See also P. Davis, Introduction to Company Law, London, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2010. 31-100; S. Griffin, ‘Limited Liability: A Necessary Revolution?’, 
(2004) Comp. Law. 99; Thompson, n.18 at 1041 
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Indeed, the Salomon principle has never been seriously questioned by the courts and 
legislatures even though some academics have described the implication as 
calamitous.
52
  
1.3 Research Questions 
The thesis therefore addresses the following main research questions:  
(a) Are there recognised exceptions to corporate personality and are they 
adequate to deal with abuses of the corporate form? 
(b) Should further measures be introduced to make directors and controllers 
personally liable in cases of abuse of the corporate form? 
(c) Should further measures be introduced to make controlling shareholders in 
limited liability companies liable beyond their agreed contribution, and if so in 
what circumstances? 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The thesis aims to propose measures to improve creditors and investors’ confidence 
in dealing with companies, which may in turn enhance economic growth and 
expansion in Nigeria and the UK. 
Unlike previous studies on this subject within these jurisdictions, this work is 
different in two major respects. First, it is the only known attempt to deal with the 
consequences of corporate personality in Nigeria and the UK with a comparative 
approach that draws from diverse environments and circumstances. Indeed, 
following a diligent period of research, it is safe to say that there is no previous 
thesis, journal article or text on this area in Nigeria. The closest works to my thesis 
are those on corporate governance,
 53
 and even then they have not looked at relevant 
issues from a comparative perspective as I have done.  
                                                          
52
 Khan-Freud, “Some Reflections on Company law Reform”, (1944) M.L.R., 54 at 54. Davies and 
Worthington have pointed out that decision in Salomon has remained controversial, but so entrenched 
in our law that the principle of limited liability for all companies, large or small, that nobody seriously 
advocates its reversal. See Davies & Worthington, n.25 at 209. 
53
 See for example, T.I. Gusua, ‘Oil Corporations and the environment: The Case of the Niger Delta’, 
An unpublished PhD Thesis submitted to the University of Leicester, 2012; N.S. Okogbule, ‘An 
Appraisal of the Mutual Impact between Globalization and Human Rights in Africa’, An unpublished 
PhD Thesis submitted to the University of Glasgow, 2012; L. Osemeke, ‘The Effects of Different 
11 
 
Second, unlike the previous approaches, this thesis advocates a new contextual 
framework of corporate personality suitable particularly in a developing country, 
such as Nigeria, which has a high incidence of corruption and weak legislative, 
regulatory and judicial institutions.
54
 This is imperative because the existence of such 
a framework may well provide a parallel corporate liability regime and appropriate 
limitations to the benefits of the corporate shield. Doing so implies that those 
responsible for inappropriate behaviour – which causes financial and other losses to 
an outsider, especially creditors of the company unable to pay its debts, – are 
accountable and can incur personal liability for financial losses without being able to 
hide behind the shield of a company’s legal personality.  
1.5 Methodology 
The research which is largely library based relies extensively on a qualitative style of 
enquiry which is concerned with exploring issues, understanding phenomena, and 
answering questions.
55
 Within the context of this work, the approach seeks to give 
insight into the analysis of relevant laws, opinions and experiences of individuals 
and persons dealing with the subject matter of corporate personality. By adopting 
this method, the thesis aims to bring to light the abuses of the corporate form and 
how it has adversely affected creditors and the operation of corporations as effective 
tools of transacting business both in Nigeria and the UK.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
Institutional Investors and Board of Director Characteristics on Corporate Social Responsibility of 
Public Listed Companies: The Case of Nigeria’, An unpublished PhD Thesis submitted to the 
University of Greenwich, 2012; I.E. Usoro, ‘Can the Law Assist Corporate Social Responsibility to 
Deliver Sustainable Development to the Niger Delta?’ An unpublished PhD Thesis submitted to 
Nottingham Trent University, 2011; E.A. Adegbite, ‘The Determinants of Good Corporate 
Governance: The Case of Nigeria’, An unpublished PhD Thesis submitted to City Univeristy, 
London, 2010; P.E.G. Augaye, ‘Evaluation of Corporate Governance in Nigeria’, An unpublished 
PhD Thesis submitted to the Univeristy of Wales, Aberystwyth, 2008; J.O. Amupitan, ‘Privatization 
and Corporate Governance in Nigeria’, An Unpublished PhD Thesis submitted to the University of 
Jos, Nigeria, October, 2007;  Asada Dominic, ‘Effective Corporate Governance and Management in 
Nigeria: An Analysis’, An unpublished PhD Thesis  submitted to the University of Jos, Nigeria, 
October, 2007; U. Idemudia, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Community Development in the 
Niger Delta, Nigeria; A Critical Analysis’ An unpublished PhD Thesis submitted to the University of 
Lancaster, 2007; M.M. Gidado, ‘Petroleum Development Contracts with Multinational Oil 
Corporations: Focus on the Nigerian Oil Industry’, an unpublished PhD Thesis submitted to the 
University of Warwick, March 1992; J.O. Adesina, ‘Oil, State Capital and Labour: Work and Work 
Relations in the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation’, An unpublished PhD Thesis submitted to 
the University of Warwick, 1988.  
54
 O. Osuji, ‘Asset Management Companies, Non Performing Loans and Systemic Crisis: A 
Developing Country perspective’, (2012), J.B.R, vol. 13(2) 147-170. 
55
 ‘Qualitative research’ available in http://www.qsrinInternational.com/what-is-qualit. accessed 
26/5/2011. 
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To this end, the research involves the use and analyses of primary and secondary 
sources and covers the area of jurisprudence and comparative approaches to the 
statutory provisions of the Nigerian Companies and Allied Matters Act 2004, the UK 
Companies Act 2006 as well as other relevant Nigerian and English laws, cases and 
policies including judicial decisions of other common law jurisdiction countries.  
It involves reviews of books, journal articles, scholarly commentaries, conference 
papers, media contributions, other publications and government and public 
documents. 
Through the analysis of case law, legislations and scholarly commentaries in books 
and articles which reveal the inadequacy of the current law, it has become 
increasingly clear that the concepts of corporate personality and limited liability are 
fraught with problems and require urgent reforms if corporations are to achieve 
economic development in Nigeria and the UK and restore creditors’ and investors’ 
confidence in corporate affairs.  
The significance of the analytical approach in this thesis lies in its potential not only 
to explain the problems associated with the application of corporate personality, 
particularly the rigidity and reluctance of the courts and the legislatures on issues 
affecting it, but its suggestion of the imperativeness of improvements in the current 
regime. 
It is further hoped that with effective application of the analytical method, the facts 
and insights elicited from the research materials will provide the necessary 
coherence and logical progression of the thesis and the questions it seeks to answer. 
Moreover, it is expected that a comparison and references to the UK and other 
common law countries such as the US, will inform the choice of alternative measures 
to deal with the abuse of the corporate form in Nigeria. 
The above position is supported by research evidence and is particularly important as 
comparative law is one of the ways for analysing a country’s law or system. In 
relation to ‘comparative law’ Lepaulle56 stated long ago that, “to see things in their 
true light we must see them from a certain distance as strangers, which is impossible 
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when we are studying phenomenon of our country. That is why comparative law 
should be one necessary element in the training of all those who are to shape 
society.” The implication is that a comparative method of analysis allows the 
observation of how other societies at a similar stage of civilization face up to similar 
and corresponding problems.
57
  
The practical values of comparative law analysis, as Zweigert and Kotz
58
 submit, is 
that it can provide a much richer range of model solutions than a legal science 
devoted to a single nation, simply because the different systems of the world can 
offer a greater variety of solutions than would be thought up in a life time by even 
the most imaginative jurist who was corralled in his own system.  
This study therefore proceeds to analyse and find solutions to the operation of the 
principle of corporate personality in Nigeria in the light of experiences of other 
jurisdictions particularly the UK, whilst recognising the inherent divergences of the 
two systems in relation to the context in which the courts and legislatures operate.      
1.6 Outline 
The thesis examines the operation of corporate personality principle in Nigeria with 
significant references to the UK because of the countries’ shared history and to learn 
lessons pertaining to abuses in corporate affairs, creditor’s protection and liabilities 
of directors. For convenience, clarity and better understanding of the issues involved, 
the thesis is divided into the following chapters: 
Chapter 1 is this introduction which sets out the research context, problems, 
questions and aims and objectives as the foundation for the rest of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 examines the theoretical analyses of a company and deals extensively on 
the theoretical underpinnings behind the legal personality of a corporation, showing 
that, in spite of it being accorded the status of an artificial person, a company has the 
attributes of a legal person. The chapter further deals with the principle of corporate 
personality of a company and its ramifications and the concept of limited liability 
and its justifications, consequences and impact on creditors, arguing that corporate 
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personality is indeed not absolute. The chapter therefore lays the basis for legal 
responses to the problems of corporate fraud and abuses in the UK in chapter 3 and 
in Nigeria in chapter 4.  
Chapter 3 deals extensively with the problems and challenges posed by the 
application of corporate personality and limited liability for members in the UK in 
the aftermath of Salomon’s case and within the realm of statutory and judicial 
responses to check corporate abuse and protect creditors. In this regard, it examines 
the circumstances under which corporate personality and limited liability for 
members may be disregarded in what is often regarded as ‘lifting the veil of 
incorporation’ or ‘piercing the veil of incorporation’, the liability of members and 
directors as well as creditors protection. The chapter argues that the legal response to 
the problems of corporate personality has been far from satisfactory. The reason is 
the strict adherence to the Salomon’s case and the reluctance of the court and 
legislature to widen the scope of veil piercing approaches and provide more flexible 
and equitable standards to deal with the problems of the corporate form. The thesis 
therefore argues that there is a need to articulate more measures to deal with the 
abuse of the corporate form in order to protect creditors and make corporate 
controllers liable for their actions.    
Chapter 4 follows the discussions in chapters 2 and 3 and analyses the operation of 
the doctrine of corporate personality in Nigeria, explaining how the application of 
Salomon’s principle has been misapplied by those who run and manage the company 
for illegitimate ends and to the detriment of creditors. An outline of the history of 
Nigerian company law which goes back to the last half of the 19
th
 century is given. 
The current state of the law, particularly the separate legal personality of the 
company, is difficult to understand without this historical picture. The chapter 
examines the existing laws and responses of the Nigerian courts and legislature to 
the abuse of the corporate form. It identifies the rigid application of Salomon’s case, 
the lack of effective disclosure, weak judicial and regulatory mechanisms, and the 
absence of insolvency laws as the major problems militating against the effective 
operation of corporate personality in Nigeria. The chapter advocates the need for 
Nigeria to improve its laws and ensure effective judicial and regulatory mechanisms 
in order to stem the prevalence of abuses of the corporate form. 
15 
 
Chapter 5 draws on chapters 3 and 4 with regard to a comparative analysis of legal 
responses, common approaches and differences respectively adopted in Nigeria and 
the UK to combat corporate fraud and abuses. It argues that while there are areas 
Nigeria needs to learn lessons from the UK, particularly in the area of insolvency 
laws and effective judicial and administrative systems, there still remains an urgent 
need for the country to adopt equitable means to deal with the problems associated 
with the rigid application of the Salomon principles and existing common law 
approaches which have brought untold hardship to creditors.
59
 
Chapter 6 articulates appropriate legal measures to tackle the problems posed by 
corporate personality in the UK and Nigeria whilst not discounting the efforts made 
by existing statutory provisions and case law. It examines the potential liability of 
shareholders in limited liability companies beyond agreed contributions and analyses 
how shareholders and directors could be held accountable for corporate abuses in 
order to improve protection given to creditors. The chapter proposes a ‘responsible 
corporate personality model’ for the disgorgement of unjust enrichment from 
corporate controllers, instead of the loss allocation approach which is prevalent in 
existing veil piercing approaches. The model favours a regime that allocates 
responsibility, liability and sanctions but nevertheless proceeds to recover gains 
made through unjust enrichment. It identifies the equitable remedy of constructive 
trust as a strong instrument to achieve this end. The model, with its primary focus on 
recovery of ill- gotten gains made by corporate controllers, is not only well-suited to 
a developing country such as Nigeria but ensures some certainty in this confused 
area of law.  
Chapter 7 concludes and reappraises the principle of corporate personality whilst 
assessing its relevance or otherwise in meeting present and future challenges of 
corporations. 
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CHAPTER 2    THEORETICAL ANALYSES 
2.1 Introduction 
It is a fundamental principle of corporate law that a company is regarded as a distinct 
entity.
1
  Once the requirements of the incorporation have been satisfied, a company 
is said to exist separately from, and independently of, the persons who established it, 
who invest in it, and who direct and manage its operations. This principle, which 
ensures the separateness of the company and enables the liability of its members to 
be limited to the amount they invested, is recognised both in UK and Nigerian laws. 
However, the duality of a company as both an association of its members and a 
person separate from its members has remained a perplexing legal concept.
2
 The 
separate entity rule pervades company law and has had far-reaching implications for 
it in both theory and practice. 
The chapter examines the theoretical and analytical framework of the separate legal 
personality of the company that undergirds the thesis. It focuses on the idea of a 
company as a separate entity, the nature of the corporation and the scope and 
ramifications of corporate personality.  
The thesis adopts the artificial entity theory and its variant of concession theory as 
the framework for its analysis. The theory is premised on the claim that the notion of 
“person” is a legal conception.3 Put simply, ‘person’ is presumed to be what the law 
makes it to mean.
4
 Consequently, a corporation being an artificial person lacking 
body and soul comes into being by state action through regulatory and statutory 
processes. Thus the artificial entity theory, which is predicated on state action, and 
notwithstanding its being more persuasive than other theories of corporate 
personality in answering the questions raised in the thesis, also provides the 
legitimacy and foundation for action to tackle abuse of the corporate form. The 
theory was and is still the precursor of the evolution of English company law and 
practices which were later transplanted to Nigeria.  
                                                          
1
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2
 D. French et al., French and Ryan on Company Law, 29
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3
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4
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The chapter is divided in two parts. The first part sets out the theoretical justification 
for the separate entity of the corporation and provides justification for state 
intervention on corporate matters, particularly in the event of the abuse of the 
corporate form. 
The second part deals with the confirmation of the artificial entity theory in the UK 
in the case of Salomon v Salomon.
5
 It argues that the separate personality and the 
limitation of liability of members in a company, as espoused in the Salomon’s case, 
has the propensity of leading to abuse of the corporate form. This needs to be 
addressed, particularly as the case has demonstrated that the legal personality of a 
company is not absolute. Indeed, since Salomon, the courts and legislature in the UK 
and in Nigeria have found exceptions to the general rule of strict application of 
Salomon’s principles, albeit only in limited circumstances. Consequently, where the 
recognition of separate legal personality may result in outcomes that are unjust or 
undesirable, the courts have deployed the equitable doctrine of ‘piercing the 
corporate veil’ whenever they have believed it necessary to impose shareholder 
liability and deny shareholders the protection that limited liability normally provides. 
This will be further discussed in chapters three and four of the thesis which deal with 
the legal responses to the strict application of separate legal entity principle in the 
UK and later in Nigeria in the wake of the aftermath of Salomon’s case.   
2.2 The Company as a Separate Entity  
A corporation is specifically referred to as a “legal person”- a subject of rights and 
duties that is capable of owning real property, entering into contracts, and having the 
ability to sue and be sued in its own name.
6
 A company belongs to a class of 
corporation known as a corporation aggregate.
7
 A corporation aggregate is defined 
as: 
a collection of individuals united into one body, under a special 
denomination, having a perpetual succession, under an artificial form 
and vested by policy of law with capacity of acting in several respects 
as an individual particularly of taking and granting of property, of 
contracting obligations and suing and be sued, of enjoying privileges 
and immunities in common and of exercising a variety of political 
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rights more or less extensive according to the design of its 
institutions, or the power of conferment upon it either at the time of 
creation or at any subsequent period of its existence.
8
 
 
Corporation aggregate is therefore an incorporated group of co-existing persons 
having several members at a time, and different to a corporation sole which is an 
incorporated series of successive persons. Corporations aggregate are by far the more 
numerous and important. However, this definition has been criticised. 
According to Frank Evans
9
 it is not essential that a corporation should consist of 
many individuals.  
Company has no strict legal meaning hence it is always been difficult to give a clear 
and correct definition of company. The nearest approach to the definition of a 
company is one found in Re Stanley
10
 Lennant v. Stanley where Buckley J. said: 
The word company has no strict technical meaning. It involves I think 
two ideas, namely, first, the association of persons so numerous as not 
to be aptly described as a firm and secondly, the consent of all other 
members are not required for the transfer of members interest. It may 
include an incorporated company. 
 
Prior to the decision in Re Stanley, James LJ in Smith v. Anderson
11
 had attempted a 
definition by comparing a partnership with a company. The judge believed that the 
difference which the Companies Act 1862 intended between a company or 
association and ordinary partnership is that an ordinary partnership is composed of 
definite individuals bound together by contract between themselves to continue to be 
combined for some joint objects either during pleasure or during limited time and is 
essentially composed of persons originally entering into contract with one another. A 
company or association, on the other hand, is a result of an arrangement by which 
parties intend to form a ‘partnership’ which is constantly changing, a ‘partnership’ 
today consisting only of certain members and tomorrow consisting only of some 
members along with others who have come in. This means that there will be constant 
shifting of ‘partnership’ and determination of the old and creation of new 
                                                          
8
 Halsbury Laws of England, Article 3 Vol.9, 4. 
9
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19 
 
‘partnership’. The effect is that so long as the intention of the people by agreement 
among themselves is to bring such a result, the new partnership shall succeed to the 
assets and liabilities of the old partnership. 
Clearly the common law position is that a company is an association of persons 
which has a broader objective than that of partnership. But the word “association” in 
this context raises a problem since a number of people may associate for multifarious 
purposes. This prompted James LJ in Smith v. Anderson
12
  to state that the word 
association as it is now commonly used is etymologically inaccurate for association 
and does not properly describe the thing formed, but does properly and 
etymologically describe the act of associating together. From this act there is formed 
a company or partnership. 
According to Davies
13
 a company, unlike a partnership with a small number of 
persons, may be seen as a complicated form of association, having a large and 
fluctuating membership. The organisation, which may be elaborate in form, is 
characterised by the conferment of corporate personality, making it a distinct legal 
person with rights and duties separate from that of its members.  
A company can be identified in terms of a completion of the incorporation process. 
Among scholars who share this view are Sealy and Worthington
14
 and Frank 
Evans.
15
 According to Sealy, a company is a kind of legal entity or corporate body 
which is brought into being by the registration procedure laid down by the relevant 
legislation.
16
 Its creation is evidenced by the issue of a certificate of incorporation.
17
 
Frank Evans  defines a company  as “an association of two individuals united for one 
or more common objectives, which whether incorporated or unincorporated: (a)  in 
the Act or Charter by or under which it is constituted, called a company and (b) if it 
is not constituted and called, it is an ordinary partnership or municipal or reading 
corporation or a society constituted by or under a statement, but an association 
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whose members may transfer their interests and liabilities in or in respect of the 
concerned without the consent of all the members.” 
However, a company may not necessarily be formed by two persons. As pointed out 
earlier, a company can come into being with a minimum of one member 
18
 as is the 
case with the UK Companies Act 2006. In Nigeria, a company is constituted by at 
least two members.
19
  
The question that a company must be incorporated before it comes into existence is 
not in doubt. This is because under s.1 (1) of the 2006 Act, a “company” means a 
company formed and registered under this Act.
20
  
It is clear from the analyses above, that a company is a creation of law and comes 
into existence both in Nigeria and in the UK by virtue of state law. Consequently, the 
law bestows certain rights and liabilities on the company. Thus, companies differ 
from any natural person in that they can only acquire or be subject to a very much 
restricted range of rights and liabilities than natural persons.
21
 In law a company is 
recognised as having no physical attributes and no mind of its own. The clearest 
statement of the company’s limitation in this respect is that of Buckley L.J. in 
Continental Tyre and Rubber Co. (G.B.) Ltd. v Daimler Co
22
:  
The artificial legal person called the corporation has no physical 
existence. It exists only in contemplation of law. It has neither body, 
parts, nor passions. It cannot wear weapons nor serve in wars. It can 
be neither loyal nor disloyal. It cannot compass treason. It can be 
neither friend nor enemy. Apart from its incorporators it can have 
neither thoughts, wishes, nor intentions, for it has no mind other than 
the minds of the corporators. 
 
It therefore follows that the operation of a company is set out in its constitution and 
this in effect clothes the company with legal personality with which it transacts its 
business. The fact that the concept of separate legal entity has been made easily 
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available for business people, it is submitted, may have very undesirable 
consequences which have actually led to abuses. 
2.3 The Nature of the Corporate Person 
The question of the nature of the corporate legal person has remained one of the 
most confusing areas of corporate law. Consequently, for many centuries, 
philosophers, political scientists, sociologists, economists, - jurists and legal 
scholars
23
 have debated what constitutes the ‘essence’ of this ‘soulless’ and 
‘bodiless’ person.24 In this ‘corporate personality controversy’, a number of theories 
have emerged. These theories are not ones in which law and legal conceptions have 
the only or final voice; instead it is one where the law shares boundaries with other 
sciences, political science, ethics, psychology and metaphysics.
25
  
There has been several different theoretical strands which have sought to illuminate, 
clarify and expand the scope of corporate personality and these reveal that much of 
the argument given to the subject of separate legal personality of a company focuses 
on developments in two key dimensions. The first dimension is the distinction 
between the corporation as an entity, with a real existence separate from its 
shareholders and other participants, and the corporation as a mere aggregation of 
natural individuals without separate existence.
26
 The second dimension is the 
distinction between the corporation as an artificial creation of state law and the 
corporation as a natural product of private initiative.
27
   
On the heels of these arguments there tends to be the dichotomisation of the 
corporation under the public/private paradigm. According to one view, corporations 
are separate entities given legal personality by act of state law under the broad social 
and political ramifications that justify the body of corporate law that is deliberately 
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responsive to public interest concerns.
28
 The alternative view sees the corporation as 
no more than the private relations involving the actors in the business for instance, 
the shareholders and the management.
29
 Thus, the difference that has emerged is 
between a public law, a regulatory conception of corporate law which sees the 
corporation as separate from its members and comes into being by the positive acts 
of state law on one hand, and a private law contractual perspective of the constitutive 
elements which make up the corporation on the other hand. 
Whilst some of these theories have been recurrent in the literature of corporate 
personality, they, unlike the artificial entity theory and its variant of concession 
theory, remain largely narrow and unpersuasive for this work as they fail to provide 
clear justification for the status and existence of modern corporations. These theories 
are briefly discussed below.   
The aggregate theory, for instance, asserts the primary status of the individual and 
the private status of the corporation. It argues that the role of law should be limited 
to facilitating the formation of this contractual relationship. The theory posits that the 
law was not central to the formation of the company; rather, the company was an 
aggregate of the individuals who had contracted for its formation. Therefore the 
private individuals behind the aggregate are the focus of corporation rights and 
obligations.
30
 The corporation in an aggregate analysis has no independent existence 
and everything is explained by the members of the corporation.
31
  
The theory, with its leading scholars such as Jhering had two significant claims to 
make about the operation of company law.
32
 First, as the company is formed by 
private contracting individuals, state interference in what is viewed as essentially a 
private arrangement becomes very difficult to justify as it would be an interference 
with the individual’s freedom to contract. 33  Second, and more significantly, as 
everything to do with the corporation was only meaningful by giving credence or by 
recognising the contracting individuals behind it, the theory served to justify the 
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primacy that company law gives to shareholders as the key contracting individuals 
behind the corporation.
34
 
A major weakness of this theory is its inability to articulate the fact that the 
relationship between the corporation and its members has remained an issue of law 
and goes beyond mere claim to shareholding rights and this explains why the 
artificial entity theory more than the aggregate theory has offered a better 
understanding of the corporation and its associated problems.  In sum, the aggregate 
theory tends to ignore the fact that the corporation is a useful legal concept because 
the common law regards it as both a separate person and an association of its 
members.
35
 
The “real entity” metaphor of the corporation first emerged around the turn of the 
twentieth century as a major challenge to the artificial entity theory of the 
corporation, with an argument that the corporate entity is a natural creature, to be 
recognised apart from its owners, existing autonomously from the state.
36
 The real 
entity theory generally views the corporate entity as a natural creature, to be 
recognised apart from its owners, and existing independently of the state.
37
 To 
elaborate, a corporation is “an organic social reality with an existence independent 
of, and constituting something more than, it’s changing shareholders.”38 The group 
asserts that an association of persons has a real personality which is merely 
recognised, and not created, by the process of incorporation.
39
 For the realists, such 
as the German scholar Gierke, the state has no role to play in the formation and 
existence of the company.
40
 
The economic or contractual approach to a corporation denies the existence of the 
organisation as an entity with separate existence from the individual contractors. For 
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this theory, the corporation is viewed as a “nexus of contracts”41 consisting of a 
series of transactions, or contracts between investors, managers, employees, creditors 
and customers. In sum, the contractarian analysis treats the corporation as nothing 
more than shorthand expression for the multiplicity of private, consensual, contract-
based relations between economic actors each seeking to maximise his or her own 
benefits. The behaviour of those involved, therefore, is regulated by market forces 
that regulate the company’s relationship with outsiders. The corporation is regarded 
not a creation of the state but of private initiative and enterprise. 
However, despite the promise and continued relevance of these theories, they do not 
provide a holistic understanding of the particularities of corporate personality in 
jurisdictions such as the UK and Nigeria where the state plays a prominent role in 
the formation and regulation of companies. Furthermore, they also seem to be 
incapable of addressing the questions raised in the thesis such as adequacy of the 
current law on corporate personality; imposition of liability on shareholders, 
directors and controllers; possible liability of controlling shareholders beyond their 
agreed contribution; and concerns of abuse of the corporate form which may result 
from the separateness of the company from its members. 
The claim of this chapter is that the artificial entity theory and its variant of 
concession theory addresses to a considerable degree, the inadequacies that 
characterise the theories briefly surveyed above, particularly in its recognition of the 
separate existence of the company from its members and the role of the state in the 
existence of the company. It is to this theory that the discussion now turns to.  
2.3.1 Corporation as Artificial Entities  
This theory assumes that the legal personality of entities other than a human being is 
a fiction. Under the artificial entity theory, corporations are not people at all but 
rather they are the artificial creations of human beings and are given personhood 
status solely as a legal fiction in order to facilitate commerce. They are the “creature 
of the legislature, owing existence to state action, rather than to acts of shareholders 
or incorporators”.42 
                                                          
41
 M.C Jensen and W.H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the firm: managerial behaviour, agency costs and 
ownership structure’, (1976) 3 J Fin Econ,305 at 310-11 
42
  Blumberg n.30 at 28. See also Wolff, n.23 at 510. 
25 
 
In his classic formulation of what became the “artificial person” of the corporation, 
Chief Justice Marshall described the corporation in vivid terms: “A corporation is an 
artificial being, invisible, intangible and existing only in the contemplation of law. 
Being mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which only the charter 
of creation confers on it, either expressly, or as incidental to its existence”.43  These 
terms were borrowed from English Jurists such as Coke and Blackstone, but 
Marshall’s emphasis on the term “artificial” was his own.44 The essence of this view 
is that the corporation is a separate juridical unit created by state action, possessing, 
in addition to its essential core attributes, only such limited powers as are granted by 
the State. In Marshall’s view, the corporation was precisely what the act of 
incorporation made it.
45
 Although a separate legal entity, its legal capacity beyond its 
core rights depended on the charter and thereby differed decisively from the fuller 
panoply of legal rights possessed by natural persons. 
The artificial or fictitious theory of corporate personality appears to have a Roman 
origin within the context of the church as shown in the work of its progenitor Pope 
Innocent 1V (1243-1254).
46
 Religious foundations were often the donors of property, 
and it was necessary to find a legal mechanism which would enable such bodies to 
be recognised as owners of that property. A solution was found in canon law, which 
had come to regard ecclesiastical bodies as “fictitious persons” (personae fictae).47 
This idea was received into common law and took rapidly, since it provided neat 
solutions to the problems caused by the existence of numerous groups, most notably 
the boroughs, but also hospitals and ecclesiastical foundations.
48
 This theory is 
associated with Savigny and Austin, who is said to have introduced the phrase “legal 
person,”49 but in fact the theory had been in circulation well before both Savigny and 
Austin. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that Savigny did begin the scientific or 
metaphysical consideration of the subject. He observed the fact that property belongs 
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in law to a corporation and not to any individual, and the question which he put to 
himself was, “who or what is the real owner of this property”.50 Savigny’s answer 
was that the corporate property belonged to a fictitious being and not to any real 
person or entity. Consequently, since a corporation is not a human being, it cannot be 
a real person and cannot have a personality of its own.
51
 It can only exist by the 
privilege of state action. 
Significant developments to the corporate form as we know it today can be traced 
back to nineteenth century England. At this time, two main business vehicles existed 
for carrying out large scale ventures, namely the corporation and the joint stock 
company.
52
 
Corporations had been used from the end of the sixteenth century and were created 
by the crown granting charters of incorporation.
53
 They were legal entities distinct 
from their members, who were, theoretically, not liable for their debts.
54
 However, 
limited liability was illusory in practice as the corporation would call on its members 
to meet its debts.
55
 This form of incorporation also came with the expense and delay 
of attaining a charter.
56
 On the other hand, the joint stock company had taken over 
the commercial scene by 1840.
57
 It was essentially a sophisticated partnership with 
emphasis remaining on elements of association and joint stock.
58
 Original partners 
could transfer shares according to partnership agreement.
59
However, even though 
their total number ran into four digits and the largest companies at the time had over 
one thousand members,
60
 it was not recognised in law as a separate entity from its 
partners.  
This remained the position until the passage of the 1844 Act under Gladstone 
leadership which provided for general registration and incorporation of Joint Stock 
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Company.
61
 However, the 1844 Act was shortlived. The reason for the collapse of 
the 1844 Act can be attributed to three major factors. First, it was ineffective in that 
it could not prevent the transfers of stock as a means to avoid liability. Second, the 
1844 Act made provision for joint and several, rather than pro rata, liability. This had 
the effect of deterring investment by wealthy individuals who feared that they might 
be primary targets for collection. Most importantly, the Depression of 1845-1848 
and a public acceptance of limited liability for railways needed for industrialisation 
were major catalysts that led to reduced public opposition to limited liability.
62
 
Before then, the South Sea Bubble had shifted the trajectory of English company 
law, so that instead of legal precedent arising from the seventeenth-century charter 
company activity, it now arose from nineteenth-century partnership law instead 
because the modern company emerged in a period when businesses were organised 
in the form of partnerships.
63
 The impact of the partnership on the burgeoning 
company law lay in the application of its normative legal values of contract and 
agency laws. However, it was not until 1855, following the passage of the Limited 
Liability Act and the Joint Stock Act of 1856, that parliament adopted general 
limited liability.
64
 It reaffirmed the provision of 1844 Act providing for general 
incorporation. 
The acceptance of limited liability, asserts Blumberg, was a triumph of laissez-faire 
which made the process far from inevitable and the adoption became a reality only 
after a long struggle.
65
 He contends that limited liability in England became available 
centuries after the emergence of the corporation as a legal unit
66
 and the factors that 
favoured limited liability were increasing the scale of capital required for 
exploitation of continuing progress in technological innovation. This need 
encouraged an increased capital investment by middle-class persons, the growing 
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distribution of share ownership and declining shareholder participation in business, 
as well as the heavy capital investment required for railway construction.
67
 
The history of the artificial entity theory outlined above demonstrates that the 
corporation’s existence is a privilege granted by the state. The fiction or artificial 
person theory occupies a special place in English thinking, and has been called “the 
only theory about the personality of corporations that the common law has ever 
possessed.”68 It underlies Lord Macnaghten’s famous dictum, in that most basic of 
all company law cases, Salomon v, Salomon: “The company is at law a different 
person altogether from the subscribers to the memorandum.”69 The artificial person 
theory raises two basic propositions: (1) that a corporation is an entity distinct from 
the sum of the members that compose it; and (2) that this entity is a person. These 
propositions are often confused; but they are properly quite distinct from one 
another. 
The artificial entity view (otherwise referred to as fiction theory) is closely linked 
with the concession theory since, according to Dewey,
70
 they both aimed toward the 
same general consequence, as far as the limitation of the power of corporate bodies 
is concerned. There are, however, different versions to this view. A strong version 
attributes the corporation’s very existence to state sponsorship. A weaker version 
sets up state permission as a regulatory prerequisite to doing business.
71
 Corporate 
status is presumed to apply once legislative prerequisites have been met. The 
judgement of the House of Lords in Salomon’s case72  is an example. In either 
version, the concession theory makes two claims about the corporation. 
The first claim concerns the philosophical status of corporation: they are artificial 
entities.  The existence of corporations as legal entities is dependent on law, as is the 
extent to which corporations can enjoy that existence: “corporate personality exists 
merely for legal and business convenience”.73 
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The House of Lords decision in Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd 
74
 provides an 
example of this aspect of concession theory. Lord Halsbury, for example, stressed 
that the company was an “artificial creation of the legislature” but stressed that once 
it was properly incorporated the company has a real existence”.75 
The second claim concerns the political status of the corporation. Concession theory 
sought to resolve the tension concerning the relationship of the company and the 
state. It tried to link the corporation’s existence to the state, thereby preserving the 
separateness of the company from the individual. The theory claims that a group as 
such has no rights unless the state chooses to grant it legal personality. Concession 
theory therefore has the capacity to emphasise the interests of the public over the 
private interests of those individuals involved in it.
76
 
The artificial entity theory, which views a corporation as a fictitious, artificial 
person, created by the state, existing only in contemplation of law, invisible, soulless 
and immortal, provides a convenient and useful framework for investigating the 
principle of corporate personality and its associated problems. The theory also 
provides further legitimation of a fuller application of social control through 
extension of the regulatory process over corporations and their economic activity.
77
 
Whilst providing answers to the philosophy behind the evolution of a corporation 
and the fact that separate personality of the corporation is not absolute, the artificial 
entity theory has further been invoked when courts seek to go behind the separate 
legal entity of the corporation and impose liability on corporate officers.
78
 Indeed, 
the theory establishes the basis for dealing with abuse of corporate personality.
79
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There are limitations to the artificial entity theory such as the fact that it does not say 
much about what goes on inside the corporation in terms of private bargaining, 
individuals and private decisions in corporations.
80
 
Despite its limitations, there is still potential in the theory particularly because of its 
far-reaching implications in the understanding of the nature of a corporation and the 
regulatory powers of the state in corporate matters. 
2.3.2 Relevance of Theory to the Research 
It has often been argued that none of the theories of corporate personality can 
adequately address all the issues in corporate law. John Dewey, for example, argues 
that there is no clear-cut line, logical or practical, between the different theories 
which have been advanced.
81
 The basis of this position is that each of the theories 
has something to contribute.
82
  As pointed out by Foster, the primary function of the 
English judge is to decide the case before the court, taking in mind policy 
considerations where possible, not to theorise about the nature of companies.
83
 In 
this connection, Millon argues, decisions about the normative implications of legal 
theories, and indeed choices among theories themselves, take place against the 
background of interpretive conventions that are constantly shifting.
84
 He asserts 
further that, even if we accept the general notion of a context that limits our beliefs 
about what is desirable, we need to keep in mind the context’s dynamic, malleable 
property.
85
 For him, therefore, it would not be safe to conclude that particular 
theories have a single or dominant tilt particularly in contemporary situations which 
keep changing in the midst of public policy controversies with normative 
implications which seems contestable at a very basic level, as does the choice of 
theory itself.
86
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For the purpose of this study, the artificial entity theory which considers the 
corporate entity as artificial, in the sense that a corporation owes its existence to the 
positive law of the state rather than to the private initiative of individual 
incorporators, will be used as a theoretical guide. Under this theory, the underlying 
entity of a legal person is an organisation which differs from its constituting 
members. The theory provides the conceptual basis for the evolution of corporation 
under the common law as well as the fundamental attributes of English company law 
which has been transplanted to Nigeria, such as legal personality itself, the law on 
fiduciary duty of directors (owed to “the company”) and the law on minority 
protection (where it is “the company” which is the proper plaintiff in most 
circumstances).
87
 It is credited as sufficiently explaining the underlying organisation 
characteristics of legal person, and explains the relationship between the organisation 
and its members. This theory is reflected in company law jurisprudence which 
recognises this underlying organisation. 
The artificial entity theory views the corporation as a privilege granted by the state 
creating the artificial entity (concession). Under this understanding, the state is 
allowing this privilege for public benefit. Thus, where a company fails to operate in 
that manner, the artificial entity should be disregarded. This is the basis of veil 
piercing doctrine in corporation by the courts. As pointed out by Maurice Wormser, 
state’s sufferance of the corporate form carried with it strong responsibilities, the 
shirking of which ought to result in the denial of corporate privilege.
88
 He further 
wrote: 
A corporate entity will not be ignored at law and equity simply 
because the number of stockholders is few, or even one, unless the 
circumstances are such that would warrant the same disregard of the 
entity were there ten thousand shareholders... When the conception of 
corporate entity is employed to defraud creditors, to evade an existing 
obligation, to circumvent statute, or advertise or perpetuate a 
monopoly, or to protect knavery or crime, the courts will draw aside 
the web of entity, will regard the corporate company as an association 
of live, up-and doing, men and woman shareholders, and will do 
justice between real person.
89
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Although Wormser’s position has been criticised for relying very much on the 
discretion of individual judges and thus creating uncertainty for third parties, his 
view agrees with the premise of this research which is to find ways and means of 
dealing with those who abuse the   corporate form under the guise of recognition of 
separate corporate personality and limited liability given to members of the 
corporation. 
Again, the right to incorporate a corporation remains a privilege granted by the state, 
even if that privilege is exercised through the companies’ legislation rather than 
through specific consents.
90
 Indeed, Maitland considered that the Companies Act, 
rather than reducing the role of the state in controlling the existence of non-state 
groupings, actually increased it.
91
 Indeed, it is impossible for a corporation to come 
into being in the UK today without being incorporated, which is an act of the state. 
92
 
The recognition that a corporation is a separate legal entity in its own right is the 
foundation of modern corporate law.
93
 Support for the principle of the separateness 
of legal personality, shared among academic commentators, has been unbroken in 
legislative and judicial circles. Similarly, the judiciary has, with minor exceptions, 
consistently reaffirmed the need to treat this legal doctrine seriously.
94
 In other 
words, since the decision in Salomon’s case, the complete separation of the company 
and its members has never been seriously doubted.
95
 The ruling has, with few 
exceptions, stood the test of time.
96
 
In sum, the independent legal personality of the company is fundamental to the 
whole operation of business through companies. This legal concept affects its 
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structure, existence, capacity, power, rights and liabilities. Although a company is a 
legal entity and has an independent legal personality, it is, of course, an artificial 
person or entity. Therefore, all the operations and activities have to be carried on by 
its organs and agents.
97
 
However to hold that a company is attributable to an individual is a legal fiction; a 
company has no separate existence other than in the contemplation of law. 
2.4 Corporate Personality Confirmed: The Salomon Case 
The unanimous decision of the House of Lords in the famous case of Salomon v 
Salomon,
98
 which is generally regarded as the cornerstone of English company law, 
established, or at least confirmed the principle that a company has a distinct legal 
personality with certain rights and duties, capable of owning property, entering into 
contract and suing and being sued. The rule in Salomon lies at the heart of corporate 
personality.  
The facts of this case, which is known throughout the British Commonwealth and 
beyond were that one Mr Salomon carried on a business as a leather merchant.
99
 In 
1892, he formed the company Salomon & Co. Ltd. Mr Salomon, his wife and five of 
his children (who were nominal members) held one share each in the company.
100
 
Additionally, Salomon got £10,000 worth of secured debenture and £9,000 cash 
which represented the cost of sale of his private business to Salomon & Co. On 
being liquidated following collapse of the business, the company was able to pay 
debenture holders but not all unsecured creditors.
101
 The question that arose on being 
taken to court was whether Salomon was the same person as Salomon & Co. so as to 
prevent him from taking priority over unsecured creditors. The claimants succeeded 
at both the High Court
102
 and the Court of Appeal whereupon Salomon was found 
personally liable for the debts of the company. On further appeal to the House of 
Lords
103
, the decision of the Court of Appeal was overruled. The conclusion of the 
House of Lords was that Salomon & Co, having been validly formed, enjoyed 
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separate legal personality from Salomon and as such Salomon was not responsible 
for the company’s debt.104 
The company was not Salomon’s agent and, consequently, Salomon’s liability was 
to be determined solely by reference to the Companies Act 1862. 
 In the words of Lord Macnaghten: 
When the memorandum is duly signed and registered, though there be 
only seven shares taken, the subscribers are a body corporate 
“capable” forthwith’, of exercising all the functions of incorporated 
company”. Those are strong words; there is no period of minority on 
its birth, no interval of incapacity. I cannot understand how a body 
corporate such  as this made  capable by statute can lose individually 
by issuing the bulk of its capital to one person, whether he be  a 
subscriber to the memorandum or not. The company is at law 
different person altogether from the subscriber... Nor are the members 
(subscribers) liable…105 
 
In short, the House of Lords position was that the fact that some of the shareholders 
are only holding shares as a technicality was irrelevant; the registration procedure 
could be used by an individual to carry on what was in effect a one-man business. 
Again, a company formed in compliance with the regulations of the Acts was a 
separate person and not the agent or trustee of its controller.
106
 As a result, the debts 
of the company were its own and not those of members.
107
 The member’s liability 
was limited to the amount prescribed in the Companies Act-i.e. the amount they 
invested. 
The Salomon case was a struggle between form and substance; whether to interpret 
the law literally or whether to consider more its presumed spirit and intention. Was a 
genuine association of seven proprietors really necessary to form a company, or 
would six nominees holding shares for the seventh suffice? Could a paper company 
really transact with the beneficial owner of its shares? The Lords accepted that if the 
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form of the company is within the letter of the law they would not look behind it to 
the substance.
108
 
Thus the legal personality of the company affects its structure, existence, capacity, 
powers, rights and liabilities. Little wonder then that, Viscount Haldane L.C, in 
holding the same reasoning stated in Lennards Carrying Co. v Asiatic Petroleum 
Ltd
109
 thus: 
A corporation is an abstraction, it has no mind of its own any more 
than it has a body of its own; its active and directive will must 
consequently be sought in the person of somebody who for some 
purposes may be called agent but who is really the directing mind and 
will of the corporation, the very ego and centre of personality of the 
corporation. 
 
The significance of the House of Lords decision was that it supports the artificial 
entity view of the corporation and gave formal approval to shift in ideas about what 
“the company” was and about the uses it could be put. Today Salomon’s case is 
commonly cited as authority for the notion of separate legal entity. In fact this 
principle was already established by the time the case had come to court;
110
 the 
House of Lords merely gave the imprimatur of high opinion to the notion.  
The decision of the House of Lords is not without both positive and negative effects. 
As Goulding explains, the reason for criticism of Salomon’s case is two-fold.111 
First, the decision gives incorporators the benefit of limited liability in order to 
encourage them to initiate or carry on trade or business. Second, the decision affords 
opportunities to unscrupulous promoters of private companies to abuse the 
advantages that the corporations Act gives them by achieving “water-thin” 
incorporation of an undercapitalised company. This position appears to be true as it 
is evident that limited liability attracts small traders to the corporate form not 
because it represents an effective device with which to raise capital, but because it 
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gives them access to an avenue via which they can escape the “tyranny of unlimited 
liability”.112 Criticisms of limited liability are addressed at its impact on creditors 
and on society at large.
113
 
Separate legal personality and limited liability of members of corporations as held in 
Salomon’s case applies in Nigeria.114 
2.4.1 Implications of Salomon’s Case  
The principle of the Salomon case,
115
 which establishes that a company is a legal 
entity distinct from its members, is strictly applied by the courts whenever it is 
sought to attribute the rights or liabilities of a company as belonging in law to its 
shareholders, or regard the property of a company as belonging in law or equity to 
the shareholders.
116
 Thus, the fact that one shareholder controls all of or virtually all 
of the shares in a company is not sufficient reason for ignoring the legal personality 
of a company.
117
 Furthermore, a company cannot be characterised as an agent of its 
shareholder unless there is clear evidence to show that the company was in fact 
acting as the agent in a particular transaction or series of transactions.
118
  Likewise, 
the property of a company in no sense belongs to its members.
119
 The company is 
not a trustee of its property for its shareholder even where the directors have been 
appointed trustees of some or all of the shares in a company.
120
 A shareholder does 
not have an insurable interest in the assets of the company as restated in the case of 
Macaura v Northern Assurance Co. Ltd.
121
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The obvious lesson drawn from this case is that the company as a separate legal 
entity owns its own property and there is no legal connection between a share in the 
company and the company’s property. Shareholders generally benefit from this 
because it facilitated limited liability, as the company also owns its debt. The 
shareholders in any company cannot exercise any rights in respect of property owned 
by their company simply because they have no estate or interest in that property. 
Conversely, as established by Salomon’s case, 122  the company has no estate or 
interest in the property of its members.   
The artificial entity theory is also reflected in Nigerian company law jurisprudence. 
Indeed, separate legal personality and limited liability of members of corporations as 
held in Salomon’s case applies in Nigeria. For instance, section 37 of the Companies 
and Allied Matters Act 2004
123
 reflects the separate legal existence which accrues to 
a company once it has been incorporated. Section 37 of the Act provides as follows: 
As from the date of incorporation mentioned in the certificate of 
incorporation the subscribers of the memorandum together with such 
other person as may, from time to time become members of the 
company, shall be a body corporate by the name contained in the 
memorandum capable forthwith of exercising all the powers and  
functions of an incorporated company including the power to hold 
land, and having perpetual succession and a common seal, but , with 
such liability on the part of such members to contribute to the assets 
of  the company in the event of its wound up as mentioned in the act. 
 
Therefore, the legal personality of a corporate body can only be established as a 
matter of law by production in evidence of the certificate of incorporation. 
Independent of its members, a company is now capable of exercising its powers as a 
body corporate.
124
  
The courts in Nigeria have similarly, and without hesitation, acknowledged the 
separate existence of a company. In Marina Nominees Ltd v F.I.B.R
125
, the Appellant 
sought to avoid its corporate liability by claiming to be an agent of another company. 
Rejecting this, the Supreme Court observed inter alia, that- 
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......the device of agency by using one incorporated company for the 
purpose of carrying on an assignment for another company or person 
must not overlook the fact that an incorporated company is a separate 
legal entity which must fulfil its own obligation under the law.   
 
2.4.2 Company Contracts 
As with individuals, companies can enter into contracts. However, there is a 
complication in the analogy with natural persons because a contract requires 
consensus ad idem (i.e., a, meeting of minds), and yet a company has no mind or will 
of its own. However, companies can be regarded as persons in the limited sense that 
they can do everything that natural persons may do through others. Furthermore, 
companies may also be deemed to have knowledge or notice. 
The cases considered thus far also provide authority for the proposition that a 
company may contract with its shareholders and directors. Lee v Lee’s Air Farming 
Ltd
126
develops this point. In this case, it was held that Lee, who formed a company 
in which he was beneficial owner of all the shares and was also “governing director”, 
was nevertheless a separate entity from his company and that he, as governing 
director, could, on behalf of the company, give orders to himself as servant.  
Lee’s case explains the fact that a company in exercise of its independent mind as a 
legal person to control the company can make a valid and effective contract with one 
of its members. It is therefore possible for a person to be at the same time wholly in 
control of a company (as its principal shareholder and sole director) and employee of 
that company, the latter acting in an independent capacity. This epitomises the fact 
that the company as an artificial entity is distinct from its members and can validly 
enter into contract with those that constitute it. It confirms Salomon v Salomon & 
Co. Ltd in making it clear that the number of shareholders and the nature of their 
interests in the company are irrelevant to any issues relating to, or derived from, the 
proper recognition and separation of the company as a legal entity.
127Lee’s case also 
epitomises the separation of a company’s contractual and other proprietary rights and 
liabilities from those of its members and reiterates the principle, which tends to have 
universal effect, that the proprietary, contractual and other powers which a company 
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may possess are in no sense derivative from or dependent upon its members.
128
 In 
this connection, the company as an artificial person is an entity possessing 
independently of its membership the legal capacity to exercise proprietary, 
contractual and other powers. As such, even though Lee is a Governing director, the 
company is in law an entirely separate entity. Lee, as a manager, was not therefore 
controlling himself as an employee; instead, and as an employee, he was being 
controlled by the company through its director. When the company’s existence and 
rights were recognised in this way Lee’s status as “a worker” within the meaning of 
the law was no different from that of other employees. 
In the Nigerian case of Aso Motel Kaduna Ltd v Deyamo
129
, the appellant, a 
company wholly owned by the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) 
established by section 3 of the Federal Capital Territory Act, Cap, 128 Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria, 1990 and carrying on hotel and catering services in Kaduna 
State of Nigeria, was in default of payment in respect of several cartons of fish, 
turkey and chicken supplied to it on credit by the respondent. In an action brought 
against it under the undefended list for the sum of N969, 750 (nine hundred and 
sixty-nine thousand, seven hundred and fifty naira) being the principal amount and 
interest accrued, the appellant sought for an order setting aside the judgment of the 
trial court entered against it and for the Court of Appeal to strike out the suit for want 
of jurisdiction on the grounds that the appellant was an agent of the Federal 
Government. 
Dismissing the appeal, the court held (among other things) that the company is in 
law a different person from the subscribers; it held that the fact of incorporation 
entails that the company has a distinct personality and distinct identity from its 
shareholders, subscribers and promoters. As such, it was not deemed an agent of its 
shareholders, meaning that the appellant cannot be held to be an agency of the 
Federal Government of Nigeria even if all its shares are wholly owned by that 
Government. 
The question of whether a party, in his private capacity, can be made to indemnify 
another for the wrongful acts of a company of which he is a director and when the 
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said company is in breach of a contract to pay money on sale of goods was answered 
in the negative by the Nigerian Supreme Court in Okafor v. A.C.B Ltd & Anor.
130
  
The facts leading to this case involved a claim by the African Continental Bank Ltd. 
(as plaintiffs) against Widi Jalo (as defendant) for money lent by the Bank to the said 
Jallo. The loan was made for the settlement of the purchase price of cement bought 
by a company known as Ekhanatone Ltd. from another company known as Misr 
(Nigeria) Ltd. On the application of Widi Jallo, Okafor was joined as a third-party by 
the court. Widi Jallo later admitted to the plaintiff claim but subsequently claimed 
contribution from Okafor in the third party proceedings which followed. 
The learned trial judge gave judgment for the plaintiffs in their claim against Widi 
Jallo. In the third party proceedings for contribution brought against Okafor, the 
learned trial judge observed that Okafor was a joint adventurer with both Widi Jallo 
and Mikawi in the cement deal and that the loan, which is the subject matter of the 
plaintiff’s claim, was advanced by the plaintiffs to Widi Jallo for the settlement of 
the purchase price of cement sold by Misr (Nig) Ltd to them. He then made 
contribution against Okafor. 
The third party, Okafor, appealed against this order for contribution. In coming to the 
conclusion that a company is a separate entity from the person who owned it, the 
court held that the party who should reimburse Widi Jallo for the payment and who 
should have been called upon to indemnify him is Ekhnatone Ltd and not Okafor. 
The court further held that the parties (whoever they are) formed Ekhnatone Ltd. for 
the purpose of the business with Misr (Nig) Ltd. and Widi Jallo paid the money, not 
on behalf of himself and Okafor, but on behalf of Ekhnatone Ltd. 
2.4.3 Perpetual Succession 
The separate legal existence of a company presupposes that changes in membership 
have no effect on its status or existence. This is a major advantage of the 
incorporation of a company which other business enterprises such as partnership do 
not enjoy. Thus, with an incorporated company freedom to transfer of members’ 
interest, both legally and practically can be readily attained. The company can be 
incorporated with its liability limited by shares, and these shares constitute items of 
property which are freely transferable in the absence of express provision to the 
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contrary, and in such a way the transferor drops out
131
 and the transferee steps into 
his shoes. 
 As an abstract legal person, the company cannot die, although its existence can be 
brought to an end through the winding up procedure. As pointed out by Gower, a 
company is not susceptible to the thousand natural shocks that flesh is heir to.
132
 It 
cannot become incapacitated by illness, mental or physical, and it has not (or need 
not have) an allotted span of life.
133
 The death of a member leaves the company 
unmoved; members may come and go but the company can go on forever. 
From the combination of these principles flow all the well-known practical aspects 
of separate legal entity. For example, due to its separate proprietary and other 
capacity the company may enjoy perpetual existence as an artificial entity recognised 
by law, its usefulness as an entity for accounting purposes is given a legal 
foundation, and the possibility is opened that its members may limit their liability.  
2.5 Concept of Limited Liability 
Although the doctrine of separate legal personality of the company and limited 
liability are distinct in origin, for the most part in business companies they go hand 
in hand. Salomon’s case held that a company’s property is not the property of the 
members and its debts are not the debts of the members. As such, and in combination 
with the principle of separate corporate identity, the principles have lent themselves 
to the concept of limited liability. Of course, it is for the company at the time of 
incorporation, to determine the liability of its shareholders and this is a matter 
removed from its corporate personality status. Also, a company can have legal 
personality without limited liability if that is how it is conferred by the statute.
134
 
However, companies formed for business purposes in practice invariably give the 
shareholders the benefit of limited liability. Consequently, for a variety of reasons 
including shareholders security and economic efficiency, most companies in the UK 
and in Nigeria, are limited by shares so that members may limit their level of 
investment. A person dealing with a company is dealing with a company as a 
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separate entity alone and the liabilities of members are limited by the amount they 
invested. Indeed, company as separate entity with liabilities of members limited 
create potential problems of abuse.  
The limited liability company as a separate legal entity is a creation of statute and a 
key feature of the corporation. It is a privilege and concession of the state conferred 
on corporations for public interest, first in England in 1855 after much struggle
135
 
and then by subsequent legislations.  
The legal existence of a company (corporation) means that it can be responsible for 
its own debts.
136
  In a limited liability company, the liability of individual members 
is limited to the amount of money which each has agreed to contribute to the 
common capital fund. As soon as the person has paid for the amount of shares he has 
agreed to subscribe to, his liability is ended.
137
 This invariably encourages 
investment and insulates the members from paying for the debt of the company 
beyond their investment in the case of failure. By contrast, in a partnership which is 
governed by the Partnership Act 1890,
138
 Partnership law 1973,
139
 Partnership law 
1976,
140
 and Partnership law  of 1959,
141
 members are liable to an unlimited extent 
to the last penny of their private fortune in order to meet the debts and obligations of 
the business.
142
 
Limited liability presupposes that shareholders are under no obligation to the 
company or its creditors beyond their obligations on a par with the value of their 
shares or under their guarantee in case of a company limited by guarantee.
143
 
Analysed from two perspectives, limited liability, from a shareholder standpoint, is 
essentially set up to “restrict” shareholders’ liability in order to contribute their own 
assets to the assets of the company in the event of its assets being insufficient to 
meet the claims of the creditors during liquidation”.144 Within Nigeria and in the UK, 
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either in a company limited by shares, or in a company limited by guarantee, no 
contribution is required from any member exceeding the amount (if any) unpaid on 
the shares or the amount undertaken  to be contributed by him to the company’s 
assets in the event of its wound up.
145
However, when a company with a share capital 
is wound up, “every member of the company is liable (in addition to the amount so 
undertaken to be contributed to the assets), to contribute to the extent of any sums 
unpaid on shares held by him.”146 
Although a company is “an artificial being, invisible, intangible and existing only in 
the contemplation of the law”,147 it is the company itself, rather than shareholders, 
that is responsible for the company’s debts. It is the liability of the members to 
contribute to meeting those debts which are limited.
148
 
From the creditor’s viewpoint, their claims are limited to the assets of the company 
and cannot be asserted against the shareholders’ assets.149 The importance of limited 
liability shows itself in the legal relationship between the company and its 
shareholders if the company becomes insolvent because it has insufficient assets to 
meet the overall claims of the creditors.
150
 In that situation, it is the company itself 
which bears unlimited liabilities for its debts, while its shareholders only assume the 
limited loss of their investment which has already been contributed to the company 
at the start. 
 Limited liability results in the shifting of the risks of entrepreneurship from 
shareholders to creditors.
151
 If the company does well, the gains are passed on to the 
shareholders. But if the company fails, the creditors will suffer the losses.
152
 The 
limited liability concept is aimed at giving investors minimum insurance in their 
business over their own private lives. Thus, creditors who have claims against the 
company may look only to the corporate assets for the satisfaction of their claims as 
creditors and generally cannot proceed against the personal or separate assets of the 
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members. This has the effect of capping the investors risk whilst their potential for 
gain is unlimited.  The rationale for limited liability according to Davies, lie 
essentially in the encouragement of public investment whilst facilitating public 
markets in shares.
153
 
2.5.1 Justifications for Limited Liability 
The limited liability company has been described as the flagship of the modern 
capitalist economy and the vehicle for economic expansion.
154
  The limited liability 
company stimulates economic growth by significantly removing an individual 
shareholder and/ or director from the economic risks associated with business failure, 
thereby increasing the incentive for individuals to engage in business activity.
155
 
From this view, limited liability is a means to motivate the market supposedly to the 
advantage of the public good.
156
 
Kraakman argues that limited liability has become a nearly universal feature of the 
corporate form and that its evolution indicates strongly the value of limited liability 
as a contracting tool and financing device.
157
 According to him, limited liability is a 
(strong) form of ‘owner shielding’ as opposed to ‘entity shielding’158 which legal 
personality provides. He argues that while entity shielding protects the assets of the 
firm from the creditors of the firms owners, limited liability protects the assets of the 
firm’s owners from the firm’s creditors and both set up a regime of what he 
describes as ‘asset partitioning’ whereby business assets are pledged as security to 
business creditors, while the personal assets of the business’s owners are reserved for 
the owners’ creditors.159 
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel in their classic work of law and economic 
scholarship, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, argue that limited liability 
reduces transaction costs and enhances the efficient and smooth running of the 
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securities markets.
160
 This in turn lowers the costs of capital, which in turn increases 
economic output and the public welfare.
161
 They advance six reasons: (1) Limited 
liability reduces the entity’s and its shareholders’ need to monitor its agents, which 
makes passive investing and diversification a more rational strategy, reducing the 
costs of operating the entity.
162
 (2) Limited liability reduces the need to monitor 
other shareholders to see whether they can properly bear the risks the entity plans to 
or is undertaking.
163
 (3) Limited liability promotes the free transfer of shares, which 
creates incentives for managers to act efficiently since the results of their inefficient 
actions will be punished by the market.
164
 (4) Limited liability makes shares 
homogenous commodities that reflect all the information publicly available about the 
entity. In situations of unlimited liability, not all shareholders would be able to 
access relevant risk information, and would thus value the share price differently. 
When all investors can trade on the same terms, investors will know the price 
reflects all information.
165
 (5) Limited liability allows for more efficient 
diversification of one’s assets. In a regime of unlimited liability, the rational strategy 
would be to minimize one’s holdings since any one holding could explode and force 
one into bankruptcy. Diversification is desirable since it is a much safer strategy and 
will induce investors to put more capital into the markets; investors will be able to 
better balance their risks.
166
 (6) Limited liability prevents managers from becoming 
unduly risk averse.
167
 
The arguments above on the justification for limited liability are based on purely 
efficiency–based rationales or how to make the company grow. This seems to have 
neglected the potential for abuse such as fraud which may result from the concept. 
Corporate statutes all confer limited liability in general terms.
168
 There is no 
distinction between contract and tort - based claims or between closely-held or 
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public corporations. This is very important because while transactions based on 
contract reflect a voluntary assumption of risk by parties entering into it, tort 
creditors are not party to any transaction and as such the risk is totally involuntary. 
As can also be seen below, the risk factor is greater in closely held companies than in 
public corporations
169
 largely because of the nature and control of those 
corporations. This point relating to contract will further be developed in subsequent 
chapters. 
2.5.2 Consequences of Limited Liability 
Despite the benefits of limited liability, it presents certain obvious consequences. 
First, limited liability encourages shareholders to seek opportunities and embark on 
excessively risky investments which tend to impair the efficiency of the capital 
markets. Although, risk is an ingredient in the generation of economic growth, the 
downside of risk is that it encourages continued trade in circumstances where the 
health of an enterprise is critical, to the point of fatality. Shareholders have an 
incentive to allow the company to undertake excessively risky ventures without 
adequate assets to carry the risk because they will gain all the resultant benefit but 
will not bear the high risk of failure since the risk has been externalised.
170
 This 
shareholders’ incentive to enlarge outcome in terms of profitability of the whole 
enterprise without taking correspondent responsibilities by transferring risk to 
creditors seriously impairs creditor’s benefit. This can be regarded as a moral 
hazard
171
 for the whole of society in terms of both undermining creditor’s confidence 
and providing an incentive to encourage economic growth through the 
instrumentality of the corporation.  
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Another potential cost of limited liability could be most evident when those who 
benefit from limited liability also have control of the company’s management. This 
has led to a situation whereby shareholders may be tempted to use their power of 
control in an opportunistic
172
 manner so as to benefit themselves. A common 
behaviour in this regard is the tendency to shift assets into the company when they 
need to raise credit and out of the company when the time comes for repayment. This 
practice is clearly evident in small companies or what is called close corporations 
where the shareholders and directors may be the same people, so that the control of 
the company is directly in the hands of the beneficiaries of limited liability.
173
 
Again, ever since the House of Lords handed down its decision in Salomon’s case, 
legal doctrine regards each corporation as a separate legal entity. When coupled with 
the consequent attribute of limited liability, the principle provides an ideal vehicle 
for fraud.
174
 Because of its malleability and facility for protecting directors and 
members against the claims of creditors, the corporate form has been responsible for 
the development of many different forms of fraudulent or anti-social activity. A 
typical illustration involves the situation where a small group of persons set up a 
limited liability company that is undercapitalised. The owners then cause the 
corporation to incur large debts in its own name, with little prospect of being able to 
repay the loans. When the company’s creditors seek repayment of the debts, the 
owners argue that because the company as a separate legal person owes the debt, 
neither the directors nor members are liable.
175
 
Thus when discussing the limits of limited liability, Easterbrook and Fischel also 
differentiate between smaller and larger firms, and parent and subsidiary firms.
176
 
They claim that in smaller firms, usually called “close corporations”, there is much 
less separation between management and risk bearing. Since the suppliers of capital 
for small firms also tend to be involved in decision making, limited liability does not 
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reduce monitoring costs as much. Additionally, since close corporation shares are 
not freely tradable, the other benefits of limited liability such as facilitating efficient 
risk bearing and monitoring by secondary markets are absent. Finally, managers in 
close corporations, have a greater incentive to engage in overly risky projects than 
managers in public corporations since they have less to lose.
177
 Subsidiary firms, like 
close corporations, have a greater moral hazard problem than public corporations.
178
 
This is the case because allowing creditors to reach the assets of a parent does not 
create unlimited liability for any investor. Easterbrook and Fischel argue that this 
extra liability defence creates an incentive for subsidiary managers to engage in 
overly risky endeavours, or to engage in risks greater than they would if the 
subsidiary were an independent organization.
179
 As a result of the above differences 
they find a stronger justification for limited liability in large corporations than in 
small firms or subsidiaries. 
Easterbrook and Fischel conclude their analysis of the limits of liability with the 
observation that the moral hazard inherent in limited liability will sometimes lead the 
courts to set aside the protections of limited liability.
180
 They argue that the 
traditional doctrines advanced for piercing the corporate veil are “obscure,” 
“arbitrary,” and “singularly unhelpful”.181 
This raises the question whether limited liability for shareholders should be forsaken 
in favour of a new more appropriate standard which in the words of Dobson might 
be: “liability derives from control”.182 This would mean that whenever there is a 
finding of company control, liability for the debts of the controlled company should 
be placed on the controller when the corporate form has been abused, the company 
being used as an instrument of fraud or a “sham” or “facade”, that the company is 
the agent of the shareholder, that the companies are part of a “single economic unit” 
or even that the “interests of justice” require the result.183 
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Commentators have further examined the economic effects and justifications of 
limited liability, exploring alternative regimes which includes but are not limited to 
the suggestion for an unlimited liability as it pertains to involuntary creditors.
184
 
Limited liability has been criticized, for example, on the basis of moral hazard,
185
 its 
propensity to encourage excessive risk-taking at the expense of creditors.
186
 Against 
this position, it has been argued that the abolition of limited liability would not 
obviate the problem of moral hazard and that ultimately a trade-off is involved, 
under which the benefits of limited liability, in facilitating separation of investment 
and management functions and in enhancing the efficiency of capital markets, 
outweigh its deficiencies.
187
 This work holds the former view, and will go further to 
posit the notion that shareholders’ protection in corporate matters has unduly been 
exploited to the detriment of creditors in Nigeria and thus there is the need to strike a 
better balance between them and the creditors. 
In addition to the negative aspects of limited liability outlined above, the concept of 
limited liability may be attacked on other fronts. First, the ease by which private 
limited liability companies can be incorporated encourages undercapitalised 
concerns, so endangering small trade creditors, consumers and tort victims, the law 
frequently depriving the creditor, the consumer or the injured party of remedy.
188
  
Limited liability appears especially deficient when it serves to bar recovery for 
corporate injuries to certain persons such as involuntary creditors and the fact that it 
creates serious externalities and inefficiencies in particular areas is evident in these 
categories of persons mentioned above.  
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2.5.3 Impact of Limited Liability on Creditors 
Creditors in spite of their recognition as key participants in corporate affairs have 
remained a vulnerable group both in the UK and Nigeria. Their vulnerability has 
been attributed largely to the unique nature of the company as business vehicle 
characterised by separate legal personality and limited liability which creates 
externalities and uncompensated risk to them whilst insulating shareholders or those 
who own, run and manage the affairs of the company from liability in the event of 
corporate failure.
189
 Members of the company by virtue of the limitation of their 
liability are not required by law to contribute their own capital to satisfy the 
company’s obligations except if there is any amount unpaid in their shares. 
Consequently, creditors whose claims have not been satisfied by the company, 
cannot, in principle, proceed against the personal property of shareholders. Whilst 
voluntary creditors can adequately maintain action against the company for return of 
their credit, and notwithstanding the risk involved in the event of corporate failure, 
such action by the involuntary creditors has remained enmeshed in a great deal of 
controversy and in most cases has proved unsuccessful.
190
 
2.5.3.1    Who is a Creditor? 
Creditors of a company are those who, by their relationship with the company, 
advance credit or perform services for the company under a contract to whom the 
latter owe an obligation.
191
 However, this definition is not all encompassing as, 
within the context of company law, creditors include not only those who lend money 
or perform services to the company under contractual terms such as banks, trade 
creditors, customers and employees but also those who do not have any relationship 
with the company but are victims of corporate actions such as tort victims or 
innocent third parties. Thus creditors are broadly divided into two types. These are 
voluntary creditors representing those who have a relationship with the company 
based on contract and those generally referred as to as involuntary creditors i.e. 
victims of tort.  The two combined together make up what is called company 
creditors. They include customers, consumers, and employees, lenders including 
banks and financial institutions and tort creditors. 
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2.5.3.2    Voluntary Creditors 
Three groups of creditors have emerged as those constituting voluntary creditor.
192
 
The first are trade creditors who supply goods and services to companies and then 
advance credit by not requiring immediate payment. The second consists of 
institutional lenders such as banks who lend money to companies. A key method of 
bank lending is the overdraft, which allows a company to borrow by overdrawing on 
a bank account. The third class is composed of creditors whose right to payment is 
evidenced by a certificate the company has issued. This group of persons are called 
debenture holders. Creditors get returns on their investment by way of yield or 
interest and the contract it maintains with the company ultimately stipulates the 
terms of repayment or maturity of yield.
193
 
The relationship between a company and its creditors as pointed out earlier is largely 
contractual in nature and gives the creditors different rights from those of the 
shareholders who are members of the company. Consequently, the debt owed them is 
by the company and not the shareholders. However, they rank ahead of any claims 
which the shareholders have against the company. This is particularly evident in 
times of liquidation when creditors have priority over shareholders since the debt 
owed must be paid before any assets can be distributed to the members.
194
 
Since the creditors enter into contract with the company “in substantial awareness of 
the risk of injury involved”, it has been argued that they have to take the 
consequences of the risk involved if the company fails to meet its obligation. In view 
of the potential problem they face in contracting with the company, creditors have 
taken some protective or “self-help” measures to protect their interest by negotiating 
favourable terms in the contract, insisting on guarantee or security and other self-
help mechanisms. These include getting adequate information about the financial 
stability of the company before initiating a transaction or exerting a premium 
payment in exchange for accepting the risk involved in the investment.
195
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For the big lenders such as banks, in particular, they can ask for higher interest rate 
as compensation for not only the money lent, but also for the risk they stand to face 
in the event of default in payment.
196
 Not only can they charge adequate interest 
rates, but they can also insert loan covenants. These agreements may for instance 
generally restrict the freedom of borrowers to distribute assets to shareholders
197
 or 
may prohibit distributions when financed by issuing debt.
198
 They may also require 
compliance with a specific debt-to-equity ratio or a particular cash flow 
development.
199
 Creditors can also include in the contract a requirement that would 
entail the company to furnish them with regular financial information.
200
 Over all, 
loan covenants tends to provide some control rights to creditors, so that the risk of 
default is not opportunistically higher than it was at the time of contracting. In 
addition to the above, creditors can still request for security in form of a charge or a 
floating charge which will crystallize due to the manner set out in the contract.
201
 
Obtaining security for these big creditors has the tendency of reducing their financial 
exposure as they are given a privileged position if the debtor becomes insolvent. 
However, it is not a viable option for many creditors, especially the smaller ones, as 
the costs and time involved in organising security could well mean that their profit 
margins are grossly depleted.
202
 It is also most likely that they will not be familiar 
with the necessary arrangements for the taking, and the benefits, of security. 
In terms of close corporation setting, where statutory limited liability may have only 
limited value, many creditors, especially banks and other lenders as well as many 
suppliers, require a personal guarantee from the corporation’s shareholders.203  
For trade creditors who supply goods and services to the company in return for full 
or instalment  payments at a later date, their position seems precarious as they do not 
request personal guarantees from shareholders and lack the skill and capacity like the 
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big lenders to gather enough information about the transaction before bargaining and 
spreading risk. Again, they do not have an incentive to spend considerable time and 
resources for exhaustive negotiations with a company, since they do not extend huge 
amount of credit. Competitive pressures can even cause them to shy away from 
demanding the contractual protection they might value.
204
  And because they provide 
goods and services to a great number of customers, trade creditors do not negotiate 
terms with each of them separately. Instead, they make use of standard forms of 
contract.
205
 In consequence, therefore, what emerges is the use of standard forms of 
uniform terms which apply to all contracts in order to save transaction costs. 
Following these inadequacies of lack of bargaining skills and widespread use of 
standard for contracts, trade creditors rarely embark upon an investigation of the 
creditworthiness of a particular company.
206
  To this extent, trade creditors remain 
the most vulnerable group among the voluntary creditors.  
In view of the above, the question whether trade creditors are voluntary or 
involuntary creditors has been a subject matter of debate among commentators with 
no agreement on their status. For Blumberg, trade creditors “are simply not in 
business to bargain for credit”.207 On the contrary, Easterbook and Fischel regard 
them as voluntary creditors able to demand compensation for the risk that they 
face.
208
 Since the trade creditors have a clear relationship with the company in terms 
of goods and services supplied, it is difficult to put them in the class of involuntary 
creditors. It is submitted that trade creditors are voluntary creditors notwithstanding 
the perceived anomalies in their transactions with the company. 
Nonetheless, some form of protection still exists for trade creditors. This may come 
in the form of higher prices for goods supplied or the inclusion of retention of title 
clauses in their contracts with the company.
209
 The retention of title clauses meant, in 
effect, that goods supplied to the company are subject to the reservation of title to the 
seller until the payment of the price thereof. Although this procedure is widely in use 
in most of continental Europe and in the US for a long time, it became an acceptable 
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feature in the UK in 1975 following the decision in Aluminium Industries Vaassen 
Bv v. Romalpa Aluminium Ltd.
210
 Thereafter, such clauses became known as 
“Romalpa clauses”. In Nigeria, such clauses are not readily available in the absence 
of any authority. However, there is an implied term in the contract that the 
reversionary interest in the goods supplied still remains with the seller until payment 
is made. In any event, the perceived protection afforded by retention of title clauses 
to trade creditors is neither comprehensive nor always effective. Its operation seems 
to be in favour of sellers of goods and not those who perform some services to the 
company. Besides, their validity is not always upheld.
211
 This is largely because, in 
most cases, the courts treat them like charges with the effect that their non 
registration renders them valueless, as against a Receiver or a liquidator.
212
  
From the above, it is submitted that creditors, particularly trade or small creditors, 
bear enormous risk from the effects of limited liability who lack the capacity to 
negotiate and elicit favourable terms from the company. The risk of a company’s 
failure is shifted to them and the likelihood that they will take enough measures to 
avoid such risk remains largely remote. To this extent, limited liability remains a 
potential source of danger to this class of creditor.  
2.5.3.3    Involuntary Creditor 
Involuntary creditors refer to persons who become creditors of the company not by 
agreement or contract with the company but by virtue of the company’s action or 
omission to them.
213
 Accordingly, since they never wanted to become a creditor of 
the company, they are inherently weak or non-adjusting.
214
 The class of persons who 
fall under this category are essentially victims of accident and consumers. Unlike the 
voluntary creditors, involuntary creditors do not have any opportunity to assess the 
possible dangers as regards the company or bargain for personal guarantees or other 
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protection in the absence of contract with the company.
215
 They are therefore not in a 
position to avoid or monitor the risk to which the company is exposing them.
216
 
In view of the externalisation of risk against these kinds of creditors arising from 
negligent or otherwise tortious conduct of the company, commentators have argued 
that limited liability should not apply to them.
217
 Some of these commentators have 
even argued, nonetheless, that the present regime of limited liability which places 
tort victims in a precarious state should be reformed in a manner which can enable 
them to recover from the shareholders personally.
218
 The degree and scope of this 
reform is yet to be determined. It is submitted here that one way the problem of tort 
creditors can be addressed is for the company to take out insurance as to cover in the 
event of such a problem occurring. However, since the risk is unforeseen, the mere 
probability that the company itself may be insured against a great dimension of 
potential tort events does not satisfactorily protect potential tort victims, unless the 
company is obliged to be insured, as in the case of car accidents. Alternatively, well 
considered public policy judgment to protect tort creditors should be made to sort out 
issues arising from such problems. Public order and safety should discourage the 
deliberate disregard of the safety of third parties through the provision of limited 
liability.  
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the theoretical foundation for corporate personality and for 
dealing with the questions raised in the thesis. Among the theories of corporate 
personality discussed, the thesis favours the artificial entity theory and its variant of 
concession theory. This is premised on the fact that it provides a clear basis for 
understanding the nature and existence of modern corporations and justification for 
action to tackle abuse of the corporate form. 
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The chapter further reveals that the fact that a company is treated as a separate entity, 
as well as the limitation of liability of members poses a difficulty in terms of dealing 
with a company. Indeed, this difficulty has resulted in abuse of the corporate form as 
a vehicle for transacting business. This identified problem will be further discussed 
in subsequent chapters in order to evaluate and determine how these problems can be 
addressed.  
 
It should be noted that the principles of corporate personality and limited liability are 
not absolute, particularly where the application of the principles has led to abuses 
and manipulations. Thus, the law in certain situations has intervened through the 
courts and legislative action to check these abuses. From time to time, courts 
acknowledge the need for limits on the availability of the limited liability shield to 
prevent shareholders, directors and officers of the company from using it to achieve 
illegitimate ends. This is the challenge faced by the courts and the legislature in the 
aftermath of Salomon’s case in the UK, and later in Nigeria.  But how effective these 
actions are, with regards to proffering solutions to the abuses inherent in the 
corporate form in Nigeria and in the UK, still remain inconclusive. This has 
therefore made it imperative to look at the adequacy of the current law with a view to 
suggesting possible improvements. The subsequent chapters will deal with these 
issues. 
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CHAPTER 3    SEPARATE LEGAL PERSONALITY OF THE COMPANY IN 
ENGLISH LAW SINCE SALOMON  
3.1   Introduction 
It is widely accepted that a company is an artificial entity. This has long been 
affirmed in the decision of Salomon v Salomon
1
 decided well over a hundred years 
ago. Salomon’s case has undoubtedly attributed the personality of a company to a 
fiction and so its existence is dependent on the law. Although rarely questioned, as 
Granthan and Rickett would point out,
2
 the strict application of Salomon’s case may 
sometimes lead to abuses as well as unjust and unpredictable results. In particular, it 
has given unscrupulous promoters of private companies an opportunity to abuse the 
advantages the law has provided to them in what one commentator described as the 
‘wafer thin’ incorporation of an under-capitalised company.3 Its adverse effect can 
be seen on a wide range of people – creditors, consumers, shareholders of related 
companies, victims of torts, and taxation authorities.  
Nevertheless, since the decision in Salomon, the courts and legislature have been 
trying to grapple with the problems associated with the separate legal personality of 
the company in the UK. Whilst holding tenaciously to a formalistic approach to the 
doctrine, they have also tried to deal with the problem by devising a number of 
schemes to enable them go behind the corporation in order to determine the realities
4
 
of the situation. Thus, the courts, on rare occasions, may deny the corporators the 
benefit of hiding behind the corporate veil with a view to imposing liabilities on 
corporate controllers where necessary.
5
 The courts will intervene, if for instance, the 
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corporate structure itself is a fraud, a device, a facade or a sham.
6
 The tendency to 
act in this manner in respect of corporate identity has often resulted in the 
metaphorical use of the words ‘lifting of the veil’ or ‘peeping through the veil’. This 
expression is used to refer to situations where corporate insiders are made personally 
liable for a corporation’s acts, where two or more related corporations are treated as 
one, or where the corporate entity is treated as one, or where the corporate entity is 
treated as a sham.
7
  The doctrine of piercing the veil has remained the primary 
method through which the courts have mitigated the hard and unpleasant realities 
occasioned by the strict application of the realisation of the separate legal personality 
concept. Pickering,
8
 has pointed out two reasons why ‘veil piercing’ is important. 
The first is that a company cannot at all times and in all circumstances be treated as 
an ordinary independent person. For instance, a company has no mens rea and 
therefore is incapable of committing a delict or a crime, unless the courts lift the veil 
and impose the intention of the directors or members on the company. He further 
argues on a second note that the absence of veil piercing with regard to the separate 
personality rule would mean that directors or members might hide behind the shield 
of limited liability and this may likely result in potentially disastrous consequences.
9
  
Whilst the courts have applied this mechanism of lifting the corporate veil on a case 
by case level, there appears not to be any common, unifying or principled approach 
to be derived from authorities except ad hoc explanations.
10
 In many cases, the 
judicial approach has been haphazard and largely of limited impact.
11
 Over the years, 
companys legislation has also been amended to admit a number of exceptions to the 
separate legal entity.  The legislative impact on the abuse of the corporate form 
became increasingly felt soon after the insolvency reforms of the 1980s following 
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the Cork Committee Report.
12
 Of immense importance to this legislative effort is the 
requirement of disclosure rules and wide publicity as condition precedent to 
recognition of corporate personality with limited liability,
13
 and the ensuring that 
assets of the company are not removed to frustrate creditors claims.
14
  
The chapter will deal with how the law has dealt with the problems associated with 
the strict application of the separate personality and limited liability principles in the 
UK following the decision in Salomon v Salomon. By analyzing and evaluating the 
law in relation to the attitude of the UK towards corporate personality and limited 
liability of the corporation, the chapter attempts to provide helpful reflection for 
Nigeria in its eventual application of the principles.  
3.2 Categorisation Approach 
Many writers as well as the courts themselves have explored categorisation analyses 
to identify particular legal categories used to justify the piercing of the corporate 
veil. The problem with this approach is that cases have been linked together to 
support lifting the veil rather than because there are real similarities between the 
cases. The result is that there may be instances where cases which can qualify to lift 
the corporate veil are thrown out simply because they do not fit into any of these 
categories. This is likely to result in injustice on parties. 
According to Kershaw,
15
 four categories of cases dealt with by the courts exist. 
These include instances which attempt to articulate the identity or nationality of a 
company being disputed upon for purposes of its veil being disregarded; cases where 
a company is being used to commit fraud or to evade existing obligations; issues 
involving the parent and its subsidiary companies and finally when the justice of the 
case demands that the veil shall be pierced.
16
  
On the other hand, Farrar and Hannigan, while accepting the difficulty of 
rationalising the cases have attempted to articulate nine broad headings under which 
lifting the veil of incorporation may apply. These are agency, fraud, group 
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enterprises, trusts, tort, enemy, tax, companies’ legislation and other legislation.17 
These categories are just a guideline and by no means exhaustive.  
Ottolenghi has identified peeping behind the veil, piercing the veil, extending the 
veil and ignoring the veil as four existing categories for lifting the veil.
18
 Whilst 
peeping behind the veil attempts to look behind the corporate form only for purposes 
of exerting fresh facts which might be useful in deciding the matter at hand, 
19
 
piercing the veil tends to impose liability on shareholders for acts of the company. 
With regards to extending the veil, questions are being raised as to the separate 
existence of the corporation, independently from a group of companies. The final 
category which is termed ignoring the veil brings to the fore questions as to the very 
existence of the company as being a sham or facade.
20
  
Gallagher and Zeigher whilst carrying out a comprehensive analysis of veil piercing 
cases in Australia, Britain and America argue that all the categories which have 
traditionally applied for purposes of lifting the veil can be subsumed into one 
category viz: the prevention of injustice.
21
 Although the prevention of injustice is 
obviously an important objective of the law, it is not in itself an overriding factor 
particularly in the UK where the veil of the corporation cannot be lifted simply 
because justice demands that it be done.
22
  
Other commentators such as Schmithoff
23
 and Friedman
24
 have also attempted to 
state the headings under which the veil of the corporation can be pierced. In the case 
of the former, he asserts that courts apply the doctrine under two headings relating to 
agency relationship, and when there is abuse of the corporate form. For the latter, the 
courts will disregard the privilege of the corporate form when it becomes a tool to 
evade tax, when the real purpose of a transaction undermines the corporate form, and 
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when the controllers disguise themselves through the fronting of subsidiaries in order 
to conceal their identities.  
It is submitted in this chapter that the categorisation process has major flaws. In 
particular, it has resulted in the courts sending conflicting messages. This has been 
attributed largely to the fact that it is difficult to fashion any clear cut coherent 
principle from the myriad of cases on the particular approach the court will most 
probably adopt in lifting the veil.
25
 This is perhaps because of the diversities of 
commentaries on particular case laws and doubts that categorisation of these cases 
under different headings will follow exactly the same pattern.
26
 There is also a lack 
of consensus in terms of number of categories, their doctrinal imperatives, or cases 
which approximate to each category.
27
 This, it is submitted, is due mainly to the fact 
that English courts have generally confined themselves to traditional common law 
concepts and principles thus making their approach to veil piercing somewhat 
sluggish, rigid and problematic. These courts have developed a number of factors to 
assess whether the conditions of lifting the veil has been met, none of which is 
dispositive. The state of affairs is not wholly satisfactory because the categories 
sometimes overlap and many do not articulate the principles on which they were 
decided.
28
 Nonetheless, these factors or categories tend to underscore the high barrier 
a party must surmount to pierce the corporate veil. Disturbed by this scenario, 
Mayson, French, and Ryan have correctly stated that in view of the current 
conceptualisation of the company, it may not be possible to reconcile the large 
number of cases on this subject let alone many academic opinions.
29
 It is posited 
here that the problematic nature of this approach has made many believe that the 
laws are inadequate and incapable of dealing with the vast nature of issues bordering 
on the abuse of the corporate form.  
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The categorising approach hardly gives one concrete idea about which conduct does 
or does not trigger the piercing of the corporate veil doctrine. It is very difficult to 
follow any particular approach or to make any principled sense of the cases that are 
presented as lifting or piercing cases. This is largely because most of the cases or 
factors listed as capable of piercing the corporate veil lack proper evaluation. It is 
against this background that common law approaches, as well as the legislative 
responses to the abuse of the corporate form through the process of piercing the 
corporate veil, must be examined. While some key UK decisions are considered, the 
research seeks to demonstrate how the lack of coherent principle has brought an 
element of inconsistency and uncertainty into the law. 
3.2.1 Fraud, Facade or Sham 
Where an individual or a corporate body creates or runs a company to act as shield 
for fraudulent purposes or as a sham or facade to avoid existing obligation,
30
 the 
corporate veil will be lifted, if not ripped or rudely torn away.
31
 To succeed under 
this category, it must be placed on preponderance of evidence that the controller 
have the intention to use the corporate structure as a ‘mask’ to hide his real purpose 
and to deny the plaintiff some pre-existing legal right.
32
This position of the law 
recognised in Salomon’s case has been reflected in a long list of authorities 
beginning from Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne
33
 to the more recent case of Adams v 
Cape Industries Plc.
34
 In Gilford Motors Co Ltd v Horne the defendant, a former 
managing director of the plaintiffs company, had entered into a covenant with it 
agreeing not to solicit for customers when his employment ceased. Contrary to the 
said agreement, and upon leaving the company the defendant set up J.M Horne & Co 
which for purposes of this action was the second defendant to do so. The court 
agreed with the plaintiff’s position that the creation of the defendants company was 
in breach of the covenant, and expressed its satisfaction that the company was 
formed as a device in order to mask the effective carrying on of the business of Mr 
Horne. Summing up the views of the court after hearing evidence, Farewell J. had 
said: 
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I am quite satisfied that this company was formed as a device a 
stratagem, in order to mask the effective carrying on of a business of 
Mr E.B.Horne. The purpose of it was to try to enable him, under what 
is a cloak or a sham, to engage in business which, on consideration of 
the agreement which had been sent to him just about seven days 
before the company was incorporated, was a business in respect of 
which he had a fear that the plaintiffs might intervene and object.
35
  
 
On appeal, this view was upheld. Lord Hanworth MR granted an injunction against 
the defendant to which Lawrence L.J and Romer L.J. concurred.
36
 Specifically, 
Romer L.J emphasized as follows: 
The defendant company was formed and was carrying on business 
merely as a cloak or sham for the purpose of enabling the defendant 
Horne to commit the breach of the covenant that he entered into 
deliberately with the plaintiffs on the occasion of and as a 
consideration for the employment as managing director. For this 
reason, in addition to the reasons given by Lords, I agree that the 
appeal must be allowed, with the consequences which have been 
indicated by the Master of the Rolls.
37
  
 
The decision of both the High Court and the Court of Appeal was triggered by the 
fact that the company in question could not for all material purposes be deemed to 
engage in the “carrying on” of its incorporator’s business but was, rather, “being 
carried on” by its incorporator in the latter’s general strategic plans.38  
Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne was followed by Jones v Lipman.
39
 Here, the 
defendant, Mr Lipman, had agreed to transfer his interest in land belonging to him 
through sale to Jones. Later in time, he changed his mind and reneged on the 
completion of the sale. In order to effectively circumvent the transaction, he formed 
a company whereupon he purportedly transferred his interest in the land to the said 
company. He then proceeded to claim that the property no longer belonged to him 
and therefore he could not comply with the contract.  The court per Russell J., 
refused his position and ordered specific performance of the contract whilst noting 
that the creature of the first defendant (Mr Lipman’s company) was a mere device, 
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sham, or indeed a mask which he held before his face in order to avoid recognition in 
the eyes of the law.
40
 It was clear from records that the purported Lipman’s company 
did not comply with corporate formalities there being no issued share capital and no 
real existence.
41
 It did not have any director appointed.
42
  It thus was clear that the 
company had no genuine economic substance and was used solely to evade the 
defendant’s contractual obligation.  
Another factual situation linking the piercing of the corporate veil as mere facade 
came in the case of FG Films Ltd
43
 where under–capitalization was the underlying 
reason. The facts of this case were that an American corporation, Film Group 
Incorporated, invested in the making of a film costing £80,000. It was in evidence 
that the applicants company, inter alia, FG Films Ltd which was an English company 
purporting to be the maker of the film and thus had the intention of registering it as a 
British film. The issued share capital of the company was £100 with dominant 
shareholding in the hands of the president of FG Films Ltd. The company, as it was 
formed, had no assets in terms of facilities and staff. Specifically, it had no film 
making facility to carry out the project. The attempt to register the film as a British 
film was rejected by the respondent and this was upheld by the court.
44
 
Another and more recent instance, of the court lifting the veil arose in the case of 
Creasey v Breachwood Motors Ltd.
45
 Creasey had been a manager employed by a 
garage, Breachwood Welwyn Ltd. He had been dismissed in circumstances where he 
probably had a substantial claim for damages for wrongful dismissal. The proprietors 
of the business wanted to avoid paying these damages. Before Creasey put in his 
claim they formed another company, Breachwood Motors Ltd, transferred the entire 
undertaking of Breachwood Welwyn Ltd to it and then had Breachwood Welwyn 
struck off from the company register. 
It was held that Creasey could present his claim for damages directly against the new 
company, Breachwood Motors Ltd, it having been formed specifically to get the 
proprietors out of their legal liability to Creasey. 
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However, the Court of Appeal in Ord & Anor v Belhaven Pubs Ltd
46
 saw it 
differently and held that the approach followed in Creasey’s case was inappropriate 
and wrong in law. It cited with approval its own previous decision in Adams v Cape 
Industries plc
47
(details of which shall be stated below) and consequently overruled 
Creasey. In Ord the defendant, who was engaged in the business of acquiring old 
pub premises, refurbishing them, and then letting them to tenants, had made various 
misrepresentations as to the potential profitability of the premises to the claimant. By 
the time these came to light, the company from which the lease was taken had 
practically ceased trading, and had no substantial assets from which any judgment 
against it could be satisfied. The claimant sought leave of court to substitute the 
defendant company’s holding company, and the judge at court of first instance 
followed Creasey and allowed the substitution. The Court of Appeal decided that 
this was incorrect, as the original company had not been a mere facade for the 
holding company, nor vice versa. Unlike the new company in Creasey, neither 
company had been created as a sham to avoid liability, there had been no element of 
asset stripping, and as such, the veil should not be lifted. Hobhouse LJ, giving the 
judgment of the court, restated the fact that Creasey had been wrongly decided and 
could not be sustained. For the court, Creasey represents a wrong adoption of the 
principle of veil piercing and accordingly, it declared that it should no longer be 
regarded as authoritative. 
It is has become clear following Adams v Cape Industries plc
48
 that the courts are 
now increasingly reluctant to lift the veil of the corporation in the absence of sham or 
where the wording of particular statute or contract requires so. In short, the Adams 
case has restated the position in unequivocal terms that the veil will not be lifted 
simply because it would be in the interest of justice unless accompanied by evidence 
that the company in question is a sham or a facade. As pointed out by Slade LJ in 
Adams, one must look to see if the company is a facade which is concealing the true 
facts.
49
 A determinant factor in such a test is the motive of the perpetrator which may 
be material.
50
 However, without further guidance, this statement is unhelpful. For the 
fraud exception to succeed there needs to be a pre-existing legal right. Thus, if such a 
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pre-existing legal right is not in existence, the intention to deceive the plaintiff is 
purely speculative. If the legal right crystallises before the corporate form is used to 
evade the right such as in Gilford Motors and Jones v Lipman, the mental element of 
the defendant to deny the plaintiff of his right is established. On the other hand, if the 
legal right crystallises after the corporate form is used to evade the right, the mental 
element would be impossible to satisfy.  
The Adams adherence to Salomon’s case has been followed in subsequent cases. In 
Trustor AB v Smallbone (No 2,)
51
 the Court of Appeal was minded to grant the 
claimants’ request to lift the corporate veil against Smallbone for using a company 
with no connection to third parties to engage in various forms of impropriety. 
Smallbone, a director of Trustor AB, had without the consent of other directors, 
transferred huge sums of corporate funds into another company controlled by him, 
Introcom Ltd. He subsequently removed some of those funds from Introcom Ltd’s 
bank account into his own private account. The court having regard to all 
circumstances of the case was not in doubt that Smallbone was jointly and severally 
liable with Introcom Ltd for those sums received by him from his bank account. 
However, like Adams, the court as per Sir Andrew Morritt VC, rejected the third 
head of the claimants’ argument that the corporate veil be lifted in the interest of 
justice.
52
   
In Ben Hashem v Al Shayif,
53
 Munby J formulated six guiding for the court in 
deciding whether or not to pierce the corporate veil. First, ownership and control of a 
company were not enough to justify piercing the corporate veil.
54
 Second, the court 
cannot pierce the corporate veil, even in the absence of third party interests in the 
company, merely because it is thought to be necessary in the interests of justice. 
Third, the corporate veil can be pierced only if there is some impropriety. Fourth, the 
impropriety alleged must, as Sir Andrew Morrit said in Trustor must be “linked to 
the use of the company structure to avoid or conceal liability”.55  Fifth, to justify 
piercing the corporate veil, there must be “both control of the company by the 
wrongdoer(s) and impropriety that is (mis) use of the company by them as a “façade” 
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to conceal their wrongdoing”. 56  The sixth principle relates to the fact that the 
company may be a “façade” even though it was not originally incorporated with any 
deceptive intent, provided that it is being used for the purpose of deception at the 
time of the relevant transactions. The implication therefore is that the corporate veil 
could only be pierced in so far as it is necessary in order to provide a remedy for the 
particular wrong which those controlling the company had done. 
In VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corpn
57
 the Supreme Court while 
dismissing the claimants appeal refused to pierce the corporate veil. The court held 
that there would be no justification to make a company’s controllers party to its 
contracts with third parties. Nonetheless, the court adopting both the reasoning of the 
Court of Appeal and the view of Munby J reiterated the fact that the doctrine 
permitting the court to pierce the corporate veil is limited on whether there was 
relevant impropriety by the controller and wrongdoer at the time of the relevant 
transaction.
58
  
Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited and others
59
 reaffirmed the limits to piercing of 
the corporate veil if there had been a relevant impropriety or where a person was 
under an existing legal restriction or liability or subject to an existing legal restriction 
which he deliberately evaded or the enforcement of which he deliberately evaded 
through the use of another company under his control. However, the court while 
considering what constitutes a relevant wrongdoing decried the indiscriminate use of 
terms such as ‘façade’ or ‘sham’ as totally unsatisfactory. As Lord Walker observed: 
…piercing the corporate veil is not a doctrine at all, in the sense of a 
coherent principle of law. It is simply a label – often, as lord Sumpton 
observes, used indiscriminately – to describe the disparate occasions 
on which some rule of law produces apparent exceptions to the 
principle of the separate juristic personality of a body corporate 
reaffirmed by the House of Lords in Salomon v A Salomon and Co 
Ltd [1897] AC 22.
60
 
 
The above analysis reveals the inherent difficulty the courts face in finding a 
common and unifying standard to pierce the corporate veil. Although, the 
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courts may pierce corporate veil when there is glaring cases of impropriety or 
evasion of existing legal obligations, the limits of the doctrine are far from 
settled in case law. As pointed out by Oh, the inherent imprecision in 
metaphors used by the courts has resulted in doctrinal mess.
61
  
  
It is therefore submitted that, rather than relying on opaque assertions that the 
corporate form is to be disregarded because the company is a mere façade, it will be 
more appropriate to impose liability on shareholders when the company is 
potentially used for purposes outside the contemplation of the law.   
It is further submitted that the de-emphasis of justice is fundamentally wrong since 
veil piercing was a child of equity, itself intended to meet the ends of justice. The 
restoration of justice for purposes of lifting the corporate veil in the UK has therefore 
become imperative. In doing so, it may perhaps be important for the courts in the UK 
to advert their minds to the Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Glazer v 
Commission on Ethics for Public Employees,
62
 where the court had the opportunity 
to emphasise that the veil may be pierced by balancing the “policies behind 
recognition of a separate existence” with the “policies justifying the piercing”. It is 
submitted that the balancing approach would result in the separate personality of the 
company being maintained in some instances, whilst in other situations it would be 
discarded. The need to preserve corporate identity would, in such circumstances, 
have to be balanced against policy considerations which arise in favour of piercing 
the corporate veil; a court would then be entitled to look at the substance rather than 
the form in order to arrive at the true facts, and if there has been a misuse of a 
corporate personality to disregard it and attribute liability where it should rightly lie. 
Following a balancing approach, a court may feel justified in piercing the corporate 
veil on the basis of improper conduct, instead of lumping, rationalising or 
categorising it on grounds of fraud or dishonesty, neither of which are the same. The 
balancing approach at least compels the ventilation of the contested issues. The fact 
that the court does lift the corporate veil for a specific purpose in no way destroys the 
recognition of the corporation as an independent and autonomous entity for all other 
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purposes. The balancing approach tends to conclude that for the court to justify 
piercing the corporate veil, the facts must indicate either a misuse of the separate 
entity privilege or a need to limit the privilege in the interest of justice and equity. 
The latter ground, let it be noted, is very broad in and of itself.   
Although the balancing approach does not seek to provide all the answers to veil 
piercing, it will ultimately usher in some element of dynamism in dealing with the 
concept and may prove capable of bringing order, certainty and consistency to this 
area of law. Thus, rather than rigid standards followed by UK courts, the Glazer test 
will usher in flexibility having regard to the separate and distinguishable facts of 
each case whilst providing a key in outlining a basis for unifying the decisions of 
courts in the British and Commonwealth jurisdictions of which Nigeria is a part. 
3.2.2 Agency 
Salomon’s case in confirming the separate personality of a company had reiterated 
the fact that the company is not an agent of its shareholders. However, where a 
parent company permits its subsidiary to act as its agent it may so act if it has 
authority to do so. In those circumstances, the parent company will be bound by the 
acts of its agent, provided the acts are within the actual or apparent scope of 
authority.
63
 But it is important to note that there is no presumption of such an agency 
relationship. In the absence of an agreement between the two corporate personalities 
it will be very difficult to establish one. 
The development of the courts’ attitude to agency in a company context has tended 
not to produce clear rules or result, perhaps until recently. The agency principle first 
came to light in the case of Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd v Birmingham Corporation
64
, 
in the context of whether a subsidiary company was the agent of its holding 
company. The facts leading to this case were that a paper manufacturing company 
took over a business of waste paper merchants and continued to run it through a 
subsidiary company in the form of a department. Both the parent and the subsidiary 
had the same directors and the subsidiary exclusively got its remuneration from the 
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parent. This was evident because of the facts that the parent company had full and 
exclusive access to the subsidiary books, the subsidiary had no employees other than 
a manager. The subsidiary occupied the parent’s premises as yearly tenants and paid 
no consideration. The only evidence of its supposed independent existence was its 
name on the stationary. The parent company also owned or controlled all the share 
capital of the subsidiary company. When it became apparent that the Corporation of 
Birmingham wanted to purchase the premises where the business of the subsidiary 
was run pursuant to its compulsory powers, the parent sought to claim compensation. 
If the claim had been made by the subsidiary, the corporation of Birmingham would 
have escaped liability under the provisions of section 121 of the Lands Clauses 
Consolidation Act 1845, which disentitles compensation to an occupier whose 
tenancy did not exceed one year. In piercing the veil and holding that agency was 
established, Atkinson J,
65
 departing from Salomon, held that the question of whether 
a company was carrying on its own business or that of its parent’s was a question of 
fact determinable by the following set of criteria:  
a) Were the profits of the subsidiary those of the parent company? 
b) Were the persons conducting the business of the subsidiary appointed by the 
parent company? 
c) Was the parent company the “head and brains” of the venture? 
d) Did the parent govern the venture? 
e) Were the profits made by the subsidiary company made by the skill and 
direction of the parent company? 
f) Was the parent company in effective and constant control of the subsidiary? 
Applying these criteria, there was no doubt in the judge’s finding that the parent had 
complete control of the operations of the subsidiary. In the circumstance, the 
existence of the subsidiary as a separate legal entity was unable to hinder the court 
from treating the business as that of the parent. 
Although the efforts to articulate the criteria for piercing the veil of the corporation 
in Smith, Stone and Knight v Birmingham have not been followed in subsequent 
cases, it remains the first comprehensive attempt by an English court to set down a 
criteria for veil piercing. There are two reasons that can account for this reluctance 
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by English Judges to follow the comprehensive criteria laid down in this case. The 
first is that English courts favoured the application of traditional common law 
concepts instead of what may be regarded as a judicially crafted list of criteria. 
Smith, Stone and Knight could be regarded as constituting judicial activism
66
 which 
was inconsistent with the nuances of the rapidly growing number of conservative 
English judges. These conservative judges found it difficult to follow the lead 
exemplified in the case. Secondly, it was also explained that the reluctance of judges 
to follow the case could be attributable to its unique nature. The case, as it was 
formulated, was one whereby the company requested that its own veil be pierced in 
order to obtain compensation from the Government. Having a regard for the nature 
of this case and its prevailing circumstances, it became easily susceptible to being 
distinguished by subsequent courts. In Adams v Cape Industries plc,
67
 the Court of 
Appeal departed from it and held that implied agency following the activities of the 
subsidiary cannot bind the parent in the absence of express agreement between the 
parties. 
As in Adams, the agency ground as applied in Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd v 
Birmingham does not have strong support as an independent ground for piercing the 
corporate veil in Australia and has been extensively criticised.
68
 Even in New 
Zealand, the veil will not be pierced on the mere excuse of degree of overlap 
between the operations of the parent and its subsidiary in terms of common 
management and shared finances.
69
 In contrast, however, Canadian courts have built 
upon the ruling in Smith, Stone & Knight to develop a deep line of precedent that 
uses, inter alia, the six questions raised in the case to pierce the corporate veil on the 
basis of an agency relationship.
70
 Two leading cases exemplifying the Canadian 
courts inclination towards piercing the corporate veil on the basis of an agency are 
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the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in both Toronto (City) v Famous Players 
Canadian Corp
71
 and Aluminium Co of Canada v Toronto.
72
 In Famous Players, the 
Supreme Court dismissed an appeal against the lower court ruling that the assessable 
income of the parent should include the income earned by the subsidiaries. In 
coming to this conclusion, the court justified piercing the veil on the basis that the 
parent effectively controlled the policies and operations of its subsidiaries. Applying 
this view in the subsequent case of Aluminium Co, Rand J. stated that the corporate 
veil may be pierced where: 
It can be said that the [subsidiary] company is in fact the puppet of the 
parent; when the directing mind and will of the [parent] reaches into 
and through the corporate facade of the [subsidiary] and becomes 
itself, the manifesting agency.
73
 
 
Rand J. further made a distinction between what he called formal agency and 
conduct whereby the parent company is in fact in such an intimate and immediate 
domination of the subordinate company that the latter in all true sense of expression 
lacks independent functioning of its own.
74
  
It is argued here that by taking the Canadian approach, the basis for piercing the 
corporate veil is not agency as per the legal relationship between a principal and 
agent, but rather is based on factors akin to a relationship that arises based on the 
intervention or control by the parent over the affairs of the subsidiary. Thus the 
Canadian position which finds expression in what Blumberg called “quasi-agency”75 
predicated on extensive interventionist control as a lack of demonstration of 
independent existence on the part of the subsidiary, has become an accepted feature 
of veil piercing decisions in the United States.
76
 It can thus be safely argued that 
Canada, following the examples from the United States where veil piercing is 
regarded as the most litigated doctrine in corporate law,
77
 has moved away from its 
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British roots and other common law countries by allowing the lifting of the corporate 
veil whenever it is established that a parent company has exercised complete 
domination and control over the affairs and activities of a subsidiary.
78
 This is a 
welcome development to other common law countries in their efforts to find 
solutions to the strict application of the Salomon’s case. 
3.2.3 Corporate Enterprises as a Single Economic Unit 
Salomon’s case which conferred limited liability on individual investor-shareholders 
in a single corporation to encourage their investment and limit their exposure, has 
now been extended to corporate groups. Consequently, the doctrine of separate 
personality and limited liability also applies to group enterprises as it is between an 
individual and a company. As pointed out by Blumberg,
79
 corporate veil litigation 
has increased since the dawn of the twentieth century. With the increasing number of 
multinational enterprises it has even become more complex and controversial. This 
however raises some concern apparently because of the greater potential for harm 
such a group structure can have on the society. In Re Southard and Co Ltd,
80
 
Templeman LJ expressed this concern using the scenario where a parent company 
may incorporate many companies in a group controlled largely by the shareholders 
of the parent company. Suddenly, a member company in the group becomes 
insolvent; the creditors will suffer whilst the shareholders of the parent and other 
subsidiaries in the group prosper without any liability imposed on them. The 
problem is made even where the assets of the subsidiary company are claimed by 
another member of the group pursuant to a right of debenture holding.
81
 
Lord Denning while lifting the veil in Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd v IRC
82
  
and declining to treat a subsidiary as a separate and independent entity from the 
parent in an income tax case had cautioned against blind adherence to the doctrine 
laid down by Salomon.
83
 Lord Denning was very careful to stress the following: 
I decline to treat the [subsidiary] as a separate and independent 
entity.The doctrine laid down in Salomon v Salomon has to be 
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watched very carefully. It has often been supposed to cast a veil over 
the personality of a limited company through which the courts cannot 
see. But that is true. The courts can and often do draw aside the veil. 
They can, and often do, pull off the mask. They look to see what 
really lies behind. The legislature has shown the way with group 
accounts and the rest. And the courts should follow suit. I think we 
should look at the [subsidiary] and see it as it really is-the wholly-
owned subsidiary of the tax payers. It is the creature, the puppet, ofthe 
taxpayers in point of fact; and it should be regarded in point of law.
84
 
 
This decision was predicated on the action of the claimants whereby they sought to 
obtain a tax advantage relying on the fact that their wholly owned subsidiary was a 
separate legal entity. The Court of Appeal decided that the claimants were not 
entitled to the advantage because “looking at the reality of the position and 
notwithstanding the Salomon v Salomon & Co. Ltd., that subsidiary was not a 
separate and independent entity but a creation of the tax payers [parents]”85. 
A notable attempt by the English court at aligning itself to piercing the veil of 
companies in a group was eloquently illustrated in DHN Food Distributors v Tower 
Hamlets London Borough Council
86
, the facts of which were arguably very similar to 
Smith, Stone and Knight. In DHN, the plaintiffs ran a wholesale grocery business 
from premises owned by its wholly-owned subsidiary known as Bronze Investments 
Ltd. The vehicles used in the business were owned by another wholly-owned 
company subsidiary company named D.H.N Food Transport Ltd. The defendants 
compulsorily acquired the premises, and, as a result, the plaintiffs, and their two 
wholly owned subsidiaries went into voluntary liquidation. The acquiring authority 
(the council) paid compensation only for the value of the land registered in the name 
of the subsidiary. The plaintiffs claimed that they were also entitled to compensation 
for disturbances of business and submitted three reasons for that. In particular, they 
argued that the veil should be lifted and that the parent company should be treated as 
the owners of the premises.
87
 Rejecting this argument, the trial court held that DHN 
was not entitled to substantial compensation for disturbance as they had no great 
interest in the land other than that of a yearly tenant.
88
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Reversing the decision of the trial court and upholding the plaintiffs claim, the Court 
of Appeal saw the case as one in which the court was “entitled to look at the realities 
of the situation and to pierce the veil.”89 The court, most importantly, further held 
that the group of companies was in reality a single economic entity and should be 
treated as one.
90
 Lord Denning concluded by saying thus: 
We all know that in many respects a group of companies are treated 
together for the purpose of general accounts, balance sheet, and profit 
and loss account.They are treated as one concern.
91
 
 
The DHN case has attracted mixed reactions from a number of commentators. Lord 
Denning who propounded the single economic unit theory – where companies in a 
group structure were treated as being a single entity - did not elaborate on his 
judgment, neither did he lay down clear circumstances or guidelines under which the 
theory would apply. Although Denning has been criticized for doctrinal failure in 
DHN
92
 his enunciation of single economic unit theory in relation to company groups 
and his call for flexibility in dealing with issues of corporate form should be 
commended. The main area of attack on Denning is his logical reasoning in the case. 
It is submitted that to require companies operating as a group to report their accounts 
on consolidated basis is one thing yet to ignore their separate legal personality is 
quite another. Whilst reporting on group finances may be, for purposes of 
information, its intention as provided by statute, ultimately it might not have 
anything to do with limited liability. As will be seen later, it was not long before 
later decisions began to question the whole idea of single economic unit theory. It 
has been noted specifically that the House of Lords questioned the reasoning in DHN 
in Woolfson v. Strathclyde Regional Council.
93
 
Notwithstanding the lack of elaboration on DHN, commentators such as Hayton 
view the result of the case on the veil - piercing issue as very sensible.
94
 Sugarman 
and Webb, saw it as hardly surprising having regard to the facts and weight of 
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authority.
95
However, other commentators such as Powles took a contrary position 
and saw the decision as an unnecessary violence done on corporate personality even 
though, based on the facts, it was a clear victory for common sense over technicality. 
In spite of these differing views, the single economic unit theory reflects the 
commercial reality in terms of the relationship of parent companies and their 
subsidiaries. 
The DHN case seemed to weaken the importance attached to Salomon. This was 
however short lived as it did not take long before it met serious opposition in later 
cases. One such case is the House of Lords decision in the Scottish appeal of 
Woolfson v Strathclyde Regional Council
96
 which did not follow DHN. Here, the 
appellant relied on DHN to claim compensation for disturbance caused by the 
compulsory acquisition of premises occupied by a company in which he held 999 of 
the 1000 shares owned by himself and another company in which himself and his 
wife were the only shareholders. 
Dismissing the appeal, the House of Lords held that there was no basis consonant 
with the principle upon which on the facts of the case that the corporate veil can be 
pierced as to hold Woolfson to be the true owner of the premises.
97
 Notwithstanding 
that the case was distinguishable on the facts from DHN, Lord Keith cast some doubt 
on whether the Court of Appeal in the DHN case had properly applied the principle 
that it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil only where special circumstances 
exist indicating that it is a mere facade concealing the true facts.
98
 The decision in 
Woolfson has been followed in Ord v Bellhaven
99
 where the Court of Appeal refused 
to substitute the parent company or another subsidiary as a defendant in order to 
satisfy a judgment debt. 
The question of whether companies in a group should be treated as single units or 
separate entities has been settled by the Court of Appeal in Adams v Cape Industries 
Plc.
100
 This case was a striking restatement of the Salomon principle of strict 
separate personality and the rejection of the single economic unit theory espoused by 
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Lord Denning in DHN. In fact the case of Adams v Cape Industries Plc appears to be 
a clear attempt by the upper echelon of the judiciary in the UK to ensure clarity of 
interpretation on issues arising from Salomon’s case. The Court of Appeal in this 
case de-emphasized the application of the doctrine of veil piercing to corporate 
groups and tort claims thus laying to rest any attempt to apply the doctrine in these 
areas of law. The case, it is submitted, highlights how separate legal personality and 
limited liability of corporations can result in significant injustice to claimants against 
multinational enterprises. Indeed, it illuminates how the legal form of the subsidiary 
company may be an obvious contradiction to the concept of justice.  
The facts of this case relates to the enforcement of a foreign judgment obtained in 
United States in England against Cape Industries Plc, a UK multinational company 
who until 1979 mined and marketed asbestos. The company had in its worldwide 
conglomerate another English company, named Capasco, who in turn had a US 
marketing subsidiary incorporated in Illinois, named NAAC. In 1978, NAAC was 
closed down by Cape and other subsidiaries formed with the express purpose of 
reorganising the business in the USA to minimise Cape presence there for purposes 
of taxation and other liability issues.  
Following a series of litigations between 1978 and 1979 arising from injuries caused 
by the operations of its subsidiaries, a default judgment was entered against Cape 
and Capasco, by which time Cape had sold its asbestos mining and marketing 
business and therefore had no assets in the US to satisfy its judgment debt. The 
claimants thus sought to enforce the judgments in England where Cape had most of 
its assets. The issue before the court was how to link Cape to the activities of its US 
subsidiaries for purposes of liability of the claim and lifting of the corporate veil. 
The court, while finding as a fact the relationship between Cape and its subsidiaries 
nonetheless upheld the sanctity of corporate personality for the respective 
companies. Consequently, it went ahead to hold that the claimants cannot recover 
from Cape. The Court of Appeal, as per Slade LJ, stated as follows: 
We do not accept as a matter of law that the court is entitled to lift the 
corporate veil against a defendant which is the member of a corporate 
group merely because the corporate structure has been used so as to 
ensure that the legal liability (if any) in respect of particular future 
activity of the group...will fall on another member of the group rather 
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the defendant company. Whether or not this is desirable, the right to 
use a corporate in this manner is inherent in our corporate law.
101
  
                            
This landmark case denoted three circumstances under which the corporate veil can 
be lifted. They include where there is in issue the interpretation of a statute or 
document, it could be a bar to corporate personality and the court can treat a group as 
a single entity. This leaves out numerous tort claims from injuries that could arise as 
a result of the activities of multinational corporations.
102
 
Secondly, the veil of the company can be lifted where special circumstances exist 
which indicate that it is a mere facade concealing the true facts. In order to establish 
a facade, there must be a showing of impropriety. The impropriety must be linked to 
the use of the company structure to avoid or conceal liability to a third party. In this 
circumstance, the court, whilst recognising the separate existence of the company, 
may nevertheless lift the corporate veil in order to prevent the individuals involved 
in the illegitimate activity from escaping liability that otherwise would have been 
enforceable had the individual(s) concerned not sought to hide behind the company’s 
separate status.
103
A facade will also exist where in a group situation, the holding 
company controls a subsidiary company to the extent that the control amounts to an 
agency relationship.
104
 In the case of Cape, the court found nothing wrong in the 
company structuring its US business through its various subsidiaries in order to 
reduce its tax and other liabilities. 
Thirdly, the court refused to agree that agency can exist in a group as a matter of 
course thus setting a high and difficult standard to maintain. Consequently, agency 
cannot be implied by conduct in terms of group entities but by express agreement of 
parties.  
From the above, it is clear that the Adams case, in applying the strict and formalistic 
approach of Salomon’s case has narrowed the scope of veil piercing approaches in 
the UK thus creating more problems for creditors and other claimants such as 
victims of tort and employees who may have genuine claim against a company. As 
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Tweedale and Flynn emphasized,
105
 the case shows how corporate strategy can be 
closely intertwined with international corporate law and occupational health and 
safety issues. It also highlights how limited liability law and separate personality can 
result in significant injustices to claimants against group enterprises and 
multinational corporations.
106
 
Notwithstanding the perceived set back occasioned in Adams, there appears to be a 
gradual but slow positive resurgence on issues of the corporate veil in view of the 
decisions in Beckett Investment Management Group v. Hall
107
 and Stone & Rolls v. 
Stephens
108
 where on various occasions, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords 
lifted the veil of the corporation. In respect of the former, the veil of the parent 
company and its subsidiaries was lifted in order to give effect to a covenant not to 
compete in an employment contract. In the latter case, the court upheld the defence 
of ex turpi causa
109
 by the defendant so as to deny the claim of the claimants. It set 
aside the separate personality of the company whilst attributing the fraudulent 
actions of its controlling shareholders to it.  
Following the decisions in Beckett and Moore Stephens, it is arguable the courts 
have added a renewed impetus to contract claims notwithstanding the separate 
personality of the company. For tort claims, it is possible to see from Adams that 
there will be inherent difficulties that any claimant will face in pursuing such claims. 
It is submitted that, with the current state of the law, such tort claims appear 
impossible to recover under UK laws. Nonetheless, the recent Court of Appeal 
decision in Chandler v Cape plc
110
 demonstrates the availability of damages for a 
tort victim from a parent company in circumstances where the victim suffered 
industrial injury during employment by a subsidiary company. The decision is 
significant because it represents the first time an injured employee of a subsidiary 
company has established that his employer’s parent company owed him a duty of 
care in health and safety matters. Given the circumstances of the case, the Court of 
Appeal reasoning is that Cape had superior knowledge about the nature and 
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management of asbestos risks, knew (or ought to have known) that the subsidiary’s 
system of work was unsafe and therefore should have provided them with a safe 
system of work or ensured that appropriate steps were taken in the light of the 
knowledge available to it. 
Although the judgment is not concerned with the piercing of the corporate veil, it 
practically gives the equivalent effect of imposing liability on a parent company 
despite the fact that it is considered a separate legal entity from its subsidiary. 
However, the four-path test set out in Chandler for ascertaining responsibility on the 
parent company for the health and safety of its subsidiary’s employees highlights key 
elements including questions of control and the assumption of responsibility which 
remain unclear and problematic.
111
  The case did not discuss nor mention unjust 
enrichment and constructive trust on the part of the controlling shareholders and 
directors who benefitted at that time from the fraudulent activity of the parent 
company and whose actions and negligence gave rise to the breach of duty of care 
complained about.  
Arguably, Chandler’s case does not depart fundamentally from the present 
orthodoxy of the corporate form. Chandler demonstrates clearly that a parent 
company will not be held liable simply because it owned, or could control, or had 
shared directors with a subsidiary company. Liability was attached to Cape because 
of its assumption of a responsibility to the subsidiary’s employees in relation to their 
health and safety. Cape was in breach of that duty of care by failing adequately to 
discharge that burden. The court’s concern was the relationship between the parties 
and whether that gives rise to a duty of care. Its wider implication is that there is no 
general duty to prevent third parties causing damage to another, though the particular 
circumstances or relationship between the parties may give rise to an assumption or 
attachment of responsibility. Given this scenario, it becomes clear that the task of 
establishing this ‘special relationship’ and therefore the assumption of responsibility 
would rest on the claimant. This burden may be difficult for claimants to discharge 
given the passage of time, information assymmetary and dissolution of companies.   
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It is therefore submitted that, rather than the present approach, the presumption of 
separateness should not apply to corporate shareholders. Instead, corporate entities in 
a group should be treated as a collective whole. Failure to do this would promote 
injustice; this is the basis of enterprise law. In the alternative, there should be a 
revival of the much maligned single economic unit theory enunciated by Denning in 
DHN, but this time with a more defined scope, clarity and theoretical foundation 
based on actual or potential control of the subsidiary by the corporate parent. The 
presumption of control puts the parent on notice on the risk of liability in respect of 
its control of the subsidiary. To disprove actual control, the corporate parent must 
show by preponderance of evidence that the subsidiary exercises independent 
judgment in its daily operation or that it does not follow the dictates of the parent. 
This will ultimately give a formal structure to the theory whilst making it clearer 
with predictable application. The benefit of this approach is that liability, whether in 
contract or tort, will be undertaken by the group as a whole rather than leaving it to 
the individual companies, even when they do not have the capacity to deal with the 
weight of the problem that has arisen. A new jurisprudential change is required in 
this direction. 
3.2.4 Nationality of Shareholders 
The English courts have sometimes attempted to pierce the veil of the corporation 
particularly in times of war in order to identify the nationality of its incorporators. 
Although this ground may not explicitly be regarded as a challenge to the separate 
legal personality of a company as it involves issues of statutory or common law legal 
questions, it has nevertheless been applied to lift the veil of incorporation. A case 
which appears very relevant on this ground is Daimler Co Ltd v Continental Tyre 
and Rubber Co Ltd.
112
 Here, the defendant was a UK company but with greater 
control and majority shareholding held by Germans. The company supplied tyres to 
Daimler, but Daimler was concerned that it might act in contravention of the 
prevailing common law offence of trading with an enemy, as well as the  
proclamation issued under s.1 (2) Trading with the Enemy Act 1914 if it made 
payments to the company. It thus brought an action to determine the propriety of 
making such payments, given that it was the First World War. Both the court of first 
instance and the Court of Appeal saw no basis for refusing to make the payments. 
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However, the House of Lords unanimously reversed the decisions of the courts 
below. It came to the conclusion that the company, as presently constituted and 
controlled, had an enemy character and therefore payment ought to be denied. This 
case demonstrates that the courts in the post Salomon era are prepared to pierce the 
corporate veil notwithstanding its separate personality, in order to see who the 
controllers of the company are, particularly in times of war. This is analogous to 
lifting the corporate veil with paramount public interest in mind. 
3.3 Statutory Exceptions 
Apart from judicial action, there are few instances when the legislature has 
intervened to temper the effects of the Salomon’s case and impose liability on 
members and corporate controllers.  Some of these interventions are intended to 
ensure that the corporate form is not misused, that there is some degree of 
transparency and accountability and that the right of third parties are not abused. 
Statutory provisions tend to clarify the prevailing or indeed changing state policy and 
reduce judicial discretion.
113
 This is particularly important because judges are 
required to comply with the provisions of the statute even when the outcome was not 
contemplated.
114
  
Before the coming into force of the Companies Act 2006, there had been attempts by 
the legislature to impose liability on the members personally notwithstanding the 
privilege of the corporate form. This is most evident in section 24 of the Companies 
Act 1985 regarding a company trading below its minimum membership over a 
certain period of time, in the case of a public company.  Under the provision of this 
law, a member alongside the company can incur joint and several liability for 
company debts where a company, other than a private company limited by shares or 
by guarantee, carries on business without having at least two members and does so 
for more than six months with their knowledge for the whole or any part of the 
period that it so carries on business after those six months. This provision affects not 
only the controlling shareholder but all shareholders of the company. However, 
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following the Twelfth Company Law Directive,
115
 which excluded private 
companies limited by shares or guarantee from the provisions of section 24, the 
section was not replicated in the Companies Act 2006. The provision was further 
weakened by the fact that it is possible to satisfy the two member requirement by 
simply issuing one share to a person who will then hold that share as a nominee for 
the other member. Although this provision is no longer applicable in the UK by 
virtue of the fact that under the current law, a company (whether private or public) 
can a have single member, it provides an example of the imposition of liability on 
shareholders in spite of the shield of separate personality and limitation of liabilities 
of members. That section is also important for purposes of comparison, because as 
we shall see in the course of this work, a similar provision of this law exist under the 
Nigerian Companies and Allied Matters Act 2004. 
As with the provision regarding reduction of number of members above, the 
Companies Act 1985 also imposed personal liability on officers of the company in 
the event of misdescription of the company’s name.116 This provision operated where 
an officer or a person acting on behalf of the company signs a bill of exchange, 
cheque or similar instrument for any transaction or purchases for goods on behalf of 
the company, in which the company’s name is not mentioned. 117  Again this 
provision was not replicated in the Companies Act 2006. It therefore no longer 
operates as a law in the UK, though it still exists as part of Nigerian laws. 
Notwithstanding the non retention of the provisions above, there are far reaching 
provisions in the Companies Act 2006, Companies Directors Disqualification Act 
1986 and the Insolvency Act 1986 delineating exceptions to the rule on separate 
personal liability of members and corporate controllers of companies in the UK. 
These exceptions can be seen in the following ways. 
3.3.1 Premature Trading 
The corporate veil can be pierced and personal liability imposed if a public company 
commences business or exercise any of its borrowing powers, without first obtaining 
from the Registrar of Companies a certificate of compliance signifying compliance 
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with the relevant provisions of the Act regarding share capital requirements unless it 
has re-registered as a private company.  This is contained in section 761 of the 
Companies Act 2006 which is in pari materia with section 117 of the Companies 
Act 1985. Thus if, a company operates or transacts any business in contravention of 
that law, the company and its officers will be fined for default. The imposition of 
liability is further extended where the company in that connection fails to comply 
with its obligation under the transaction within 21 days upon being called upon to do 
so. In that case, the directors of the company are jointly and severally liable to 
indemnify the other party to the transaction in respect of any loss or damages 
suffered by him by reason of the company’s failure to comply with those obligations. 
What is obvious from that provision is that whereas it exculpates directors from 
liability of company’s debt, it nevertheless penalises them for any loss suffered by 
third parties following the company’s default in complying with the section 
breached. To this extent, section 761 of the Companies Act 2006 seeks to protect the 
creditors of publicly held companies in the event of the company violating its share 
capital requirement. Arguably, without reaching the share capital requirement in 
publicly-held company, limited liability can be abused. Lack of adequate share 
capital guarantee can also lead to stock market disorder or fraud. It may also result in 
inefficiency, poor economic development as well as social wealth maximization. The 
provision relating to premature trading is rarely invoked largely because of the 
changing processes of companies converting from private companies to public 
companies; companies may originally be formed as private company and  later apply 
the procedure of re-registration for conversion into a public status .
118
 This process 
can further erode the application of the law, though it can still be checked if 
obtaining the minimum capital requirement is made a pre-condition for conversion 
through re-registration. 
3.3.2 Fradulent Trading Provision 
A fraudulent controller cannot use the corporate form to commit fraud or defraud 
creditors and escape liability in respect to the company’s debt if the company goes 
into liquidation. This is the basis of the fraudulent trading provision contained in 
section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The provision, which is a clear departure 
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from the decision in Salomon’s case, relates to the fact that during the winding up of 
a company it appears to the court that any business of the company has been carried 
on with intent to defraud creditors of the company or creditors of any other person, 
or for any fraudulent purpose, the person or persons involved shall be called upon to 
contribute to the debt of the company. This involves making such contributions to 
the company’s assets as the court may deem fit and proper in the circumstance of the 
case.
119
 The court’s intervention is compensatory in nature. In making any 
declaration, the court ultimately takes into account the extent of loss made by the 
company during the period of the fraudulent trading.
120
  At times the courts 
declaration may be punitive in nature. Section 213 of the Insolvency Act only 
empowers the liquidator to initiate civil proceedings on behalf of the company. This 
tends to exclude applications from individual creditors and also the possibility of 
multiplicity of individual actions.  
Section 213 of the Insolvency Act provides the civil liability against fraudulent 
trading and operates to lift the corporate veil. Essentially, the provision covers 
anyone involved in the carrying on of the business. In small companies, directors are 
often also members of the company and so their limitation of liability is indirectly 
affected. In large or holding companies, the holding company can only be held liable 
as a party to the fraudulent trading of a subsidiary if it is shown in evidence that the 
holding company is an active participant in running the subsidiary business and the 
degree of control is substantial. However, this appears impossible in practice as the 
holding company is clothed with separate personality and is therefore responsible for 
its own actions.
121
 
The criminal liability of the fraudulent trading provision can be found in section 993 
of the Companies Act 2006. Unlike the provision in the Insolvency Act, it need not 
operate in the course of winding up.
122
 This provision carries a deterrent measure of 
criminal liability of ten years, or a fine, or both on conviction for any person who 
knowingly commits this crime.
123
 The provision of section 993 of the Companies 
Act 2006 has had a chequered history in successive company laws. Indeed the notion 
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of the fraudulent trading became known under English law in the Companies Act of 
1928 following the recommendations of the Green Committee and was re-enacted in 
the Companies Act 1929,
124
 followed by the Companies Act 1948.  
The fraudulent trading provision is intended primarily to protect the interests of 
corporate creditors. However, it has been suggested that carrying on a company’s 
business “for any fraudulent purpose” may extend the effect of the provision on 
persons other than creditors of a company in its strict sense. An instance of this 
could be seen in Lord Denning’s comments in Re Cyona Distributors Ltd125 where 
he asserted that the word “for any fraudulent purpose” were composed deliberately 
in wide terms to enable the courts to bring fraudulent persons to book, and that they 
should be given their full width. Following this dictum of Denning, some later 
authorities have classified customers as persons who are potential / contingent 
creditors of a company with an existing right to the payment of a debt at some future 
date.
126
 Though the argument of inclusion of a customer as a creditor appears 
unnecessary following the varied misconception of the provision, viewed within the 
context and the potential width of the term “for any other purpose”, the fraudulent 
trading provision has now been applied to bring the customer of a company within 
the ambit of the creditor.
127
  
Dishonesty is a fundamental element of fraudulent trading.
128
 Proof of fraud requires 
that the directors not only acted unreasonably but that they acted dishonestly.
129
 This 
requirement however poses a difficulty which tends to make the remedy of little 
use.
130
 The result has been the paucity of cases in relation to director liability for 
fraudulent trading
131
 and calls for reforms in this area of the law. 
The fraudulent trading provision has also been difficult to operate in practice. This is 
largely because the provision contains both criminal and civil elements. The fraud 
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element in the provision requires that the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, 
which is very high. In Re Patrick and Lyon Ltd,
132
 a case involving a company which 
had never made a trading profit and in which the directors secured money that was 
owed to them from the company by causing the company to issue debenture to them, 
the court was of the opinion that actual dishonesty involving current notions of fair 
trading among commercial men, real moral blame be proved.  However, in Re 
Gerald Cooper Chemicals Ltd
133
 an insolvent company which accepted an advance 
payment for the supply of goods in a manner which presupposes that the directors 
knew that there was no prospect of the goods being supplied or that the payment 
made would not be repaid was held to be carrying on business fraudulently. 
The fraudulent trading provision does not appear to help tort victims. This is because 
the kind of creditors contemplated by the provision with respect to declaration to be 
made by the court for liability “against any person in any business of the company 
which has carried on with intent to defraud creditors of the company or creditors of 
any other person or for any other fraudulent purpose” tends to relate contractual 
creditors in contractual relationship with the company who may be defrauded. Tort 
victims have no related contract with the company capable of being defrauded. In 
addition, even if creditors have not been defrauded, section 213 of the Insolvency 
Act 1986 still requires that there must have been some fraudulent purpose on the part 
of the company, which apparently excludes the protection of tort victims.  
With the fraudulent trading provision failing to curb director’s excesses in running 
up losses when their companies are in deep financial difficulty,
134
 a new section with 
a lesser burden of proof which seeks to stop directors externalising the cost of their 
companies’ debts and placing all of the risks of further trading on the creditors, 
becomes expedient. This new section as we shall see below turns attention away 
from any person (shareholders) to directors of companies.  
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3.3.3 Wrongful Trading 
The wrongful trading provision found in section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 
remains another major attempt by the legislature in the UK to deal with the abuse of 
the corporate form. It is as a leading commentator pointed out, an “extreme 
departure” from the rule in Salomon’s case so far achieved in the United 
Kingdom.
135
 The section is intended to deal with situations where directors who 
seeing that their company is facing imminent collapse fail to do something to protect 
creditors interests. The introduction of section 214 of the Insolvency Act became 
apparent when it emerged that the existing fraudulent trading provision was unable 
to stem the prevalence of directors running up losses in periods when their 
companies were deeply in financial difficulty.
136
  
The inclusion of the section in the Insolvency Act appears to be the Government 
response to the recommendations of the Cork Report
137
 which had endorsed for the 
creation of a wrongful trading provision having in mind the need to ensure stricter 
controls to curb the reckless trading activities of persons involved in the management 
of insolvent companies.
138
 The committee thought that the wrongful trading 
provision would provide a balance between the need for economic growth and the 
need to discourage abuse of the privilege of limited liability.
139
  
The wrongful trading provision focuses attention on a civil remedy for those who 
have suffered financial loss and compensation to be available to those who suffer 
foreseeable loss as a result of unreasonable behaviour.
140
 Thus, the major advance 
brought about by the introduction of wrongful trading is that considerable personal 
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liabilities can be imposed on those persons who have run a company where the 
company has gone into insolvent liquidation, even where those persons have not 
acted dishonestly. This is particularly important because the person entrusted to 
manage the company failed to take any necessary action to stop further transaction 
when it is apparent that the company is insolvent and can no longer pay its debt. The 
consequence of this negligence is two- fold. First, it can result in further economic 
loss with regard to the fact that the company may be incapable of taking regular 
responsibilities when it is insolvent. Second, and by far more importantly, the 
transaction could possibly increase market immorality by bringing more transaction 
risk to outsiders.  
The wrongful trading provision as a regulatory framework shifts attention of 
directors from shareholders to creditors. Directors are required by the provision to 
take action to minimise losses to creditors since the latter have a residual claim over 
company assets when the company is proceeding to insolvent liquidation.
141
  
Section 214 of the Insolvency Act has a very wide scope and extends to a shadow 
director for purposes of liability. A shadow director under the Insolvency Act is: 
...a person in accordance with those instructions the directors of the 
company are accustomed to act (but so that a person is not deemed a 
shadow director by reason only that the directors act on advice given 
by him in a professional capacity.
142
 
 
There has also been further extension of liability under section 214 to those regarded 
as de facto director. In Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd,
143
 a de facto director was defined 
thus: 
...a person who assumes to act as a director. He is held out as a 
director by the company, and claims and purports to be a director, 
although never actually or validly appointed as such. To establish that 
a person was a de facto director of a company it is necessary to plead 
and prove that he undertook functions in relation to the company 
which could properly be discharged only by a director.
144
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The definition of a de facto director is a marked contrast to a shadow director who 
claims not to be director but is he held out by the company as a director. 
Thus the meaning of a shadow director may seem to be a person who having retired 
from a company which he helped to build up over so many years continues to have 
influence over the directors. A parent company which is directing the affairs of a 
subsidiary may come within the purview of a shadow director.
145
  
The wrongful trading provision, unlike the fraudulent trading provision in section 
213 of the Insolvency Act, does not require proof of intent to defraud or dishonesty. 
Section 214 of the Insolvency Act attempts to deal specifically with the civil 
sanction associated with the negligent conduct of a director of the company or 
persons in that category who fail to take appropriate steps where the avoidance of 
insolvent liquidation was not a reasonable prospect.
146
 The section does not avail 
corporate controllers the protection of limited liability, on threat of insolvency, 
unless their conduct meets an objective standard required of a person occupying such 
position.
147
 Thus the courts shall not proceed to make the order against the director 
unless it is satisfied that the director, having known that there was no reasonable 
prospect of the company going into insolvent liquidation, took no steps with a view 
to minimising the potential loss to the company’s creditors.148  The conclusion a 
director ought to reach are those which would be known or ascertained by a 
reasonably diligent person having both the general knowledge, skill and experience 
that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the same functions as 
carried out by the director in relation to the company, and the general knowledge, 
skill and experience that the director personally possesses.
149
 The standard of 
knowledge and skill required is therefore a cumulative blend of subjective and 
objective standards. 
The defence which suggests that the director must take ‘every step’ in order to avoid 
liability appears to be quite herculean, and going by its strict interpretation, and 
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except in few cases, it is almost impossible to establish.
150
 The lack of legislative 
guidance or judicial pronouncement on what constitute ‘every step’ for purposes of 
establishing the defence have not helped matters. It has become increasingly difficult 
to make application for this defence for purposes of satisfying the requirements of 
section 214(3).
151
 
A number of suggestions has, however, been made as to how a director, following 
this lack of clarity, can establish the defence. This includes regular attendance of 
board meetings where he will ensure that measures taken by him are recorded and 
keeping of, up to date books detailing the company’s accounts, records and efforts 
made to minimise loss to creditors. It is logical at this stage, when a company is 
nearing insolvency, for the director to present to the board the critical financial 
position the company has found itself in, allowing it to be discussed and supporting 
any measure aimed at assessing the company’s capacity to stop trading. If it means 
that the company should stop trading at this juncture, the director should equally 
support it.
152
   
There have been alternative suggestions that where it becomes evident that there was 
no reasonable prospect of the company’s debt and liabilities being reduced by the 
continued trading, the director should support the appointment of an administrator or 
have the company put into receivership.
153
 In exceptional cases, when the company 
has reached a point of no return, the director may consider resigning his 
appointment. However, the latter option has been seen as a sign of capitulation and 
failure on the part of the director to take every step to minimise potential loss to 
creditors than finding solution to the problems of the company which could have 
exculpated him from liability.
154
 In effect, this may be viewed as a step designed by 
the director to protect his personal interest and integrity.  
3.3.3.1    Compensation 
The power to make compensation under section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 lie 
at the discretion of the court. Usually, the courts approach is to determine the actual 
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date the insolvency was triggered by way of its balance sheet. Thus under section 
214, compensation that may be made by the court is the amount by which the net 
deficiency of the company increased between the two dates. The first date is when 
the directors knew or ought to know that the insolvent trading is inevitable. The 
second date is the one involving the start of liquidation.
155
 The judge’s discretion in 
making orders under section 214 is too wide. The court may not necessarily order 
that a director make payment, even if he or she has engaged in wrongful trading. If 
the judge decides to order that payment be made, it has to be the actual amount. This 
makes it difficult for a liquidator to determine the likely award by the court.
156
 
Since the court has been given wide discretionary powers under section 214 
particularly in deciding the quantum of contribution payable,
157
 it could consider the 
culpability of the director in the wrongful trading, with the effect that an honest, 
naive director might be viewed with leniency whilst a reckless director might attract 
little sympathy. It is submitted that the exercise of courts discretion under this 
circumstances is questionable as the intention of section 214 is to provide 
compensation rather than penalise directors. In Re Produce Marketing Consortium 
Ltd
158
 the court recognised that the amount of compensation is at the discretion of the 
courts,
159
 but nevertheless upheld the fact that the jurisdiction of section 214 was 
compensatory in nature and not penal. To this extent, therefore, the amount of 
compensation is not dependent on the state of mind of directors,
160
 but on the loss 
sustained by the company, and the ultimate prejudice to creditors. Before now, it was 
thought that a secured creditor which held a floating charge has priority to the 
proceeds of the contribution under the terms of the order.
161
 This presumption has 
however changed following the Court of Appeal decision in Re Oasis Merchandising 
Services Ltd
162
 which changed the law and held that the priority being afforded to 
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holders of floating charge is unsustainable.
163
 To this extent, the benefits of the order 
made pursuant to section 214 are not affected by the claim of prior interest of any 
floating charge.
164
 
3.3.3.2    Who can make an Application in Respect of Wrongful Trading    
The only person empowered to make an application under the section is the 
liquidator.
165
 By this provision, creditors are excluded from making such an 
application. As no opportunity is provided to creditors, this may prejudice them, 
particularly where the liquidator exhibits a cautious approach towards taking out 
proceedings against the erring directors.
166
 The huge capital outlay required to 
initiate such proceedings may be a discouraging factor to the liquidator 
notwithstanding the public importance of instituting such action. Anecdotal evidence 
indicates that a sum in the region of £50,000 is needed, even for relatively small 
claims.
167
 Again, as the liquidator may not be a beneficiary, he may not be concerned 
with the amount of money that can be obtained for the benefit of the creditors.  
Putting these factors together, it becomes difficult to accept why a creditor may not 
be allowed to take action for recovery against the director. One possible argument 
weighing against it is that the proceeds of an order under section 214 is not directed 
for the benefit of a particular creditor but to the whole group of creditors.
168
  
3.3.3.3    Assessment of the Wrongful Trading Provision  
Section 214 of the Insolvency Act has been hailed as positive by a number of 
commentators despite the associated problems arising from it. While some have 
regarded it as being capable of shaping the minds of directors in the wake of the 
likely insolvency of companies,
169
 others have variously seen it as unquestionably 
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one of the most important developments in company law this century;
170
 it has been 
viewed as a welcome development and additional weapon in the fight against abuse 
of limited liability by directors of trading companies,
171
 and as offering a bright 
future for the provision of much needed protection to creditors.
172
 
Despite the encomiums poured on the wrongful trading provision, it has in reality 
been seen to have failed to achieve its objective. The reasons attributed to this failure 
have been wide and varied. Apart from paucity of reported cases,
173
 only a small 
number of compensation claims on behalf of creditors for wrongful trading against 
directors have been successful.
174
 In most cases, the courts do not appear ready to 
impose liability on directors, and this is particularly true where the directors have 
sought and obtained advice from professionals. Indeed, the cases suggest that only 
the most irresponsible of directors have been found liable for wrongful trading by 
judges.
175
 Further empirical research carried out by Hicks has also revealed that only 
on rare occasions have any actions for wrongful trading been brought against 
directors who are disqualified under section 6 of the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986.
176
 The provision has been fundamentally flawed as it 
placed no ready funds in the hands of the liquidator to pursue claims for recovery 
against directors. As the funds needed to pursue these claims are quite enormous, 
liquidators are reluctant to institute compensation claims unless there are funds 
available to cover not only the cost incurred by the liquidator himself, but also the 
costs against the liquidator himself in favour of the other party from whom recovery 
is sought in the event of failure in the recovery proceedings.
177
 Another factor is that 
in many cases the directors in question have insufficient assets to make them worth 
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suing.
178
 The result has been the failure to achieve a more efficient regulation of the 
wrongful trading activities of directors.
179
  
Another major problem associated with wrongful trading provision is its inability to 
make specifications as to the precise action a director is required to take to meet its 
requirements.
180
 Rather than lay down a rule to which the director must conform to 
in order to avoid liability, it seems to provide an across-the-board standard of every 
step to be taken to minimise potential loss to company’s creditors in the course of 
insolvent liquidation.
181
 Crucial at this juncture are two unanswered question: at 
what point can it be said that there is no reasonable prospect of the company 
avoiding insolvent liquidation; and what can we say constitutes “every step” taken to 
minimise loss to creditors?  These two questions lack answers.  
The wrongful trading provision in the UK appears to be at variance with similar 
insolvency regimes in other jurisdictions in terms of certainty and scope of liability 
and procedure for recovery. In Australia for instance, the point at which liability is 
attracted seems to be more definite. Under the Australian provision, a duty is 
imposed on the directors to prevent their companies from incurring debts at the time 
of insolvency.
182
 Thus where a director incurs debts at the time of the company’s 
insolvency, he may be liable for recovery by the liquidator to such amounts as may 
be equal to the amount of loss or damage suffered by the company as a result of the 
insolvent trading.
183
 In addition, the Australian law grants the creditors the right to 
pursue claims against the directors for insolvent trading subject, although it requires 
the consent of the liquidator or the leave of the court.
184
 It further imposes liability 
on the holding company for the insolvent trading of its subsidiary.
185
 Like section 
214 of the Insolvency Act, the Australia law had no provision for the insolvency of 
the group. In New Zealand, the reckless trading provision imposes liability against a 
director not merely where there is a loss, but rather where there is a substantial risk 
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of serious loss to the company’s creditors.186 Thus, a director is required not to 
perform any obligation unless he believes, on reasonable grounds, that the company 
has the ability to perform the obligation when required to do so. This provision 
therefore requires knowledge on the part of the director concerning the incurring of 
the debts, which is different to Australia’s insolvent trading provision and section 
214 of the insolvency Act. 
Following the above, it is submitted that section 214 of the Insolvency Act can be 
strengthened by ensuring clarity in the law as to when liability could arise against a 
director. It is apparent on the face of the law that the term “no reasonable prospect” 
in relation to when liability may arise is somewhat vague and difficult to interpret. 
The use of the term at the moment renders the provision vulnerable to various and 
contradictory interpretations. It also makes it difficult for the liquidator to ascertain 
when the liability of the director can be said to have started running. One way to 
solve this problem is by providing a time limit between when insolvency sets in and 
the time the director is expected to stop trading. It is suggested that a period of thirty 
days should be given for the director to initiate an insolvency case on reasonable 
ground that the company has no prospects of recovering or incuring liability 
thereafter. 
On the issue of funding proceedings, it is submitted that the Secretary of State should 
be granted the powers to bring section 214 proceedings in the overall public 
interest.
187
 Alternatively, creditors may be allowed to pursue recovery actions as a 
class without recourse to a liquidator.  These measures will ultimately relieve the 
liquidator the burden of looking for funds to pursue claims against the incompetent 
directors. 
Finally, the nature of the provision which affects the extent of the contribution that 
the court may order should be clarified, whilst liability of companies in a group 
should be dealt with by the group as whole, liable with all its assets.  
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3.4 Disqualification of Directors  
Disqualification of directors is another mechanism deployed in the UK to deal with 
delinquent directors who have abused the corporate form. The Disqualification of 
Directors Act 1986 (CDDA 1986) aims to strengthen corporate responsibility and 
accountability. As pointed to by Browne Wilkinson VC in Re Lo-Line Electric 
Motors Ltd,
188
 the primary purpose of disqualification provisions was “not to punish 
the individual but to protect the public against the future conduct of companies by 
persons whose past records as directors of insolvent companies have shown them to 
be a danger to creditors and others.” A director for the purposes of disqualification 
includes a de jure, de facto and shadow directors.
189
 However, in Holland v Revenue 
and Customs & anor
190
 the Supreme Court held that merely acting as a director of a 
corporate director of a company and performing duties in that capacity without more 
is not sufficient for a de facto directorship of that company.  
Thus, where a director engages in fraudulent or wrongful trading
191
 or has been 
found guilty of other misconduct in connection with a company and is held to be 
unfit by the court, he may be disqualified by a court order or have a disqualification 
order accepted by the Secretary of State under the Directors Disqualification Act 
1986 (CDDA).
192
 Such a disqualification order may include periods ranging between 
two and fifteen years.
193
  
The ‘other misconduct’ identified above for the purposes of a disqualification order 
may include persistent breaches of companies legislation,
194
 where there has been 
fraud in relation to a company’s promotion or management, 195  or where an 
individual was a director of a company which became insolvent and the individual’s 
conduct with that company or another company makes him unfit to act as director in 
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the future. In the case of the unfit director, the Act imposes mandatory 
disqualification orders which must be complied with by the courts.
196
  
Owing to the seriousness of imposing such an “unfitness” order or undertaking, what 
has to be proved is “breach of commercial morality”,197 lack of commercial probity 
or “gross negligence or total incompetence”. 198  Commercial morality is relevant 
within the context of creditor protection. However, the whole concept of “unfitness” 
lacks clarity and can be subject to variety of interpretations that rest on questions of 
fact and not of law.
199
 In Cathie v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and 
Skills[No.2),
200
 it was held that when considering appeals against disqualification, a 
court would better be guided by the use of the phrase ‘extenuating circumstances’ 
than by the phrase ‘exceptional circumstances’. The court must look at the situation 
as a whole, to see whether a director had fallen below standards of probity and 
competence appropriate for directors. As Cheffins points out, the extent to which 
disqualification performs a screening function is very much open to debate.
201
 
Consequently, many individuals whose conduct does not meet the standard 
prescribed by the Act still operate as directors.
202
 Worse still, most disqualification 
orders come too late to resolve problems. Secretary of State for Business, Innovation 
and Skills v Gifford & Ors
203
 exemplified this. This is largely because it is only after 
the companies have failed and debts been incurred that action is taken. There is also 
little to ensure compliance even after obtaining disqualification orders and there are 
no schemes of arrangement to ensure that disqualified directors resign or that a 
director is affected for the first time.
204
 The sanctions provided under CDDA 1986 
ss.13 and 15 for criminal and personal liabilities for the company’s debts if there is 
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breach of a disqualification order have not been adequately utilised because of the 
huge cost involved in order to obtain a disqualification order. This leaves directors in 
breach of a disqualification orders with no appropriate sanctions. 
Following the amendments to the CDDA 1986 introduced by the Insolvency Act 
2000, directors who are subject of intended disqualification proceedings are now 
required to give an undertaking to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and 
Skills not to act as a director for a given period.
205
 This procedure does not require a 
court order and consequently, avoids the expense of disqualification proceedings in 
the courts. Milman observed that, the number of disqualifications appears to be on 
the decline following this new measure which has seen a high percentage of 
disqualifications implemented through the use of undertaking procedure.
206
 
However, it is not clear whether the declining numbers are due to improved 
managerial standards and the exclusion of those Milman referred to as ‘cowboys’ 
from managing limited liability companies or the effect of the shrink on public 
finance which has imposed expenditure cuts on the authorities empowered to process 
information made available to them by insolvency practitioners.
207
 In any event, the 
fact that an undertaking has the same effect as a court order even though provisions 
exist for its variation where there is a change of circumstances signify the essence of 
the reform process.
208
 
3.5 Phoenix Companies   
The Insolvency Act 1986 allows the court to lift the corporate veil in cases of so – 
called “phoenix Companies”, in which a new company is created with the same or 
similar name to an insolvent company. Section 216 of the Insolvency Act makes it 
an offence for anyone who was a director of the Insolvent company during 12 
months before liquidation to be associated with a company with similar name as the 
Insolvent company or a name so similar as to suggest an association.
209
 Section 217 
provides that where a person is involved in the management of a company in 
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contravention of s.216, or where he acts, or is willing to act, on instructions given by 
a person whom he knows to be in contravention of that section, he is himself liable 
jointly and severally with the company for all the relevant debts. 
A phoenix company is one which has been reborn soon after its failure. The new 
company which is unable to pay its debt takes on the failed company business, often 
using a similar name with the same managers and directors and the same assets 
under the guise of a new limited liability, but disclaiming any responsibility for the 
debt of the predecessor.
210
  
Under this arrangement, a new company is formed (the “phoenix company”). 
Typically, before the new company is placed into liquidation, the directors of that 
first company transfers the profitable aspects of the first company to the new 
company, at under value. The directors of the first company then carry on with the 
second company. In sum, the meaning, scope and dimension of Phoenix Company is 
best captured by the Company Law Review as follows: 
The ‘phoenix’ problem results from the continuance of a failed 
company by those responsible for that failure, using the vehicle of a 
new company.The new company, often trading under the same or 
similar name, uses the old company’s assets, often acquired at an 
undervaluation, and exploits its goodwill and business opportunities. 
Meanwhile the creditors of the old Company are left to prove their 
debts against a valueless shell and the management control their 
previous failure from the public.
211
 
 
From the above, it may be argued that the phoenix is inimical to public interest being 
that it tends to remove the assets of the first company beyond the reach of the 
creditors thus depriving them payment of their debt.   
In addition to the above, the phoenix syndrome allows for mistaken identity in terms 
of name and management and has the capability of confusing creditors and those in 
transaction with the two companies. The result is that the cycle of abuse will 
continue undetected. 
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Unlike the fraudulent trading provision which does not allow creditors to maintain 
action against the directors for recovery, claims under section 217 to enforce 
personal liability can be brought by individual creditors as opposed to the 
liquidator.
212
 In order to prove liability under section 217 of the Insolvency Act, the 
claimant does not need to prove that he has been misled by the prohibited act. The 
court will be satisfied if he is able to adduce evidence showing that the two company 
names had a tendency to mislead.
213
  
The essence of the prohibition against phoenix company is to protect public interest 
and safeguard the rights of corporate creditors.  
3.6 Conclusion 
The chapter has explored the development of the law in the UK in the light of the 
decision of Salomon v Salomon which confirmed the separate personality of the 
company and limited liability for members. The result drawn from the analysis 
reveals that legal responses to the principles of separate legal personality and limited 
liability in the UK since after the decision in the Salomon’s case have been cautious. 
In most cases, the courts and the legislature have followed a strict and formalistic 
approach in the application of the case and have reluctantly lifted the veil of the 
corporation only in few, exceptional circumstances. 
In the absence of clear guidelines by the legislature, the courts have had to rely on 
common law tests to deal with issues arising from strict application of Salomon’s 
case. This has however resulted in conflicting judgments from various courts on 
similar subjects. A measure of clarity appears to have been laid in Adams v Cape 
Industries Ltd. Although this landmark case sets out the current law on judicial 
attitude to Salomon’s case, it came with its own confusions and apparent injustices. 
The case has effectively foreclosed tort victims from making claims against parent 
companies in the UK in respect of wrongs done to them by the action of their 
subsidiaries in a group situation. It further recognised the distinctiveness and 
separate personality of each company in the group. The case merely reiterated the 
decision in Salomon and narrowed the scope under which the corporate veil can be 
lifted in the UK. The result is that, except in cases of fraud or sham or where the 
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company is a mere facade, the corporate veil cannot be pierced. The effect is that 
lifting of the corporate veil can only be founded in contract as opposed to tort and 
only in the limited circumstances highlighted above.  
There seems to be nothing in the cases to suggest that liability has been imposed on 
the corporate shareholders for corporate abuse or that the corporate veil has been 
lifted to reach the assets of shareholders or the parent companies. This is a major 
lacuna in the UK corporate veil doctrine. It is therefore submitted that a well thought 
out corporate veil lifting, unlike the present approaches, should emphasize not only 
imposing liabilities on shareholders and directors but in engaging in the whole 
programme of activities that will aim at tracing and recovering the gains of these 
shareholders following their improper use or abuse of the corporate form. In this 
regard, there is need for equitable intervention in this area of the law. 
Although the legislature has moved more rapidly than the courts to impose liabilities 
on corporate controllers, the provisions considered reveals problems of adequacy of 
the laws, procedural defects and difficulties in implementation. It has been found that 
it is extremely difficult to make claims under fraudulent trading provision owing to 
the high standard of proof required largely because it contained elements of criminal 
and civil intent. On the other hand, the wrongful trading provision has also been 
found inadequate owing to the fact that it placed commencement of proceedings in 
the hand of liquidators, thus effectively denying creditors the right to maintain such 
action.  
Given the foregoing analysis, it is submitted that the existing law in the UK both at 
common law and under statute for lifting the corporate veil are far from being 
satisfactory. A more functional, flexible and equitable approach should be adopted in 
veil piercing claims. This will enable the courts to incorporate notions of justice and 
policy and widen the scope of categories based on the merits of each case. With this 
in place, the courts can and should impose liability on a shareholder or director that 
induces a corporation to generate mass risk with negative value or abuse of the 
corporate form. His personal assets should equally be reached in order to recover any 
gain made by him through the improper use of the corporate form. Furthermore, it is 
proposed that the single economic unit theory based on actual or potential control of 
the parent company over the subsidiary be revived. This will obviate the apparent 
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injustices associated with veil piercing claims within the context of corporate groups 
and restore certainty in this area of law in the UK. 
Section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 needs to be redrafted to settle the issues of 
funding, liability of directors and the precise time the company’s insolvency could 
be said to have set in. The introduction of a detailed scheme consisting of a precise 
set of measures is required for action in dealing with these problems. One such 
measure could be to give the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry the power to 
bring action for wrongful trading on his own initiative or to allow creditors to bring 
such action in the form of a class. This will remove the burden from the liquidator in 
terms of cost to bring an action. Further to this, there should be clarity on the precise 
time the liability of a director commences under the law within the meaning of 
“every steps”. Timing is an important ambiguity within section 214. It is proposed 
that instead of speculation by the director or leaving the timing within the discretion 
of the courts, a period of thirty days be given to the director between the time 
insolvency sets in and the time he should stop trading. In addition, it is proposed that 
there should be a specific provision which particularly makes directors personally 
accountable for corporate debts. This will make them more responsive to creditor’s 
interest and minimise uncertainty that surrounds this area of the law. 
The importance of examining the state of law in the UK in the wake of Salomon’s 
case is particularly pertinent in light of the fact that the entire gamut of the corporate 
law and the corporate form was transplanted from the UK to Nigeria. The huge 
impact made by the UK corporate law on Nigeria, particularly in terms of the 
application of the corporate form, will be looked into below with a view to drawing 
appropriate comparisons.  
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CHAPTER 4    RECOGNITION, INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION: 
DOCTRINE OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY IN NIGERIA  
4.1 Introduction 
The separate legal personality of the company as encapsulated in the case of 
Salomon v Salomon
1
 is an often neglected, confused and somewhat misapplied area 
of corporate law in Nigeria. While it is difficult for some people in Nigeria to 
distinguish between a company and its owners, others see it as a fiction and 
imaginary thing existing only in the minds of lawyers. Yet a third group, including 
controlling shareholders and directors, who appears to know what it means has 
misapplied its use.  
Salomon’s case remains one of the most frequently cited cases in British 
Commonwealth, applied and interpreted in a many different circumstances. This has 
wide and varied implications on the evolution and practice of company law in 
Nigeria, particularly in terms of corporate fraud and abuses, the effectiveness of the 
laws in dealing with the problem arising from its application as well as probable 
solutions.  
This chapter examines the operation of corporate personality in Nigeria and the 
inherent problems associated with its application. It begins with a brief analysis of 
the evolution of company law in Nigeria, the recognition, interpretation and 
application of Salomon’s principles in Nigeria and the grounds upon which the veil 
of the corporation can be lifted under various statutes and by the courts in Nigeria to 
find liability against corporate controllers. Whilst it will be demonstrated that there 
are areas where Nigerian corporate law can learn lessons from the UK experience, 
this chapter will demonstrate that Nigeria as a developing country is in dire need of 
an equitable approach to dealing with the abuses of the corporate form. This is 
particularly important because the existing common law approach, with its rigid 
application of the Salomon principles, appears inadequate to deal with the scourge of 
the abuse of corporate form. It is on this score that the chapter seeks to contribute to 
the meagre literature on corporate personality and the limited liability of members of 
                                                          
1
 [1897] AC 22 
105 
 
corporation in developing economies by bringing a Nigerian perspective to the 
application of corporate personality.  
4.2 Development of Company Law in Nigeria 
Nigeria’s contact with the British, first through trading and later through colonialism 
in the 19
th
 century, had the effect of creating and changing the existing structures and 
legal mechanism of what later became the country called Nigeria. This included the 
development of company law.
2
 
Prior to contact with the British, the people today known as Nigerians were mainly 
agriculturists who practiced farming at the subsistence level. There was no 
commercial activity until the abolition of the slave trade and its replacement with 
legitimate trade in the second half of the 19th century.
3
 The emergence of legitimate 
trade saw increased ascendancy of British trading activities in the area called the 
Niger Delta Basin.
4
  To benefit from these trading activities in the Niger Delta Basin, 
the United African Company was established by George Goldie.
5
 In line with the 
charter activities of the time, the company received concession for the areas 
surrounding the Niger River under the charter of the Royal Niger Company in 1886.
6
 
The company faced stiff competition from a number of equally ‘rough-hewn British’ 
merchants who were originally slave traders but later became engaged with 
mercantilist trading activities following the abolition of the obnoxious slave trade.
7
 
With these rapidly developing trading activities and stiff competition from the 
traders, ground rules had to be laid. This was achieved with the establishment of a 
formal British Authority in the second half of nineteenth century. 
                                                          
2
 See K.D. Barnes, Cases and Materials on Nigerian Company Law, Obafemi Awolowo University 
Press Limited, Ile-Ife, Nigeria, 1992, 63; See also Motosho v Registered Trustees of Diocese of 
Ibadan, (1966) 1 All N.L.R. 287, per Brett, J.S.C. at 293 and A. Alliot, The Limits of Law, 
Butterworths, London, 1980, 170. 
3
 J.O Orojo, Nigerian Company Law and Practice, Mbeyi & Associates (Nig.) Ltd, Lagos-Nigeria, 
1976, 1 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 See the history of United African Company (UAC) in http://www.uacplc/company/history.htn, 
accessed on 18 July, 2012. 
6
 The Royal Niger Company was a mercantile company chartered by the British Government in the 
Nineteenth century. It formed the basis of the modern state of Nigeria. For detailed information of the 
activities of the Royal Niger Company, see Obaro Ikime, Groundwork on Nigerian History, Ibadan 
University Press, Ibadan-Nigeria, 2000, 23. 
7
 See R.Law (ed.), From Slave Trade to Legitimate Commerce: The commercial Transition in 
Nineteenth-Century West Africa, London, 1995,278; See also K.M Amaeshi, et al, ‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) in Nigeria: Western Mimicry or Indigenous Practices?’ in 
http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/1091, accessed on 19 July, 2012  
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The establishment of colonial rule meant that certain laws were introduced in order 
to maintain peace and order in the territory; these were coupled with the common 
law, doctrines of equity and other British legislations which were received as part of 
statute of general application that had come into force in England on 1
st
 January, 
1900 and were altogether called received laws. With the amalgamation of Northern 
and Southern protectorates and with the Colony of Lagos, these laws were made to 
cover the whole of the country. This became effective by virtue of section 14 of the 
Supreme Court ordinance 1914 which provides as follows: 
Subject to the terms of this or any other ordinance, the common law, 
the doctrines of equity, and the statutes of general application in 
England on the 1
st
 day of January, 1900 shall be in force within the 
jurisdiction of the Court. 
 
Interestingly, it was during this period that the famous case of Salomon v Salomon 
was decided. The effect of this on company law was that the English common law 
and the doctrine of equity applicable to company law in England were both made 
applicable to Nigeria, albeit subject to any later relevant local statutes. It was in this 
connection that the concept of the separate and independent legal personality of the 
company as stated in Salomon v Salomon was so received and has since become part 
of Nigerian law. Similarly, other English laws relating to company affairs such as the 
doctrine of ultra vires and the English Companies Act 1862 which consolidated the 
Joint Stock Companies Act 1856
8
 and subsequent amendments providing for limited 
liability, the introduction of the modern form of the memorandum and articles of 
association in place of deeds of settlement, and contained provision for winding up, 
were all made applicable as part of the pre-1900 English statute of general 
application. In the absence of indigenous corporations and local laws requiring 
incorporation during this period, foreign companies operating in the colony of Lagos 
were governed by the laws of their respective countries. As most of the companies 
were English corporations, they enjoyed advantages of limitation of liability as long 
as they were registered in England.
9
      
                                                          
8
 19 & 26 Vict. C. 89; Great Britain Pub. Gen. Stats, 277, 1856. The Act was the first English 
enactment relevant to Nigeria. 
9
 Orojo, n.3 above. 
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Thus with the reception of English laws into Nigeria and the growth of legitimate 
trade which developed rapidly in the 19
th 
century and continued into the early 20
th
 
century, attempts were made to enact laws which would reduce the tendency of 
having to go to England to ascertain the position of the law on controversial 
company issues.
10
 The first of these laws was the Companies ordinance of 1912
11
 
which was in force only in the colony of Lagos but was later extended to the entire 
country following the amalgamation of Southern and Northern Nigeria in 1914. 
Progressively, the country made successive company laws beginning with the 
Companies Decree 1922 which repealed both the 1912 and 1917 ordinances and the 
1968 Companies Decree which was fashioned along the lines of the United Kingdom 
Companies Act 1948 as part of the recommendations of the Jenkins committee
12
 and 
was listed in the Exclusive Legislative list of the 1979 constitution. To boost the 
innovations of the Companies Act 1968, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act 
1977
13
 and the 1968 Act made copious provisions for the first time on matters such 
as mandatory provisions for accounts and greater accountability of directors, while 
part X made inputs towards checking the excesses of company officers. 
However, the 1968 Act was criticised as being inadequate to deal with the rapid 
economic and commercial developments of the country particularly with the 
introduction of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Acts, intended to promote 
indigenous enterprises.
14
 One of the major defects of the Act, as with most colonial 
company statutes, was the failure to state the law in a systematic, comprehensive and 
chronological form. As pointed out by Orojo,
15
 the 1968 Act was little more than the 
putting together of some of the sections of the repealed 1922 Ordinance re-
designated Companies Act 1963, and some sections of the English Companies Act 
1948. A clear example of the failure of the 1968 Act was its inability to provide a 
legal framework to regulate the activities of companies in Nigeria through effective 
                                                          
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Ibid. See also the Southern Nigeria Ordinance 1910-1912. 
12
 See the preamble to the 1968 Companies Act. 
13
 Now Cap No 117 Laws of the Federation 2004. 
14
 See the Nigerian Enterprises Promotions (Indigenisation) Decree (NEPD) of 1972 which puts in 
place a framework for the varied transfer of majority equity ownership of expatriate businesses to 
Nigerians. See also Federal Republic of Nigeria, Second National Development Plan 1970-74: 
Programme of Post-War Reconstruction and Development, 1970 at 239. Prior to indigenization, the 
Nigerian economy was dominated by foreign businesses; F. Odufalu, Indigenous Enterprises in 
Nigerian Manufacturing, The Journal of Modern African Studies 9, 1971, 599. 
15
 See Orojo, n.3, at 20 
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registration, control and monitoring in the absence of a separate commission from 
the Ministry of Trade.  It therefore became expedient to repeal the Act, allow for 
consultation and review, and eventually replace it with a new Act able to take 
cognisance of the country’s developmental activities as well as protect the interests 
of the investors, the public and that of the nation as a whole.
16
 This gave birth to the 
Law Reform Commission set up in 1987 by the Federal Government and headed by 
Justice Orojo whose work ushered in the present Companies and Allied Matters Act 
1990
17
 (hereinafter referred to as CAMA) and other amendments such as the 
Investment and Securities Act 2007.
18
  
4.3 Nigerian Approach 
The doctrine of corporate personality established very early in Salomon’s case19 
applies in Nigeria. Section 37 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2004 
(CAMA)
20
 confirms that a company comes into existence as a body corporate on the 
day it is registered by the Corporate Affairs Commission. In doing so, the company 
becomes a separate legal entity - a person in law capable of enjoying rights, 
exercising powers, and incurring duties and responsibilities distinct from the 
members. It can sue and be sued whilst liability of members is limited to the amount 
in their shareholding. In recognising this position of the law, the Nigerian Court of 
Appeal in the recent decision of N.R.I. Ltd v. Oranusi
21
 stated as follows: 
The concept of corporate personality means that once a company is 
incorporated under the relevant laws, it becomes a separate individual 
person from the individual who are its members. It has capacity to 
enjoy legal rights and is subjected to legal duties which do not 
coincide with that of its members. Such a company is said to have 
legal personality and is always referred to as an artificial person. It 
can sue and be sued in its own name. It may own property in its own 
right and its assets, liabilities, rights and obligation are distinct from 
that of its members. A registered company has perpetual succession. 
Thus a change of membership or death of a member does not affect 
the existence of the company. It acquires its capital from its members 
                                                          
16
 See Working papers on the Reform of Nigerian Company Law, Vol. 1, p.3, para.9. 
17
 Cap 59 Laws of the Federation 1990 but later codified in 2004. The law provided for the 
establishment of the Corporate Affairs Commission to administer the affairs of companies, business 
names and incorporated trustees set up under the Act among its improvements.  
18
 Investment and Securities Act Cap No 29 of 2007. 
19
 Salomon v Salomon & Co [1897] AC 22 
20
 At inception the law was called Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 before it was codified in 
2004 
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 [2011] ALL FWLR ( Pt. 577) 760 at 777-778 
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through the sale of shares and invariably distributes the profits in 
form of dividends from the utilization of the capital to its members. 
Companies speak or express their decisions through resolutions, 
which must be validly passed. No member of the company has right 
to unilaterally commit the company on any matter without its consent 
and approval. 
 
The above decision which has been replicated in numerous decisions of Nigerian 
courts re-affirms the essential characteristics of companies in Nigeria and the strict 
adherence to the separate legal personality firmly established in Salomon’s case.22 It 
further confirms the common law prescription crystallised in what is known as the 
rule in Foss v. Harbottle
23
and codified in section 299 of CAMA that the proper 
plaintiff in an action in respect of a wrong alleged to be done to a company or 
association is the company itself. The provision of section 299 of CAMA is made 
subject to certain exceptions contained in section 301(2) of CAMA which seeks to 
protect minority shareholders not only for the enforcement of personal rights, but 
also corporate rights. However, problems often arise where the shareholder is 
seeking to enforce a right which strictly belongs to the company. There is always the 
question of locus standi in such a situation. The rationale for the rule that a company 
is a proper plaintiff for wrong done against it is based on the fact that it is not the 
duty of the court to run the affairs of the body corporate for the body.
24
 The 
provision of section 299 of CAMA above which tends to shield majority 
shareholders, directors and indeed corporate controllers has given rise to all sorts of 
manipulation in the guise of operating through the corporate form, particularly where 
the derivative action, for example is premised on fraud on the company or fraud by 
those in control. To establish fraud as a basis for legal action, the minority 
shareholder must be seized of detailed information beyond what may be gleaned 
from the company’s books of account and auditor’s report. In most cases, such 
information is very difficult to get due a lack of effective disclosure mechanisms, 
particularly in a country like Nigeria.  
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 See for example the decisions in Saleh v B.O.N. (2006) 6 N.W.L.R (Pt. 976) 220; Laban-Kowa v 
Alkali (1991) 9 NWLR (Pt 602); Comet Shipping Agencies Nigeria Limited v. Babbit (Nigeria) 
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4.3.1 Insider Corporate Abuses  
Insider corporate abuses have remained a dominant feature of the Nigerian corporate 
history in the last few decades. This is evident in the fact that incorporating a limited 
liability company is seen as a status symbol by an average Nigerian and as a means 
of maximising the wealth of the controlling shareholders or directors, even in some 
cases by defrauding creditors, instead of being used to promote commerce and 
entrepreneurship and further economic growth and development. These companies 
often get people to make payments without intending to supply goods and services as 
promised.  One commentator on the Nigerian economy
25
 has blamed the abuse of the 
corporate form on what he called “the culture of Nigerian entrepreneur as a lone 
ranger” which took its root from the oil boom years of the 1970s when money was 
readily available in Nigeria because of huge oil exports in the international oil 
market. During this period, it was possible for those in business to get huge loans in 
excess of the equity capital of their business from banks, most of which are 
government controlled, without collateral. Many of the loans were not repaid.
26
 
Under this scenario, entrepreneurship flourished from 1970 through to the early 
1980’s and most businesses that were sole proprietorships emerged without equity 
participation from others. As most of these private companies are family-run 
companies, there is rarely any distinction between ownership and management. Thus 
in these type of companies, the shareholders are also directors of the company and, 
in certain cases, the majority shareholder is the sole director.  
While it may be disputed that oil boom alone laid the foundation for the abuse of the 
corporate form in Nigeria, it nonetheless brought in its wake the emergence of a 
corporate culture where limited liability lacked form and substance. With this culture 
in mind, these companies became instruments for which their incorporators used to 
siphon the oil wealth, engage in contrived contracts and fraud, and obtain loans from 
banks with little or no collaterals. With the prevalence of informality, irrationality 
and the almost total absence of corporate organisation such as meetings, proper 
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record keeping (including accounts and the observance of rules), there emerged a 
negative corporate practice in Nigeria. This practice has continued through to today. 
A recent feature of the abuse of the corporate form is the tendency of bank directors 
to establish companies without genuine business interest and activities as fronts to 
get loans from their banks. These directors often give loans to their children, wives, 
relatives and associates without securing collaterals. This practice mirrors the nature 
of business undertakings in Nigeria, most of which are predominantly family-owned 
with a propensity for being closed corporations set up, as earlier pointed out, with no 
genuine business intentions and lacking in form and substance. With the mask of 
corporate personality shielding these unscrupulous incorporators, who may be 
regarded as the emerging elite or business classes, the courts appear to be 
increasingly frustrated in dealing with them. The consequence of this situation is the 
distress syndrome by banks in Nigeria in the late 1980s, 1990s and 2009, which were 
owned by powerful individuals in the society, and the failure of most corporations 
with the attendant loss of depositor’s funds.27 This has attracted the attention of the 
regulatory agencies such as the Central bank of Nigeria (CBN) and invoked response 
from the Nigerian Government through various publications and regulatory 
activities. Indeed in one of its publications entitled “Insider Related Credit 
Facilities”, the CBN stated as follows: 
One of the endogenous factors that caused the last generalised distress 
in the financial system was the magnitude of non-performing facilities 
granted to key shareholders and directors of banks and their related 
interests...however reports of routine examinations of banks by both 
the Central Bank of Nigeria and the Nigeria Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (NDIC) have indicated that many banks have continued 
to record huge amounts of insider-related credit facilities, many of 
which have been classified as either doubtful or lost.
28
  
 
Nigeria is an interesting case to explore in terms of the application of corporate 
personality principles and the inherent abuses in the system. First, it is the dominant 
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and most populous black- country in the world, and its influence both within sub-
Saharan Africa and indeed the global oil market makes an interesting inquiry into the 
conduct of business in the country and beyond. Second, unlike in the UK and other 
western countries, corruption both in public and private enterprises appears 
prominent. Whilst most businesses are set up with no real intention of providing 
goods and services, the majority of such endeavours are one-man companies and 
small and medium enterprises whose members also double as directors. They are 
owned by wealthy politicians and businessmen who have acquired enormous funds 
through corrupt means and government patronage because of their close relationship 
with those in government. Often, they are drawn from the erstwhile military 
oligarchy which ruled the country for a long time before the return of civilian 
democracy.
29
 Third, the directors of most State corporations and even privatised 
companies under the bureau of public enterprises are appointed by the government as 
their agents and are given access to the judiciary and law enforcement agencies.  
There is clear evidence that Nigerian government’s response to the problem of 
corporate abuses through the existing laws and intensification of regulatory activities 
by way of new laws and regulations and increased Central Bank of Nigeria 
supervisory roles have failed to achieve what they set out to do. A new approach 
aimed at disgorging the assets of these fraudulent shareholders and directors, as well 
as tracing diverted funds through their agents and associates, is required through 
appropriate legislation by government and intervention by the courts. This approach, 
rather than undermining the separate personality principle, will strengthen it, 
particularly for a developing country like Nigeria where it is difficult to separate a 
company from those who run it. An examination of the various approaches adopted 
by the Nigerian courts and statutes to deal with the problems of corporate abuse is 
dealt with below.  
4.4 Disregard of Corporate Personality under Nigerian Laws 
Both the statute and the courts in Nigeria are prepared to lift the veil, though only in 
limited circumstances. These circumstances are shown below. 
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 Nigeria became an independent country on 1
st
 October, 1960. It became a republic in 1963. In 1966, 
a violent change of government took place through a coup d’état. The military ruled the country from 
1966 to 1979 and handed over power to an elected civilian government. The return to civilian 
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4.4.1 Statutory Exceptions to the Separate Personality Doctrine 
The legal framework for companies in Nigeria is set up in the Companies and Allied 
Matters Act (CAMA) 2004. However, there are other laws enacted by the legislature 
which also touches on the running of companies in Nigeria and the conduct of its 
controllers. These include the Central Bank of Nigeria Act
30
 (CBN Act); the 
Investment and Securities Act,
31
 the Failed Banks (Recovery of Debt) and Financial 
Malpractices Act,
32
 the Insurance Act (IA)
33
 and the Banks and other Financial 
Institutions Act (BOFIA).
34
 It is open to the legislature to limit the effects of 
incorporation by a suitably worded statutory provision. These laws permit the veil of 
incorporation to be lifted or disregarded in the following cases: 
4.4.1.1    Reduction of Members below Legal Minimum 
The minimum number of memberships for the formation of a company in Nigeria, 
whether private or public is two.
35
 Only in the case of a private company is a 
maximum placed at fifty persons. Thus where a company’s membership falls below 
the prescribed minimum, the veil of incorporation will be lifted to find liability 
against the corporate controllers. Section 93 of CAMA, which is related to the 
liability for members debts, provides that if a company carries on business without 
having at least two members and does so for more than six months, every director or 
officer of the company during that time it so carries on business after those six 
months who knows that it is carrying on business with only one or no member is 
liable jointly and severally with the company for the debts of the company 
contracted during that period. In this case, the officers and directors will share in the 
liability of the company. 
However, this section should be interpreted as creating an offence, but it only states 
the consequences that follow when a company carries on business for more than six 
months after the members has fallen below the legal stipulated minimum. 
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In Iro v Park,
36
 the Supreme Court of Nigeria reiterated the fact that the section 
warns the directors and officers of the consequent liability to which they are exposed 
but it does not proscribe the company or deny its existence; what it does is to set it 
aside in order to strike at the members. 
The liability imposed on every director or officer of the company by the section may 
easily be avoided, except in cases where the articles impose restrictions on the 
transferability of shares. This is because the liability does not attach until the 
membership has remained below the statutory minimum for six months and it 
attaches only in respect of debts contracted after that time; the directors or officers 
may, therefore, escape personal liability by transferring some of the shares to 
themselves during the six months, if they are not members, so that the number of 
members is restored to the statutory minimum before the expiration date.
37
 
It is important to note that the wording of the section also suggests that those who 
remain after six months are liable only in respect of debts contracted by the 
company, and not in respect of claims for damages against it for breach of contract 
or tort or in respect of statutory claims against the company, whether liquidated or 
not; for instance, this might include taxation, claims by employees for redundancy 
payment or compensation for unfair dismissal.
38
 Every director or officer of the 
company will not incur personal liability merely because the claimant has obtained 
judgment against the company. The amount payable under the judgment is a species 
of debt, but it is not contracted by the company as required under section 93 of the 
Act. Also every director or officer of the company may be sued personally if he is 
liable to a creditor; it is not necessary to wind up the company in order to enforce a 
director or officer’s liability.39 Moreover, there is no limit to a directors or officers 
liability for a debt for which he is personally liable under this section - his liability is 
not limited, as it is normally with a member of a company, to the amount unpaid on 
his shares.   
It is submitted here that the provisions of section 93 of CAMA is designed to prevent 
misuse of corporate entity and limited liability to the detriment of creditors. As 
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 (1972) 12 S.C. 93 at 102 
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 See Pennington’s Company Law, Butterworth, London, 1985, 53. 
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pointed out by Akanki, if the law were to be different, a company that exists without 
real operation, moribund or left in the hands of an inefficient few, might be used to 
contract debts and liabilities which it has become incapable of discharging.
40
 Section 
93 of CAMA ultimately protects the interest of creditors who transacts business with 
a company when the latter is in breach of section 18 of CAMA in respect of a 
minimum number of memberships. 
The essence of section 93 of the CAMA is fortified by the rule under section 408 (c) 
that a company may be wound up by the court if the number of the members is 
reduced below two. Nonetheless, it has to be borne in mind that there is no 
equivalent provision of section 93 of CAMA in the Companies Act 2006 as section 
24 of the 1985 Act has been abolished by the Twelfth Company Law Directive on 
single-member private limited liability companies.
41
  
4.4.1.2    Where the number of Directors falls below a certain Minimum 
Where the number of directors of a company falls below two and the company 
carries on business after sixty days of such depletion, the corporate veil shall be 
lifted to make every director or member of the company who know that the company 
so carries on business after that period liable for all liabilities and debts incurred by 
the company during that period when the company so carries on business. This 
section appears more embracing and explicit than liability under section 93. This 
position is anchored on the fact that liability is not restricted to debts incurred by the 
company during the period but all other liabilities which are outside the ambit of the 
term “debt”. 
4.4.1.3    Personal Liability of Directors and Officers of a Company 
Although there is a clear distinction between a company and its directors and 
members in terms of corporate liability, there are circumstances express or implied 
where a director can still be personally held liable. Consequently, a director may 
incur liability without express assumption of liability. This could be seen where he 
engages in contract in his personal name without disclosing that he was doing so on 
                                                          
40
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behalf of an existing principal. Where such a thing happens, a third party who files 
an action against a director is likely to succeed.
42
  
In the realm of Nigerian law particularly with regards to third party dealings with 
companies generally, section 290 of CAMA is very crucial. It provides that where a 
company receives money by way of  a loan for a specific purpose; or receives money 
or other property by way of advance payment for the execution of a contract or other 
project, with intent to defraud or fails to apply the money or other property for the 
purpose for which it was received, every director or officers of the company who is 
in default shall be personally liable to the party from whom the money or property  
was received. They will be liable for a refund of the money or property so received 
and not applied for the purpose for which it was provided so that nothing in the 
section will affect the liability of the company itself”. This type of statutory 
provision, it is hoped, should go a long way in checking the transgression of some 
types of business indicated earlier which had surfaced in Nigeria since the oil boom 
era and had been used to hood-wink unsuspecting business partners including 
creditors.
43
 
In addition to the above, it can be argued that this provision is apparently designed to 
catch not only those who borrow money from the bank and divert it to their own use, 
but those who receive a mobilization fee without intending to apply them for the 
purpose for which they are paid.
44
 In Public Finance Securities Ltd v. Jefia,
45
 the 
respondent vide the undefended list procedure sued the appellants jointly and 
severally for the recovery of the sum of N3, 593,851.000(Three Million, five 
hundred and ninety three thousand, eight hundred and fifty one naira) with interest 
paid to the first appellant based on the assurance and warranty of the second 
appellant (its Managing Director) that upon maturity he would be paid. The 
appellants failed to fulfil their obligation to the respondent at the appropriate time. 
The appellants upon service of the writ in the matter filed “Notice of Intention” to 
defend the suit. They thereafter filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection. Argument 
was taken on the preliminary objection and in a considered ruling, the court found in 
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favour of the respondent. The trial court proceeded to decide the matter on the 
undefended list and found that the appellants have no defence to the claim. It then 
found the appellants liable jointly and severally to pay to the respondent the sum of 
N3, 593,851.00 (Three Million, five hundred and ninety three thousand, eight 
hundred and fifty one naira) in addition to various sums of interest being made due 
until payment was made. 
Dissatisfied with the ruling, the appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal. The 
Court of Appeal, while unanimously dismissing the appeal, held that by virtue of 
section 290 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 1990 (now 2004), where a 
company receives money by way of loan for a specific purpose, and with the intent 
to defraud, and fails to apply the money for the purpose for which it was received, 
every Director or officer of the company shall be personally liable to the person from 
whom the money was received. Rowland, J.C.A. delivering the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal noted as follows: 
The money invested by the plaintiff represents a loan to the 1
st
 
defendant for the sole purpose of yielding interest. The company is 
not willing to pay and says that it is in some distress and has resorted 
to all sorts of subterfuge in order to avoid payment of the sum 
appearing in the Bond certificates. I have already shown that this is a 
sham and fraudulent defence that is put forward. The question is what 
did they do with the money? It is fraud in my view to establish a 
Financial Institution that collects money from the general public by 
way of investments and turn round to disappoint their legitimate 
expectation under the guise of having a general decline in business 
proceedings. I agree with him. I also agree with him that this a proper 
case to invoke the provisions of section 290 of the Companies and 
Allied Matters Act 1990 to protect the respondent and hold the second 
appellant liable jointly and severally with the 1
st
 appellant for the debt 
owed the respondent.
46
  
                    
Nevertheless, it does appear that a director of a company who has a good business 
proposition and diverts such a loan received on behalf of the company to another 
project in good faith and for good reason is not caught by the provision.
47
 In other 
words, mere innocent misapplication of funds in situations honestly believed to be in 
the best interest of the company will not give rise to personal liability under this 
section. The determination of what constitutes the best interest of the company is not 
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defined in the Act. It is vague and subjective. It is likely that a fraudulent director 
may embark on a project which does not serve the best interest of the company, yet 
declare it to be so. The provision of section 290 of CAMA have regularly been 
invoked by the courts to curb the excesses of directors who misapply their company 
funds for purposes other than what it was meant for. 
Another instance of director’s liability under the Nigerian laws is found in Banks and 
Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA). Section 18(1) of BOFIA prohibits a 
manager or an officer of the company from granting any advance, loan or credit 
facility to any person unless it is authorised in accordance with the rules and 
regulations of the bank. They are further required not to receive any benefit as a 
result of any advance, loan or credit facility granted by the bank. Contravention of 
this provision attracts a fine or term of imprisonment.
48
   
Where a director is involved in the granting of loans or advances, he has a duty to 
declare his interest as well as the nature of such interest in the meeting of the board 
where the loan or facility would be first considered.
49
 This provision is designed to 
avoid a conflict with the duties or interests of being a director of a bank. Any officer 
or director that contravenes the obligations imposed above is liable to punishment on 
conviction.
50
 There is also a general duty imposed on directors and officers of the 
bank, by virtue of section 46 of BOFIA, to take all reasonable steps to ensure 
compliance with the provisions of BOFIA, failing which they are liable to be 
prosecuted. The ultimate sanction for failure to comply with the provision of BOFIA 
is the powers given to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) pursuant to section 12(1) 
of BOFIA to revoke the banking license of the affected bank. Although these 
provisions could be said to have helped to sanitize the banking sector, it remains to 
be seen how effective they are in view of the continued upsurge of corporate abuse 
and insider corporate fraud which has led to numerous bank failures in Nigeria. 
Furthermore, under the Failed Banks (Recovery of debt) and Financial Malpractice 
in Banks Decree (No 18 of 1994) (hereinafter referred to as the Failed Bank Decree), 
all directors and employees both present and past must be joined as parties to any 
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action for recovery which must include the debtor of the bank.
51
 Section 3 (3) (b) (ii) 
of the Decree empowers the court to lift the corporate veil for purposes of 
discovering the members who may be liable jointly, or severally for the debts owed 
by the corporate body.
52
  
The Act was a bold response from the then Nigerian Military government to the 
growing incidence of near collapse of the financial sector through the phenomenon 
of failed banks and other financial institutions in the late 1980s and 1990s. In 
consequence, the Act was promulgated to facilitate the prosecution of those who 
contributed to the failure of banks and to recover the debt owed to the failed banks. It 
made provision for the establishment of a Tribunal to deal with cases arising as result 
of bank failures as well as recover debts owed to banks.   
Under section 19 of the Decree, the persons affected for purposes of liability are 
directors, managers, officers or employees of a bank who grant loans and other 
advances in a manner deemed unethical to the growth and survival of the Bank. This 
includes where any director , manager, officer or employee of a bank knowingly , 
recklessly, negligently, wilfully or otherwise grants, approves the grant, or is 
otherwise connected with the grant or approval of a loan, advance, guarantee or any 
other credit facility or financial accommodation to any person without adequate 
security or collateral, contrary to the accepted practice or the bank’s regulations. 
Liability may also be imposed on the persons affected above where such loans or 
advances were granted without security or collateral where such collateral is 
normally required in accordance with bank’s regulations, or with defective security 
or collateral or without perfecting through his negligence or otherwise, a security or 
collateral obtained. Apparently, because of the incessant abuse of director’s position, 
the Decree widened the scope of the meaning of a director by defining a director to 
include a wife, husband, mother, father, son or daughter of a director. 
53
This was 
designed to get at relatives who served as conduits for these directors to siphon bank 
funds through non- performing loans and advances. 
In terms of the recovery of these loans or advances, the Decree provides that where 
the assets of a debtor company, whether pledged as security or not, are inadequate to 
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offset the company’s debt, the personal property of such a company could be sold 
and applied in satisfaction of the outstanding debts.
54
 Where it becomes impossible 
to locate the security pledged for the loan, or where no security is pledged at all, or 
where the debtor is fictitious, the tribunal was empowered to hold liable for the 
outstanding debts and interests therein on the directors, shareholders, partners, 
managers, officers and other employees of the failed bank who in the performance of 
their duties were found to have been connected in any way with the granting of the 
loan which has become impossible to recover.
55
 
The tribunal set up under the Decree was empowered to deal with matters 
expeditiously devoid of legal technicalities, inefficiencies, loopholes of the legal 
system and to deliver judgment in each case not later than 21 working days from the 
day of its first sitting. The Tribunal was also given powers of remand, and even bail, 
whilst members of the police force or armed forces were empowered to arrest 
offenders under the Act without any warrant;
56
 -trials and sentencing of offenders, 
even in absentia, was also recognised.
57
 Appeals under the Decree can only lie to the 
Appeals tribunal and no more.
58
  
A number of cases that came before these tribunals indicate clear corporate abuses 
and insider corporate fraud by dominant shareholders and directors who use their 
vast personal and family resources to establish banks. In Federal Republic of Nigeria 
v. Ajayi for instance,
59
 the accused person who was the founder of the now defunct 
Republic Bank Ltd was arraigned and convicted on a 17-count charge for failing to 
disclose his interest as soon as possible to the Board of Republic Bank while being a 
director in respect of loans and advances granted to five of his companies contrary to 
section 18(2) of the BOFIA. In addition, he was found liable for contravention of the 
provisions of section 46 of BOFIA in respect of general compliance with the Act. 
Similarly, in Federal Republic of Nigeria v Mohammed Sheriff & 2 Others,
60
the 
accused were found guilty as charged for using their positions to  grant facilities to 
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companies which, at the time the loans were granted they were directors, contrary to 
the provisions of sections 18(2) and 20(1) of BOFIA which requires a disclosure of 
this information for such a transaction to take place. Closely related to the above 
cases is Federal Republic of Nigeria v Alhaji Murnai
61
 where the tribunal made a 
finding of guilt and convicted the accused, a former manager of Nigeria Universal 
Bank, for granting facilities to customers of the bank without lawful authority and in 
contravention of the rules and regulations of the bank regarding the granting of credit 
facilities without taking security or collateral. 
Although the activities of the Tribunal were hailed as laudable and curbing the 
menace of corporate abuse in these individual and family owned banks, it 
nevertheless was criticised for punishing the innocent directors, who, in the course of 
their duties, may have granted loans to their customers in the mistaken belief that 
they would pay them back. The extension of the liability to include relatives of the 
directors made the operation of the decree open to abuse. Finally, the decree and the 
tribunals set up under it did not last long before Decree No 62 of 1999 dissolved the 
Failed Bank Tribunals and transferred all pending part- heard matters before it to the 
Federal High Court following the return of civilian democracy in 1999.
62
 With the 
transfer of the cases to regular court, most of the problems the Decree sought to 
avoid, such as delays, technicalities and undue interference, returned.  
4.4.1.4    Reckless or Fraudulent Trading 
The above provision which is similar to section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986 is 
found in section 506 (1) of CAMA 2004. It seeks to protect corporate creditors by 
holding directors/members personally liable during winding-up proceedings. For the 
section to apply, the court must be satisfied that in the course of winding up a 
company, its business has been carried on in a reckless manner or with intent to 
defraud creditors of the company or creditors of any other person or for any 
fraudulent purpose.  The court may, therefore, on the application of the official 
receiver or creditor or contributory of the company, declare that any persons who 
were knowingly parties to the carrying on of the business in that manner shall be 
personally responsible without any limitation of liability for all or any of the debts or 
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other liabilities of the company as the court may direct.
63
 It can be deducted from the 
provision that it is only operative on winding up and not before. This is also not 
without prejudice to such persons who knowingly participated in the carrying on of 
the business in such fraudulent manner being guilty of a criminal offence. 
Consequently, section 644 of the Act provides that section 506 which imposes 
penalty for certain offences connected with fraudulent trading of a company on 
winding up of company shall be extended and applied to cases where fraudulent 
trading is discovered in circumstances other than winding up. Also, the section does 
not cover only fraudulent trading alone, it also extends to recklessness in carrying on 
the business of the company. 
Section 506 of CAMA suffers the same problem identified with section 213 of the 
Insolvency Act in terms of difficulty to prove “intent to defraud”, which requires 
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Arguably, its own effect is in terms of deterrence of 
corporate controllers whereby, as Pennington has postulated, the separate legal 
personality of the company is ignored, but not its very existence.
64
 
Again, it is difficult to determine judicial attitude in this area of law in Nigeria 
because of a dearth of case law which could have helped to clarify some of the 
contentious areas in the provision. This may be due to the fact that corporate 
insolvency practice is still evolving in Nigeria at a relatively slow rate. Worse still, 
Nigeria does not have a separate Insolvency Act similar to the British Insolvency Act 
of 1986, streamlining insolvency practice in the UK in a single statute and providing 
clear and certain answers to emerging issues. Even in the existing CAMA, there is no 
equivalent section for wrongful trading as is also the case in section 214 of the 
Insolvency Act, which in spite of its inadequacies, is a marked improvement on 
section 213 in terms of the difficulty of proof,  because of its essentially civil 
liability nature. The result is that sections 506 of CAMA evokes confusion among 
practitioners and lawyers in Nigeria and appear unhelpful in dealing with creditor 
protection problems.   
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4.4.1.5    Where the Company is not mentioned on the Bill of Exchange 
Under section 631(1) (c) of CAMA 2004, every company is required to have its 
name mentioned in legible characters, inter alia, in all bills of exchange, promissory 
notes, endorsements and cheques. Sub section 4 provides that if any officer of a 
company, or any person on its behalf, issues or authorises the issue of any bill of 
exchange, promissory note, endorsement, cheque or order, for money or goods 
without the name of the company being so mentioned, he will be liable to the holder 
if any such bill of exchange, promissory notes, cheques or order for the amount 
thereof, unless it is duly paid by the company. If an essential part of the name of the 
company is omitted, that will amount to a breach of the section. In Western Nigerian 
Finance Corporation v. West Coast Builders Ltd
65
 the court held that the omission of 
the word “Limited” on a company’s contract constituted a misdescription of the 
company which rendered the contract null and void. 
It is suggested that section 631(4) be amended so that the signatory will have a 
defence if he can establish the holder had not been misled by the misdescription. 
4.4.1.6    Taxation 
Nigerian law recognises that the corporate veil can be lifted for purposes of ensuring 
compliance with tax liabilities under the Companies’ Income Tax Act. Thus in order 
to ensure that a company complies with the Companies’ Income Tax, it may be 
prudent to pierce the corporate veil in order to determine where the control and 
management of the company is  exercised for this helps to determine whether or not 
a company is a “Nigerian Company” for the purpose of the Companies Income Tax 
Act.
66
 
Ordinarily, one expects the control of a company to be where the board of directors 
functions, although it may not necessarily be so. In some cases, it may be where the 
holding company is or where the managing directors are, especially if they had the 
controlling shares.
67
 However, the place where the management and control is 
exercised is a question of fact as could be seen in Smith, Stone & Knight v. 
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Birmingham Corporation
68 , where the court said that this is determined by “a 
scrutiny of the course of business or trading”. 
4.4.1.7    Holding and Subsidiary Companies 
The classic Salomon v Salomon doctrine requires that each company in a group be 
regarded as a separate entity - each may have its own directors and its own auditors, 
and its own account. It was not until 1948, as a result of the Cohen Committee in the 
UK, that consolidation of the balance sheet and profit and loss account of holding 
and subsidiary companies was required.
69
  
Thus under Section 336 to 338 of CAMA 2004, and notwithstanding the concept of 
corporate personality, companies belonging to a group constitute in effect a single 
commercial unit for many purposes including preparation of a single account so as to 
enable not only the company’s registry but also the investing public to have an 
accurate idea of the financial position. The section therefore provides that where, at 
the end of financial year, a company has subsidiaries, it must prepare group financial 
statements dealing with the state of affairs and the profit and loss account of the 
company and subsidiaries, unless otherwise permitted by the Act. Section 345 
further provides that these must be laid before the company in a general meeting 
when the company’s balance sheet and profit and loss account are displayed. These 
measures are designed to prevent misleading information about the financial position 
of a group of companies controlled by its holding company, which arise where it is 
possible for the controlling company to publish a positive picture of itself without 
reference to the gloomy state of affairs that exist in its subsidiaries.
70
 
Furthermore, the significance of the provisions from the point of view of the 
creditor, is that the group financial statement gives the creditors a total picture of the 
assessing standard of the whole group, so that he will be better informed for the 
purposes of subsequent transaction and/ or the prospects of recovering the debt due 
from any of the companies.
71
 Apart from the above, Orojo has rightly pointed out 
that the effect of such a group account is to depart from the separate independent 
personality of the companies and by so doing demonstrate that they are not only 
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related but are subject to scrutiny, or indeed examination, behind the incorporation 
veil.
72
 However, in practice, there is nothing to show that these companies have 
produced any account depicting the true financial state of the companies, as the 
external auditors of these companies merely rubber stamps figures submitted to 
them. This has led to a situation whereby creditors have had to deal with the 
company relying on such accounts only for them to realise when it is too late that the 
company is in a bad shape financially. 
Another instance where a holding subsidiary relationship is pierced under the Act 
can be found in section 159. The prohibition of financial assistance for the purchase 
of a company’s shares extends to financial assistance by any of its subsidiaries. 
4.4.1.8    Investigation into Related Companies 
Section 314 (1) of CAMA 2004 provides that the Corporate Affairs Commission 
(CAC) may appoint one or more competent inspectors to investigate the affairs of a 
company and to report on them. When an inspector is appointed by the Commission 
to investigate the affairs of any other related company, the inspector may, if he 
thinks it necessary for the purpose of his investigation, investigate into the affairs of 
any other related company and report on the affairs of the other company which may 
be the basis of civil
73
 or criminal action
74
so far as he thinks the result of the 
investigation thereof are relevant to his main investigation. However, such a related 
company may be a corporate body or may have at any time been the company’s 
subsidiary or holding company or a subsidiary of its holding company or a holding 
company of its subsidiary.
75
  
It may be rightly stated that these provisions of the Act for investigation of a 
company and of related companies should be seen as an integral part of a developing 
system of governmental disregard of the corporate veil it has permitted companies to 
drape over themselves.
76
 As Dr Barnes put it: 
It is thought that Corporate Affairs Commission’s power to inspect 
certain companies will facilitate state intervention to make offenders 
subject to relevant civil or criminal liabilities. Such suspicious 
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situations seen in Lasis v Registrar of Companies...readily indicate 
the potential use of these provisions to uncover the real situation 
behind a corporate wall.
77
 
  
In this process, the separate legal personality of the companies may be disregarded.
78
  
Notwithstanding the above, there are still inherent problem with investigation of 
these companies. The first problem may lie with access to information as, 
management often may not be forthcoming with relevant information. This problem 
is similar to that identified in respect of the DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) 
charged with similar responsibilities in the United Kingdom.
79
 However, in the latter 
case they have the power not only to order for books and papers from the company if 
there are good reasons to do so in their internal investigation,
80
 but such power is 
backed by power of entry and search.  Secondly, the commission may lack the 
necessary human and material resources to embark on the investigation. There is yet 
the third problem which relates to the issue of bureaucracy by the CAC who has to 
be convinced that the company’s affairs need to be investigated. The CAC in its 
present state as the main agency for regulating and supervising all corporation 
related matters in Nigeria is weak and perfunctory in performing its duties.
81
  
It is therefore submitted that there is need to improve the schemes for exercising 
control and surveillance over the conduct of company’s affairs by the appropriate 
authority. This will help to put the directors/management of companies in check and 
obviate the likely abuse and potentiality of fraud. Even at that, this provision appears 
to have no impact in the Nigerian corporate scene largely because it does not extend 
to small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs) which constitute about 80 percent of 
the registered companies in Nigeria. These companies owned by a network of 
families of the political and business classes lack all forms of disclosure and have 
become the conduit to perpetuate fraud and launder their loot through legitimate 
corporate channels.   
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4.5 Under Case Law 
Having discussed the express provisions of the Act relating to circumstances under 
which the veil of incorporation may be lifted, it is necessary also to examine the 
judicial in-roads into this field under the Nigerian law. 
Since the decision in Salomon v Salomon, efforts by the judges to lift the corporate 
veil have in general been hamstrung and penetration into the corporate person of 
companies has been extremely difficult. Nevertheless, the Salomon doctrine is not an 
immutable one. 
Like in England and other jurisdictions, courts in Nigeria have refused the use of 
corporate personality for the commission of fraud, improper conduct or to defeat the 
aim of the law. Whenever the use of the doctrine for some certain purposes are 
challenged, the courts look at the intention and activities of the individuals 
composing it to see if the advantages of separate personality of companies are being 
applied to protect interest. In looking at the human instead of the corporate entity 
when it is considered necessary, Nigerian courts do call in aid general principles of 
law and more often allow themselves to be assisted by English authorities. The 
influences of English law on Nigeria remain steadfast, although the decisions by 
English courts are only persuasive and not binding. In addition, English commercial 
law will be applicable in Nigeria, provided there is a lacuna in the law and so long as 
the law is appropriate to local circumstances.
82
  
Efforts will be made to see how the courts, in recent years and in exceptional cases 
lifted the corporate veil in order to look at the realities behind the facade. Courts in 
Nigeria tend to take a fact-based approach to questions of piercing the corporate veil, 
and no particular trend is readily discernible from an overview of the cases. This 
may be attributable to the intensely factual nature of the issues in the cases
83
 or the 
preference to judge each case on its merit.
84
 Review of the cases dealing with this 
issue decided in Nigeria, however, establishes certain broad principles and it is 
appropriate to consider these principles in turn. 
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4.5.1 Fraudulent Use of the Corporate Form 
As is prevalent in the UK, Nigerian courts denote fraud as an important exception to 
the separate personality principle of the company. Consequently, where a company 
is used to perpetrate a fraudulent act, the courts will treat the company and those 
behind it as one and the same. Thus, if a company has been incorporated to defraud 
innocent investors, the courts may hold the promoter liable even though the promoter 
and company are separate persons.
85
  In FDB Financial Services Ltd v Adesola,
86
 the 
Nigerian Court of Appeal reiterated the fact that once there is clear evidence of fraud 
or illegality the veil will be lifted. Manifestation of fraud, as pointed out by Singh, 
could be seen in false accounting, misrepresentation, tax evasion, siphoning off 
corporate finances, money laundering, etc.
87
Whilst the misuse of a corporate entity 
structure depicts the failure of the regulatory system, it may also be attributable as a 
phenomenon embedded in the social system.
88
  
In the case of Nigeria, the fraudulent attitude of incorporators appears more 
prevalent in private limited liability companies than in public limited companies.
89
 
This is largely because the private limited company discloses lesser information in 
the process of its incorporation, operations and activities, vis-a-vis public limited 
companies which have stricter disclosure norms and are under tighter regulations. 
Moreover, a private limited company with minimal subscription is the most 
economical structure for such fraudulent promoters to design a structure, which is 
also, legally, a distinct entity separate from its promoters.
90
 It is arguable whether or 
not this position is completely right in view of numerous bank distresses in Nigeria 
though most of the banks do have top businessmen and politicians as their dominant 
shareholders.
91
 Nonetheless, a survey of the cases in the law reports giveS credence 
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to the preponderance of  fraudulent and sharp business practices among private 
limited liability companies than public companies. 
In all these illuminating line of cases, Nigerian courts have refused to be tied down 
by the entity theory and have shown marked impatience with all attempts to hamper, 
delay or defraud creditors by means of “dummy” of fraudulent incorporations. In all 
such instances, the courts did not hesitate to penetrate the veil and to look beyond the 
juristic entity at the actual and substantial beneficiaries. The decision of the Supreme 
Court in Alade v. Alic (Nig) Ltd
92
 is very important on this point. A summary of the 
plaintiff’s case, as can be gleaned from his pleadings, is that he entered into a 
partnership agreement with the 1
st
 respondent which is a registered company for 
trading on produce that is cocoa beans, palm kernel and other produce generally for 
the 1987/88 season. The 2
nd
 respondent was the Managing director and major 
subscriber of the 1
st
 respondent. Based on the agreement, the appellant raised a loan 
of N240, 000.00 for the take off of the business with the profit accruing from the 
partnership to be shared between the appellant and the respondent on a 40% and 60% 
basis, respectively. The appellant obtained the loan from the International Bank for 
West Africa Ltd. (IBWA). The loan was guaranteed by the Marine and General 
Insurance Company upon an indemnity given by the appellant to the Insurance 
Company. It was the appellant’s case that the 2nd respondent thereafter fraudulently 
failed to disclose the 1
st
 respondent’s prior indebtedness to the International Bank for 
West Africa and this consequently resulted in a substantial sum of the loan procured 
to be deducted from the 1
st
 respondent’s account once deposited to off-set the 
indebtedness of the 1
st
 respondent leaving only a credit balance of N71, 000.00. 
There was a further diversion by the respondents of the sum of N453, 584.50 into the 
2
nd
 respondent’s account and non-disclosure of the sum of N165, 000.00 from a 
major trading customer of the 1
st
 respondent Kopak Ltd. The 2
nd
 respondent kept the 
appellant in the dark of all the transactions of the 1
st
 respondent and refused to render 
account of its trading activities under the partnership.  The appellant further claimed 
that the profit, which occurred to the partnership, was over N1, 000,000.00 (One 
Million Naira) and that his 40% share of the profit was therefore N436, 649.44. 
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Due to the above facts and the inability of the appellant to realize anticipated profit, 
the appellant  instituted this action against the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 respondents claiming the 
sum of N3,296,528.08 (Three Million, Two Hundred and Ninety-six Thousand, Five 
Hundred and Twenty Eight Naira, Eight Kobo) as particularised being damages 
suffered as a result  of the 1
st
 defendant’s breach about March, 1988 of partnership 
agreement entered into at Ibadan between the plaintiff on 1
st
 July, 1987, and which 
breach was masterminded, procured and instigated by the 2
nd
 defendant as agent of 
the 1
st
 defendant in fraud of the plaintiff. 
At the conclusion of evidence, the trial court gave judgment in favour of the 
appellant. 
Being dissatisfied, the respondents appealed to the Court of Appeal which allowed 
the appeal in part but nevertheless set aside the entire damages awarded in favour of 
the appellant by the trial court notwithstanding that it found that the appellant proved 
the special damages awarded him as loss of profits due to him in the partnership 
business. On the appellant’s further appeal against the decision of the Court of 
Appeal, the Supreme Court unanimously allowing the appeal held that it was wrong 
for the Court of Appeal to have dismissed the appellant’s entire claim after having 
held that he proved the special damages awarded by the trial court. The court stated 
clearly that one of the occasions when the veil of incorporation will be lifted is when 
the company is liable for fraud. In fact, the Justices of the Supreme Court in turns 
condemned unequivocally the failure of the business transaction. As for Onnoghen, 
JSC: 
The facts of this case is a clear pointer to the dilemma of the small 
scale business community of this nation such as partnerships. It brings 
to the fore the total absence of honesty and trust between business 
partners and the fraud being perpetrated by some of them. The 
situation revealed by the facts of this case ought not to be encouraged 
by the deployment of legal technicalities irrespective of the case 
pleaded by the plaintiff.
93
 
 
Muntaka-Commassie, J.S.C echoed his own views in the following words: 
It must be stated unequivocally that this court, as the last court of the 
land, will not allow a party to use his company as a cover to dupe, 
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cheat and or defraud an innocent citizen who entered into lawful 
contract with the company, only to be confronted with the defence of 
the company’s legal entity as distinct from its directors. Most 
companies in this country are owned and managed soley by an 
individual, while registering the members of his family as 
shareholders. Such companies are nothing more than one-man 
business. Thence, the tendency is there to enter into contract in such 
company name and later turn around to claim that he was not party to 
the agreement since the company is a legal entity.
94
 
 
On his own part, Rhodes-Vibour, J.S.C stated his opinion on the case as follows: 
The Court of Appeal was of the view that the respondents cannot be 
jointly and severally liable. When an individual (the 2
nd
 respondent) 
used the 1
st
 respondent (the 1
st
 respondent is inanimate) in conducting 
his personal business in the pretence that he was acting on behalf of 
the 1
st
 respondent in the partnership agreement between the 1
st
 
respondent and the appellant the court is left with the only option, and 
that is to liftthe veil of incorporation of the 1
st
 respondent to reveal 
fraud. The court will readily impose liability on the 2
nd
 respondent 
and that liability is joint and several. In this situation, it is necessary 
for justice to be seen to have been done. In my view, I think the Court 
of Appeal missed the point completely. This is not a question of 
reading anything into exhibit P.5. It has to do with lifting the veil of 
incorporation of the 1
st
 respondent in order for the learned trial judge 
to see the fraud perpetrated by the 1
st
 respondent on the 
appellant....The breach of the partnership agreement was 
masterminded, procured and instigated by the 2
nd
 respondent as agent 
of the 1
st
 respondent in fraud of the appellant.
95
 
 
The views of the learned justices of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrate the abuse 
of the corporate form by corporate controllers on the guise of the separate 
personality of the company. There are yet other cases on fraud where the Nigerian 
courts have risen up to the occasion to lift the veil of incorporation in order to get at 
the corporate controllers. 
One other case will serve to make it clear that the courts ignore the concept of legal 
corporate entity when used as a shield for fraudulent attempts to swindle creditors. In 
Adeyemi v. Lan & Baker (Nig) Ltd & Anor,
96
 the respondent sued the appellant and 
the 2
nd
 respondent jointly and severally claiming a total sum of N132, 500 for a 
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consideration that wholly failed. The 1
st
 respondent also made an alternate claim 
against the appellant alone for the same amount of money and compound interest 
thereon in the rate of 14% from September 1984 until payment or judgment 
whichever is earlier. 
In support of his claim, the 1
st
 respondent pleaded that the appellant introduced 
himself to the 1
st
 respondent as the Managing Director and Chief Executive of the 2
nd
 
respondent and purportedly acting as such and for himself offered to sell some bags 
of rice which he had at the ports to the 1
st
 respondent which rice the 1
st
 respondent 
could in turn sell to the third party whom the appellant also introduced to the 1
st
 
respondent as a prospective purchaser.  The appellant also showed the 1
st
 respondent 
certain documentative materials to the business in a bid to convince him to embark 
on the transaction. The 1
st
 respondent then gave a total sum of N106, 000 in three 
instalments for the rice to the 1
st
 respondent, who received it but failed to issue 
receipts despite his promise to do so. In defence of the suit, the appellant filed a 
statement of defence. 
In proof of his case, the 1
st
 respondent called three witnesses namely the Managing 
Director of the 1
st
 respondent company, his solicitor and the 1
st
 respondent’s 
accountant through whom two of the instalment payments were made to the 
appellant. All the three witnesses corroborated the case of the 1
st
 respondent that the 
money in dispute was actually paid to the appellant in their presence. At the 
conclusion of trial, the court found for the 1
st
 respondent and held the appellant 
personally liable for the money received from the 1
st
 respondent. 
The appellant’s contention at the Court of Appeal that he was an agent for a 
disclosed principal and the 2
nd
 respondent was dismissed. The court held that, 
although an incorporated company is a distinct person from its members, where it is 
proved that it is a mere sham, device or mask being used to cover the true state of 
things in the eyes of equity the court must open the veil. It thus came to the 
conclusion that the 2
nd
 respondent was a mere puppet of the appellant and the veil of 
incorporation ought to be lifted on grounds of equity.
97
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While arriving at its decision, the Court of Appeal noted that the decision in Salomon 
v. Salomon must not bind one to the essential acts of dependency and neither must it 
compel a court to engage in an exercise of finding of fact which is contrary to the 
true intentions or positions of parties voluntarily created by the parties as distinct 
from an artificial or fictitious one. It then concluded that once a company is 
discovered to be a cloak of a biological creature, whoever he might be, the veil of 
incorporation must be lifted.
98
  
Whilst the Court of Appeal should be commended for its position to lift the 
corporate veil in the above cases, later decisions by the same court demonstrated the 
lack of consistency in this area of law in Nigeria, which is not that different from 
what is prevalent in the UK and other common law jurisdictions. A case in point is 
FDB Financial Services Ltd v. Adesola
99
 where the court, in refusing to lift the 
corporate veil on similar facts, stated as follows: 
Even if fraud and / or illegality is discernible in the conduct of the 
affairs of a company, this in itself does not disregard the company’s 
separate personality since the court often imposes liability on the 
company as well. There must be clear evidence of illegality or fraud 
for the veil to be lifted. In the instant case, it was not necessary to join 
the second appellant (Managing Director of the 1
st
 appellant) as a 
party to the suit since there was no evidence of fraud and he was 
merely an agent of the company. 
 
It is difficult to comprehend the views of the Court of Appeal in this case in view of 
the fact that the appellants evinced a clear intention to deny the respondents the fruits 
of their investments even when it had become due. It is submitted that fraud 
simpliciter should not only be the basis for lifting the veil even when there are 
surrounding circumstances leading to it. Thus, once fraud is discernable in the affairs 
of the company or is shown to be the sole reason for the establishment of the 
company, as in this case, the veil ought to be lifted. This proposition in itself raises a 
problem in terms of the determination of what constitutes fraud or when it can be 
deemed that a company is a mere facade. In this connection, the motive of the 
incorporators becomes pertinent. To this extent, where a company is incorporated 
with a deceptive motive or intention, it is more likely that the court will lift the veil 
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of incorporation. The determination of deceptive motive should be at the time of 
transaction and not before it.
100
 
In yet another case, Dosunmu, J. of the High Court of Lagos, Nigeria in Bank of 
America National and Savings Association v. Niger International Development 
Corporation Ltd,
101
 refused to accede to the interpleaded claim of the claimant as it 
was found to be a fraud to deprive the judgment creditor of the fruits of his litigation. 
The subject matter of this action relates to a Volkswagen saloon car which was 
attached in pursuance of the writ of attachment taken out at the instance of the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff had obtained judgment against the defendant in the sum of 
£1,424, in addition to some costs. Only £50 was paid out of the judgment debt. The 
plaintiff subsequently took out a writ of fi.fa whereupon the vehicle was attached. 
While the writ was waiting to be executed, the claimant interpleaded and claimed to 
have bought the vehicle from the defendant bona fide and without knowledge of any 
action at the price of £300. 
The question that came for determination was whether the purchase was one made 
for value and without notice or was made in fraud of creditors under the Fraudulent 
Conveyances Act, 1571. At the hearing, the claimant called one witness, Alhaji 
Rufus Adeshina who swore to the affidavit on behalf of the defendant in his earlier 
bid to have an order for instalment payments in respect of the judgment debt. The 
witness was also found to be the agent of both the defendants and claimants 
company being both a manager and general manager of the two companies 
respectively. It was also established that the owners of the two companies were the 
same, having the same shareholders and directors. The court did not hesitate to come 
to the conclusion that the transaction between the defendant and the claimant was 
juggled after the latter had failed to secure instalmental payments of the judgment 
debt, in order to defeat the judgment creditor in pursuit of its remedy. Citing with 
approval the decision in the English case of re Hirth,
102
 the court dismissed the claim 
and held that where an alienation is made by a debtor with intent to defraud his 
creditors to a company practically identical with himself, the company must be taken 
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to have full notice of the true nature of the transaction and so be unable to avail itself 
of the protection (of the Fraudulent Conveyances Act, 1571, s.5). 
More recently in Access Bank PLC v. Erastus Akingbola and others,
103
 an English 
court sitting in London, whilst dealing with a monumental case of insider corporate 
fraud and cross border related issues of abuse of the corporate form, departed from 
the Salomon’s principles and found the defendant guilty of misappropriating and 
diverting billions of depositors funds to buy properties in the United Kingdom. The 
defendant was also found to be taking his company’s money to make illegal shares 
purchases for himself in order to manipulate its share price in the Stock Exchange. 
He was found guilty of diverting or siphoning his banks money to five other 
companies named as co-defendants controlled by him and some of his family 
members, including his wife, in order to help them pay off “substantial debts”.  
The facts leading to this case were that the defendant, who was a former Managing 
director of Intercontinental Bank PLC before its merger with the claimant, had fled 
Nigeria to the UK in 2009 to escape justice after he was removed by the Governor of 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) in exercise of his statutory powers under Section 
35(2) of the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act 1991(“BOFIA”), and 
following an investigation into the affairs of Intercontinental Bank. The 
consequences of events material to the proceedings, as the claimants asserts, was the 
collapse of the bank which before then, was one of Nigeria’s top four banks, 
employing over 20,000 people and having some 350 branches. Following his flight 
from Nigeria, the bank pursued him to the UK and commenced this action largely 
because the Fulgers claim related to properties (proceeds of the fraud) in the UK and 
at the time of service of the proceedings, he was resident in London.  
There were three areas of claims in the proceedings: the unlawful share purchase 
claim, the tropics payments claim, and the Fulgers claim. In respect of the unlawful 
purchase claim, the claimants challenge was that between April 2007 and August 
2009, the defendant procured, operated, approved and/or orchestrated a share 
purchase or support scheme by which under his direction, the Claimant was caused 
to purchase or acquire with its own funds shares issued by it contrary to sections 159 
and 160 of CAMA 2004. Whilst section 159 of CAMA prohibits financial assistance 
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by a company for acquisition of its shares except the lending of the money is part of 
the ordinary business of a company, section 160 makes it clear that a company may 
not purchase or otherwise acquire shares issued by it. The shares as it turned out 
were purchased for the benefit of the defendant. 
The second heading of claim the Tropics payments claim relates to a total sum of 
N18, 684,500, 000 (approximately £68m) in respect of monies paid away by the 
claimant to, or to the benefit of, various companies in the Tropics Group, of which, 
as set out in the claim, the Defendant was a director, and which he, and /or his wife 
or family, directly or indirectly owned, between 11 May and 26 June 2009.  
The third head of claims otherwise referred to as the Fulgers claim relates to two 
transfers caused or directed by the Defendant to be made by Intercontinental Bank to 
the client account of Messrs Fulgers (in association with David Berens & Co) LLP, 
London solicitors, in the sum of £8,540,134.58 on 11 March 2009 and £1.3m on 13 
July 2009, which were used for the purchase of property to or to the order of the 
Defendant (and variously involving other defendant companies named in the claim). 
At the end of trial for which relevant witnesses were called, including experts on 
Nigerian law agreed by both parties, the court agreed with the claimant that the 
defendant’s actions were inconsistent with the provisions of sections 159 and 160 
CAMA and that he breached his duty as director of the company under section 283 
of CAMA which provides that: 
Directors are trustees of the company’s moneys, properties and their 
powers and as such must account for all the moneys over which they 
exercise control and shall refund any moneys improperly paid away, 
and shall exercise their powers honestly in the company and all 
shareholders, and not in their own or sectional interest.  
 
Accordingly, the court held that the claimant is not only entitled to all the three heads 
of claim but also a tracing claim into the properties or their proceeds of sale. Burton, 
J, made the following observations: 
 As for his strategy for the company to buy its own shares into the 
box, quite apart from being contrary to Nigerian law, it was simply 
wrong-headed and was plainly a substantial contributing factor to the 
collapse of the bank. 
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Burton, J, further observed that it was certain that the defendant paid out the banks 
money to buy properties for his companies. In his own words, he said as follows: 
But I can simply rest my decision on the basis that in fact the bank’s 
money was paid out to buy properties for the defendant’s companies. 
As it happens I am satisfied that they were never repaid, but in any 
event they were caused to be paid out by the defendant in breach of 
duty and consequently of trust, and the claimant has a tracing claim 
into the properties or their proceeds of sale. 
  
The irony of this case is that whilst the court in the UK has quickly dispensed of the 
bank’s claim, its sister case in Nigeria bordering on allegation of crime in the Lagos 
High Court, is yet to be heard and determined to date. The case has suffered from so 
many interlocutory applications and adjournments, thus exposing the weak Nigerian 
judicial and regulatory system as well as enforcement mechanisms of Nigerian laws. 
This is obviously a lesson Nigeria must learn from the UK.  
However, before leaving this point it is necessary to point out that in the Nigerian 
case of Adeniji v. The State,
104
 the Court of Appeal had to consider whether it was 
proper to lift the veil of incorporation in order to hold the managing director of a 
company criminally responsible for conversion by the company of money paid to it 
by a third party. The Court of Appeal in allowing the appeal held inter alia that the 
doctrine of lifting the veil applies invariably to civil matters and not to criminal 
matters. 
It is arguable if this decision is correct in view of similar English authorities and the 
common law position that the agent is always personally liable for his or her own 
crime. It is therefore respectively submitted that the veil of incorporation may be 
lifted for the purpose of Civil law as well as for Criminal Law. It is not restricted to 
the civil law as the Court of Appeal would assume in the case. Lifting the veil of 
incorporation was involved in the following criminal cases R. v. McDonnel,
105
 R. v. 
Pearlberg and O’Brien,106 R. v Arthur,107 and R. v. Gillet.108 
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4.5.1.2    An Assessment 
In all the above cases, the court demonstrated its willingness to lift the corporate veil 
on grounds of fraud whenever invited to do so. However, the nature of the decisions 
leaves much to be desired. Most of the judgments following common law 
approaches seem to be declaratory in nature, merely determining the rights of the 
parties, without making any consequential order which could have allowed for the 
equitable recovery of ill-gotten gain from the corporate controllers. This ultimately 
makes it difficult for the attainment of satisfactory remedy to restore the injured 
party to his former position whilst denying him compensation for that which was 
forfeited or denied as a result of the abuse. The result is that a victorious party 
pursuant to the lifting of the corporate veil is faced with the herculean task of making 
recovery from the corporate controller through another claim. 
This is nevertheless an arduous task for a litigant in a developing country like 
Nigeria considering the cost of litigation, delay and the length of time it takes before 
cases are determined. It is therefore submitted that the courts should adopt a more 
equitable approach which tends to disgorge the assets of the corporate controller in 
the principal judgment, thus making recovery and compensation to the injured party 
less difficult or cumbersome.  
4.5.2 Where a Company is used by the Shareholders as an Agent 
Nigerian corporate laws follow the principle enunciated in Salomon that the 
company is not an agent of its subscribers. However, the question whether the court 
will ascribe liability under the agency construction is a question of fact depending on 
circumstances. Thus, where there is an express agreement of agency between the 
company and its shareholders, or where a controlling personality be it corporate or 
natural, dominates a company, the veil may be disregarded to that extent on the 
general principle of agency. In Marina Nominees Ltd v. Federal Board of Internal 
Revenue
109
 the Supreme Court refused to lift the veil on the suggested agency 
construction that the appellant was set up to perform secretarial duties on behalf of 
Peat Marwick & Co which would have enabled it to avoid payment of tax to the 
respondent. In coming to this conclusion, the court found no proof that the company 
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was set up strictly to perform secretarial functions for Peat Marwick, there being 
other functions performed by the company in its memorandum of association. 
Unlike the UK where agency has been widely used for so many years, the case above 
represents the first widely known instance of the use of agency in company law 
reported in Nigerian case law.
110
 What had existed before it were mere divisions of 
existing companies which does not translate to separate legal personalities as they 
are not independent companies. It is however hoped that, what- with the influence 
which multinational companies exert in the country, it is highly probable the forms 
in use in the UK may be employed in Nigeria.  
4.5.3 Interest of Justice 
Nigerian courts permit exceptions to separate personality and limited liability in the 
interest of justice. This is unlike in the UK where the interest of justice seems less 
important.
111
In FDB Financial Services Ltd v. Adesola
112
, for instance, the Court of 
Appeal ordered for specific performance of the contract between the appellant and 
the respondent whilst reiterating that the veil of incorporation can be lifted as the 
justice of the case demands so. The interest of justice exception was also applied by 
the Nigerian Supreme Court in Edokpolo v Sem-Edo Wire Industries
113
 and yet again 
by the Nigerian Court of Appeal in First African Trust Bank v Ezegbu
.114
 However, 
the courts did not clarify in vivid terms the circumstances in which the interest of 
justice will apply. This tends to leave each case to be determined at the discretion of 
the court in the absence of coherent and rationalised principles. Notwithstanding the 
above, it is apparent that with the combination of interest of justice exception and the 
provisions of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria,
115
 which grants individuals access to 
courts for a redress of their grievances, an aggrieved person can pursue a claim 
against the company and its erring director/ or controlling shareholder based on this 
ground.  
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4.6 Conclusion 
The primary principle in relation to the status of corporate entities is that they are 
separate from their corporators and other controllers, and as a general rule the 
corporate veil will be maintained. Nigeria has followed the UK in applying this 
principle. However, the doctrine of corporate personality is not immutable.  
Beyond the common law exceptions such as fraud, incompatibility with public 
policy, avoidance of legal obligations and perhaps where the justice of the case 
demands, it is difficult to hazard any principled approach requiring the circumstances 
in which the veil of the corporation can be lifted. This is largely due to the rigid and 
formalistic approach adopted in Salomon’s case, and which has been applied 
vigorously by Nigerian courts. 
In any event, Nigeria’s peculiar circumstances as a developing country with diverse 
sociological and different level of development than the UK appear to need a more 
radical approach towards dealing with the abuse of the corporate form in order to 
accelerate its social and economic development. One means of doing this is to deny 
the incorporators the benefit of the advantages gained through the abuse of the 
corporate form. An attempt to this was evident in the promulgation of the Failed 
Banks (Recovery of Debts and Financial Malpractices Act) 1994 to hold corporate 
controllers and sundry debtors of failed banks liable for the failure. This Act was 
short lived as the inevitability of transfer of power from military to civilians in 1999 
led to its eventual demise.  
Again, a close study of the chapter reveals deep institutional problems in tackling the 
abuse of the corporate form as could be seen in the weak judicial system, inadequacy 
of laws and regulatory activities of the Corporate Affairs Commission-the main 
agency for regulating and supervising all corporation related matters in Nigeria. The 
judicial system and the administrative apparatuses of the commission desire 
immediate strengthening to enable them meet with the changing times in the modern 
world. 
Furthermore, there are obvious lessons Nigeria has to learn from the UK in terms of 
improvement of its laws and effective judicial system. There is need in Nigeria for 
an Insolvency Act, similar to the British Insolvency Act of 1986 and effective 
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disclosure mechanism. This will help protect creditors and make access to 
information about a company readily available. In addition, the technology available 
to investors and creditors should be improved through easy and accessible websites 
on company matters.  
More discussions on the comparative analysis of the state of the law in the UK and 
Nigeria in relation to the operation of corporate personality principles in the two 
jurisdictions, as well as suggestions on how to tackle the above problems, shall be 
dealt with in subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER 5    LIFTING THE CORPORATE VEIL: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
UK AND NIGERIAN PERSPECTIVES  
5.1 Introduction 
The concept of the corporation as a separate personality with limited liability has 
long been fully entrenched as part of the laws of the UK and Nigeria. A comparative 
analysis of the laws of these two countries in relation to the application of the 
doctrine has become imperative in view of the globalisation of business. This is 
particularly pertinent because there is a growing business relationship between the 
developing countries and the developed countries. In particular, the UK and Nigeria 
are the two most important common law jurisdictions in the developed and 
developing countries of the world with trading activities spanning well over a 
century. The UK is the most significant trading partner to Nigeria whilst most of the 
latter’s institutions are shaped on the innovations and improvements found in the 
UK, including in the area of company law.   
One area of concern which has tended to undermine healthy trade and investment in 
businesses both at the domestic and international level is the whole question of the 
abuse of the corporate form. The trend and scale of this abuse has been well 
documented in previous chapters. What is relevant to us in this chapter is the fact 
both UK and Nigerian company laws recognise the fact that in spite of the generally 
strict application of the doctrine of corporate personality, the doctrine is not 
immutable. Thus, in appropriate circumstances involving the abuse of the corporate 
form, the corporate veil will be disregarded to find liability against the corporate 
controllers.   
A review of the approaches adopted by the UK and Nigeria to deal with the abuses 
of the corporate form reveals certain commonalities and differences. This may 
perhaps be attributed to the common law doctrine which pervades the two 
jurisdictions and the diverse nature of the peoples, levels of development and 
corporate behaviour between the nations. In the light of the growth of veil-piercing 
jurisprudence in the UK coupled with the improvement of insolvency laws and 
disclosure mechanisms aimed at ensuring corporate rescue and protecting creditors, 
it is expected that Nigeria, as a developing country, will learn lessons that could help 
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it fill the vacuum in its laws in the absence of existing legislations. Furthermore, an 
understanding of the different approaches adopted by the two countries, particularly 
where there are gaps, will help to fashion new ways and strategies to tackle the 
problem of the abuse of the corporate form.  
In the light of the above, this chapter builds on the findings in chapters three and four 
and critically examines and discusses the approaches adopted by the UK and Nigeria 
with regards to the lifting of the corporate veil. The chapter engages in an in-depth 
comparative study by looking into the substantive rules and legislation as well as the 
underlying jurisprudential basis of the approaches adopted. The respective gains and 
limitations of the approaches are then identified. The aim is to provide the 
foundation or guidance for reforms or new jurisprudential approach towards 
corporate personality in Nigeria in chapter six, drawing on the strength of the two 
approaches, while simultaneously avoiding their pitfalls. 
The chapter is divided into four parts. Part I briefly explains the corporate formations 
found in the UK and Nigeria whilst highlighting the issue of undercapitalisation 
resulting from lack of, or a low threshold of, capital requirement for private 
companies operating in the UK and Nigeria as well as the attendant consequences it 
has on creditors in these jurisdictions. Part II proceeds to analyse the measures aimed 
at protecting creditors in the UK and Nigeria including insolvency laws and 
disclosure mechanisms, explaining the differences in approach between the two 
jurisdictions. Part III provides a comparison between the UK’s and Nigeria’s 
corporate veil doctrines. From the comparisons in relation to their jurisprudential 
approaches, some broader inferences will be drawn about the UK and Nigerian 
legislative and judicial reasoning on the issue. Part 1V, while drawing on the 
strengths of the existing regime, nevertheless proposes the need for a new approach 
to the identified inadequacies of the present approach.  
5.2 Corporate Formations  
Effective operation of the corporate personality principle would mean in effect that a 
company at inception should have adequate capital for its business. Unfortunately, 
corporate law jurisprudence in the UK and Nigeria allows for the existence of 
companies with little or no capital requirements. In the UK for instance, the 
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company law allows for the setting up of a single-member private company.
1
 There 
is no minimum capital requirement for private companies in the UK and public share 
subscription is not allowed.
2
 This has the potential of reducing the amount such 
companies may have for their operations, resulting in a weak asset base as they are 
unable to pool resources together from a wide spectrum of investors.
3
 The problem is 
also worsened by the fact that financial institutions avoid lending to small businesses 
unless there is personal guarantee by the controlling shareholder or directors. As 
pointed out by Davies, of about 2,000,000 registered companies in the UK, only 
about 11,500 are public companies.
4
  In the case of public companies, a minimum 
capital requirement of £50,000 is provided in the Companies Act.
5
  
The lack of minimum capital requirement for private companies in the UK may also 
create opportunity for business failure and the existence of undercapitalised 
companies which may be unable to fulfil their obligations to creditors. Although a 
low capital threshold may not be peculiar to small companies, as it also exist in 
companies with more than one member (depending on the investment capacity), the 
likelihood of its occurring, and the problems associated with it, appear to be greater 
in small companies. This raises concerns of potential fraud about the one member 
company because at the time when advances are made to the firm, the shareholder 
with fixed caps on possible losses made possible by limited liability, knew it could 
not have borrowed a similar amount of money from an informed outside source.
6
 
Moreover, if a creditor requested financial information, and the controlling 
shareholder lied in response, there would be fraud and grounds to pierce without the 
need to discuss capital itself. The owner who promises corporate performance 
                                                          
1
 See Companies Act 2006, section 7. The foundation for the operation of one-man company was laid 
in the leading case of  Salomon v Salomon [1897]AC 22 
2
 See CA 2006, s755. See also D. Milman, ‘Promoting Distributional Justice on Corporate Insolvency 
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6. See Chen Jianlin, ‘Clash of Corporate Personality Theories: A Comparative Study of One-Member 
Companies in Singapore and China, (2008) 38 H.L.J 425; J.M Dobson, ‘Lifting the Veil in Four 
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W.P. Williams & T.G. Benson, ‘Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital’, 43 U. PITT. L. REV, 
837 at 859, 888 
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knowing that, at the time, the corporation will never be able to perform, has obtained 
limited liability by fraud.
7
 
Analysing a study by the German credit rating agency,
8
 Hurley has noted, following 
an analysis of financial statements of around 4.3 European companies, that UK 
businesses are among the most over reliant on debt finance in Europe.
9
 The research 
also revealed that UK companies are some of the continent’s most undercapitalised. 
As pointed out by Williams, of Credit Agency Graydon, the research showed that 
UK businesses followed the same pattern as individuals, relying too much on debt to 
finance their activities, and that they were not ready for the recession when it hit 
because they were not able to get hold of more debt.
10
 For Williams, the problem in 
the UK is particularly pronounced among small, private companies because of a lack 
of understanding of balance sheet quality as well as unwillingness of directors to 
invest start-up capital or retain profits in the business. The study further revealed that 
many UK small businesses opted for just £2 of issued share capital at start-up stage. 
The implication of this study is that corporate owners are risking relatively little of 
their own capital or else failing to maintain or preserve their stated capital, while the 
company’s debts grow vastly out of proportion to its capitalization. Such gross 
under-capitalization in the private corporate sector heightens the risk of corporate 
insolvencies as owners of business will be increasingly willing  to engage in risky 
activities because they have little to lose. 
11
  
From the legal standpoint, the basic idea behind undercapitalization is that 
shareholders are engaging in an abuse of the corporate privilege for deliberately 
incorporating with initial capital they know to be inadequate to meet the expected 
liabilities of the business.
12
 In other words, shareholders should not be entitled to 
personal immunity if they fail to provide the quid pro quo for such immunity, which, 
specifically, would mean failing to provide a reasonably adequate length of capital at 
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incorporation to which creditors may resort.
13
 However, notwithstanding the basic 
problem posed by undercapitalisation, it has not been made an issue in the UK as a 
ground of lifting the corporate veil as no case has been reported in this study on the 
subject. This may be attributed to the difficulty faced by the courts in developing a 
workable standard that can be meaningfully and fairly applied to all shapes and sizes 
of business as well as the obvious economic reason that raising a barrier in the form 
of high capitalisation may discourage small business development.  
Another difficulty is the fact that the UK is subject to EU legislation and competition 
rules.
14
 These rules have opened competition among member states so that a 
business established in one state has freedom to operate in any member state or have 
branches elsewhere.
15
 The rationale behind this is that the citizens of the EU can 
move freely everywhere as legal persons in the EU and do business. The citizens 
also have legal right to take up cases or seek redress in courts. The effect of this is 
that some of these businesses which may have little or no capital or whose asset base 
can hardly be determined are allowed freedom to operate unhindered in spite of the 
problems they pose to creditors.      
Unlike the UK, Nigeria maintains a requirement to have a minimum share capital of 
N10, 000 (Ten thousand Naira) in order to set up a private company.
16
 However, this 
amount is too small to effectively run a company though given the widely divergent 
needs of businesses, it is difficult to determine what level of capitalization is 
sufficient. This is coupled with the problem of assessing the level of risk a particular 
business proprietor should be willing to accept.
17
 With this in view, it seems unlikely 
that a uniform test for inadequate capitalization may be fashioned to account for 
different business sizes and types and the expected and unexpected liabilities 
attributable to each particular area of business.
18
Even at that, it is clear that the 
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amount which is merely stated in the form in order to satisfy the requirement of the 
law is rarely paid by the incorporators at the time of incorporation of the company. 
Consequently, the same problem of undercapitalisation and its attendant effect of 
risk to creditors which befalls the UK system are still prevalent in Nigeria. As is also 
the case with the UK, undercapitalization has not been made a subject of veil lifting 
for purposes of holding fraudulent members or directors liable for corporate abuse.
19
 
Indeed, there is no authority in Nigeria allowing the courts to pierce the corporate 
veil in circumstances where a company is incorporated with insufficient funds to 
satisfy creditors if debts become due and payable.  
Given the risk posed by undercapitalisation among private companies in Nigeria
20
 
and the fact that most of them do not observe corporate formalities
21
 and are 
characterised by lack of accounting records, misleading documentation on 
incorporation and non-filing of returns, the lack of consideration of 
undercapitalisation as a factor for lifting the veil of the company in this jurisdiction 
is obviously a major lacuna which needs to be filled in view of the massive problem 
it poses to potential creditors.  
In the light of the problem posed by undercapitalisation and the fact that private 
companies cannot invite the public to subscribe for shares or debentures in order to 
raise capital for its business, it becomes doubtful whether the small corporate 
enterprise was ever intended or designed to embrace the institution of the corporate 
form with regard to widespread abuses inherent in it.
22
 Nevertheless the single-
member company and family corporation have become familiar modes of business 
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enterprise and, despite occasional questioning by the court
23
 and some writers,
24
 
have generally received judicial sanction and approval.
25
 The usual argument 
advanced by the courts is that limited liability is a privilege held out by the 
corporation law of the state and where a person incorporates a single-member or 
family corporation in compliance with the formalities of the law, for purposes of 
taking advantage of the corporate form in a commercial venture, he is merely taking 
advantage of the privilege conferred by law.
26
 There is always a temptation to 
question both the logic and the historical realities in this judicially tailored reasoning. 
What is important however, at least for the purposes of this study, is that this and 
similar reasoning indicates clearly a judicial proclivity following the legislation, 
allowing the existence of a single-member company and family corporations on top 
of the risk it poses to the society.  
There is therefore the need to ensure an adequate capital ratio for small businesses on 
incorporation if they must be allowed to function in order to avert the potential risk 
they pose to creditors. If the courts at least set minimum standards that creditors 
would be sufficiently covered, it would surely operate as a bar to those who may 
want to join the market without capital.
27
 In the United States, the courts have always 
pierced the veil where the company is incorporated with insufficient funds to satisfy 
creditors if debts become due and payable.
28
 The UK and Nigeria can follow this US 
example, although it may not be uncommon for a company to have insufficient 
assets to cover all of its debts at the inception of its operation. To this end, a balance 
needs to be struck between ensuring a business environment that facilitates economic 
growth, and also the one that protects the rights of participants such as creditors. This 
will bring harmony among all participants in the corporate field whilst reducing the 
tendency of fraudulent shareholders and directors to abuse the corporate form 
through the use of undercapitalised companies.   
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5.3 Directors Duties and Creditors’ Interest 
A fundamental question that has resonated in various company law debates over a 
long period of time is whether the director’s duty should or ought to extend to 
creditors. Some commentators have answered the question in the affirmative
29
 while 
others simply believe that the existing common law duties of directors are 
sufficient.
30
 They have also raised conceptual issues and policy concerns and 
questioned the practical implementation of such an extended duty.
31
 Implicit in this 
fear is the fact that extension of directors’ duties to creditors will amount to an 
erosion of the principle of limited liability. There is also the argument that such 
extension of duty to directors in favour of creditors is likely to restrict directors from 
risk taking which is commonly associated with businesses.
32
 If this is allowed to 
happen, it is contended, directors are likely to adopt defensive measures in order to 
protect themselves from liability.
33
 This argument is largely based on the idea that 
the contractual paradigm 
34
 appears flawed as the conceptual basis of protecting 
shareholders and directors because it must be matched with accountability in the 
performance of their duty. Such design will facilitate the protection of deserving 
directors while punishing the delinquent ones.
35
 
Under the common law, directors owe their duty to the company. The Jenkins 
Committee while appraising the issue in the wake of Percival v Wright,
36
 restated the 
fact that “no fiduciary duty is owed by a director to individual members of his 
company, but only to the company itself, and a fortiori that none is owed to a person 
who is not a member”.37 In doing so, the director shall exercise that degree of care, 
diligence and skill, which a reasonably prudent director would exercise in a 
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comparable circumstance.
38
 The courts in Nigeria have upheld these common law 
principles. Thus in Okeowo v. Milgore
39
 the Nigerian Supreme Court held that the 
directors’ fiduciary duty is not for any individual director’s advantage but for the 
advantage of the company.  It is settled law that directors, in exercising their powers 
must do so bona fide and in the best interest of the company.
40
 However, what 
constitutes the ‘interest of the company’ has assumed a wide and varied 
interpretation. Often, the interest of the company is indeterminate and somewhat 
incoherent.
41
 Some commentators have even questioned why a director should owe 
any duty to the company when he is acting as the agent of a shareholder.
42
 On 
equitable grounds, it would appear that the interest of the company is that of the 
shareholders or investors acting as a whole. In Greenhalgh v. Aderne Cinema Ltd
43
 it 
was held that the company as a whole does not mean the company as a commercial 
entity, distinct from its incorporators. It means the corporators as a general body. 
Notwithstanding this position, the prevalent company legislations in the UK and in 
Nigeria still maintain the position that directors owe their duty to the company. In 
relation to whom the duty extends to, it has been pointed out that statute has now 
given some form of recognition to the interests of employees to whom directors in 
the discharge of their duty should have regard to.
44
 This duty is still owed to the 
company and is also enforceable in the same manner as other duties to the company 
are enforced, namely by the shareholders. 
Both the Companies Act in the UK
45
 and the Companies and Allied Matters Act in 
Nigeria
46
 failed to provide any duty of the directors to creditors. However, section 
172 (3) of the Companies Act 2006 is subject to any enactment or rule of law 
requiring directors, in certain circumstances, to consider or act in the interest of the 
company. This proviso tends to give credence, as will be discussed later, for the 
accommodation of certain insolvency legislation aimed at protecting the interest of 
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creditors.
47
 The courts have also been faced with the controversy of whether the 
interest of the company should be interpreted to incorporate the interest of creditors. 
This question tended to be answered in the affirmative, as it has been held that the 
interest of the company can include the interests of a company’s creditors in certain 
circumstances and this gives credence to the fact that directors owe some indirect 
duties to a company’s creditors.48 Indubitably, whilst such duties are not imposed 
when the company is a going concern and solvent, it is automatically altered in 
favour of the creditors as soon as the company becomes insolvent or is approaching 
insolvency.  
Further to the above, there are a number of cases in the UK which support the view 
that directors owe some duty to the creditors. This can be found, for example, in 
Winkworth v. Edward Baron Development Co Ltd
49
 where the House of Lords 
approved that the directors owe some duties to its creditors both present and future. 
Explaining the views of the court, Lord Templeman asserted as follows: 
A company owes a duty to its creditors, present and future. The 
company is not bound to pay off every debt as soon as it is incurred 
and the company is not obliged to avoid all ventures which involve an 
element of risk, but the company owes a duty to its creditors to keep 
its property inviolate and available for the repayment of its debts... A 
duty is owed by the directors to the company and to the creditors of 
the company to ensure that the property is not dissipated or exploited 
for the benefit of directors themselves to the prejudice of the 
creditors.
50
 
 
From the above, it can safely be said that the courts have countenanced the view that 
directors owe a duty to the company and to the creditors. 
The fact that directors owe some duty to the creditors was driven home more 
forcefully in West Mercia Safetywear Ltd v. Dodd
51
 where the Court of Appeal, 
citing with approval the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in 
Kinsela v. Russel Kinsela Pty Ltd
52
 held that shareholders cannot absolve directors 
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from a breach of duty to creditors so as to bar the liquidators claim. In coming to this 
conclusion, Dillon LJ who gave a different view in Lonrho Ltd v. Shell Petroleum
53
 
quoted the statement of Street CJ as follows: 
In a solvent company the proprietary interests of the shareholders 
entitle them as a general body to be regarded as the company when 
questions of the duty of directors arise...But where a company is 
insolvent the interests of the creditors intrude. They become 
prospectively entitled, through the mechanism of liquidation, to 
displace the powers of shareholders and directors to deal with the 
company’s assets. It is in a practical sense their assets and not the 
shareholders’ assets, through the medium of the company, are under 
the management of the directors pending liquidation, return to 
solvency, or the imposition of some alternative administration. 
  
The implication of the cases discussed above is that directors owe an indirect duty to 
the creditors which is dependent on the occurrence of a particular or series of events 
in respect of the financial health of the company. Consequently, as soon as the 
company moves into insolvency or some form of triggering effect of financial or 
economic distress, the human equivalent of the company for purposes of director’s 
duties becomes the creditors as whole, namely its general creditors.  The corollary in 
the circumstance would therefore be that so long as the director’s act in the interests 
of the general creditors and not with a section of it, it is within its bounds of duty and 
no breach of duty can be said to have occurred.
54
 This, it is submitted, has to be done 
through the medium of the company and not to individual creditors directly.
55
 The 
underlying reason for this position is that it will eliminate problems of double 
recovery, allow for equal treatment of creditors in order to preserve the firmly 
entrenched principle of insolvency law (i.e. the pari pasu principle)
56
 and preserves 
the company’s monopoly of liquidation proceedings.57  It has to be pointed out that a 
key limitation exists with respect to this duty owed by the directors to the creditors. 
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The limitation is to the extent that a creditor does not have the standing to litigate on 
behalf of the company.
58
 As pointed out by Cheffins,
59
 it is only when the company 
is in liquidation that the situation changes allowing the liquidator to exercise his 
powers by proceeding against the responsible officials in court to recover damages 
for distribution to the creditors as part of the liquidation proceeds.  This situation, 
which allows only the liquidator to maintain such action, can be remedied if creditors 
are allowed to make a claim as a class and not as individuals. 
In Nigeria, and except for the traditional cases dealing with directors duties 
generally, there is no reported authority in relation to director’s duties to creditors as 
found in the UK case.  Indeed, that approach has not been taken at all in Nigeria yet. 
The courts are still adhering strictly to the old common law principle of director’s 
duties. This may be attributable to the low level of knowledge about creditors’ rights 
in other jurisdictions and the fact that commercial litigation is still evolving. 
Nevertheless, the cases discussed above are of high persuasive value to Nigeria in 
the absence of local case law on the subject. 
It is clear from the discussion above that courts in the UK are beginning to widen the 
scope of director’s duties to consider creditors’ interests and are willing to lift the 
corporate veil in order to hold that directors who fail to protect creditors during or 
near insolvency of the company have breached their duty, and hence are liable for 
their actions. This does not connote that courts have discountenanced the age-long 
principle of corporate personality enunciated in Salomon v Salomon
60
 on account of 
the exception allowed in the cases.  
5.4 Disclosure Mechanisms    
Corporate disclosure of relevant and reliable information is critical for the effective 
operation of corporate personality and protection of creditors. As a regulatory device 
in company law, its importance has also been widely recognised.
61
However, in the 
UK and more particularly in Nigeria, disclosure requirements for private companies 
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are remarkably low. This is significant because private companies constitute about 
eighty percent of all registered companies in the UK.
62
 Instead, most of the 
disclosure processes have been centred on public companies. The reason may be 
explained by the low capital structure of private companies and the issue of equity 
participation which is built around a small number of people as opposed to the large 
number of people engaged in public companies. Notwithstanding this, disclosure is 
important both for private and public companies because both types of companies 
are engaged in business with third parties who rely on information gathered through 
this process to make decisions in their transactions with them.  
A clear example that disclosure is important for companies of all types was 
demonstrated in the landmark case of Salomon v. Salomon.
63
 In that case, both the 
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords agreed that the existence of a publicly 
available register of debentures containing information about the first priority 
debenture held by Mr Salomon was an important consideration. Following this 
consideration, the House of Lords was of the firm view that the public availability of 
this information allowed trade to incorporate the fact of the existence of the 
debenture into their decision as to whether or not to do business with the company 
and enter into the terms of the trade. This position has been statutorily recognised in 
the Companies Act 2006. Thus, under section 743 of the Act, the public is allowed to 
inspect the register of debentures kept by a company.
64
 On the other hand, section 
876 of the 2006 Act requires that companies maintain a register of charges which is 
available for inspection to any person on the payment of a nominal fee.
65
 If a 
company does not comply with disclosure in the UK, it is clear from legislation that 
it can be struck off.
66
 
Disclosure essentially concerns issues of transparency in the activities for which 
companies are accountable, namely, the results of their activities.
67
 As pointed out by 
Kershaw, the primary function of corporate disclosure is to facilitate a third party’s 
assessment of the risks associated with entering into a transaction with the company 
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and his determination of the terms upon which he would be willing to enter into the 
transaction.  Companies provide disclosure through regulated financial reports, 
including their annual audited financial statements, directors, management 
discussion and analysis and other regulated fillings.
68
  
In the UK, mandatory disclosure is a significant requirement for all companies 
regardless of whether they are public or private, large or small. However, it is 
evident that the level of disclosure obligations for listed companies are more onerous 
than those of private companies or public companies that are not listed as can be 
seen in the variation of financial and narrative reporting  obligations, which are 
dependent on company type. Nonetheless, all companies in the UK regardless of size 
are required by the 2006 Act to keep and maintain accounting records.
69
 Failure to 
comply with these obligations is a criminal offence.
70
 In addition, all companies are 
required to produce a narrative report, namely, a directors report which serves to 
provide narrative information about the development of the company’s business and 
its performance for the prior financial year. The extent and scope of such report 
varies depending on type and size of the company. The directors’ report must contain 
the names of the directors of the company and the company’s principle business 
activities.
71
  
Furthermore, the disclosure obligation also requires that all private companies must 
file its accounts and reports with the Companies Registrar within nine months from 
the accounts reference date i.e. the financial year.
72
 For public companies, it is within 
six months of the account reference date.
73
 It has to be noted that a benefit of 
qualifying as a small or medium –sized company is that such a company only need 
to file a balance sheet account to the Company House and do not need to file a profit 
and loss account unless they elect to do so.
74
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In all situations, the account submitted must provide a true and fair view of the 
company’s financial position.75  What constitutes a ‘true and fair view’ was not 
defined by the Act. However, both legal commentaries and case law suggest that 
compliance with relevant accounting standard or principles is a prima facie evidence 
of compliance.
76
 
In Nigeria, the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2004 similarly to the provisions of 
the Companies Act highlighted, provides that every company must maintain 
accounting records which must be sufficient to show and explain the transactions of 
the company.
77
 Such accounting records in cases of business involving dealing in 
goods, must show a statement of stocks held by the company.
78
 In addition, directors 
are required to prepare financial statements reflecting a true and fair view of the 
company for the financial year, the balance sheet, and a profit and loss account 
which must be laid before the company in a general meeting and delivered to the 
commission. Curiously, the financial statement required of a private company 
excludes a statement of the source and application of funds.
79
 Section 340 of CAMA 
dealt with disclosure of loans in favour of directors and connected persons as defined 
in section 286(8) of CAMA. The connected person includes the director’s spouse, 
child or step-child, including any illegitimate child.
80
 There is also a provision in 
section 277 of CAMA on disclosure relating to director’s interest in contracts, or 
other officers. Sub-section 277(4) provides that any director who fails to comply 
with the provisions of this section shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine of 
N100.
81
 
From the above provisions of CAMA, it is clear that little or nothing was provided 
for disclosure by private companies, yet they constitute almost ninety-eight percent 
of the total number of companies in Nigeria. It is also doubtful if any private 
company has ever delivered its financial statement to the Corporate Affairs 
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Commission. Even when it has been done, the document, in the absence of income 
and expenditure excluded in the Act, is virtually meaningless.  
In comparative terms, therefore, disclosure mechanisms in the UK appear to be 
stronger than that of Nigeria with regard to the provisions of the law and policies put 
in place to ensure compliance and eventual sanctions.  
5.5 Creditors Rights in Insolvency 
The protection provided to creditors in case law is strengthened further by legislation 
in the UK, in particular as shown in the Insolvency Act 1986. Compared to the UK, 
Nigeria has no general elaborate insolvency regime aimed at protecting creditors or 
dealing with erring directors. It is still relying on some provisions of the Companies 
and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) which is now rather obsolete and has failed to in 
many respects to curb the activities of directors who continue trading to the 
detriment of creditors, even when they knew that their companies’ financial capacity 
cannot sustain such endeavour. CAMA, in its present state only deals with issues 
arising from the direct holding system of company securities, winding-up and 
arrangement and compromise respectively
82
 while falling short of new areas of 
insolvency practices found in the UK such as wrongful trading. The result is that the 
UK and Nigeria follow different paths in protecting creditors and finding liability 
against directors during insolvency. While the UK has made significant 
improvement in this area of the law, Nigeria’s corporate insolvency is still in its 
infancy.  
The inadequacies of the Nigerian law on Insolvency matters can easily be seen when 
consideration is made in relation to the definition of insolvency in CAMA. Section 
650 of CAMA defines corporate insolvency in the following terms: 
‘insolvent person’ where used in this Decree means any person in 
Nigeria who, in respect of any judgment, decree or court order against 
him, is unable to satisfy execution or other process issued thereon in 
favour of a creditor, and the execution or other process remains 
unsatisfied for not less than six weeks. 
 
This definition requires the grant of court order as the only means to establish 
insolvency. This, it is submitted, is not legally correct or appropriate in real terms. 
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For purposes of clarity, corporate insolvency can also occur if the company is unable 
to meet its commercial commitments or debts
83
 and in particular, financial and other 
transactions arising from trade with third parties or secured lending. The test 
employed in most cases to determine the insolvency of a company is that of the 
balance sheet of the company.
84
 Where such balance sheet signifies more liabilities 
in excess of the company’s assets, insolvency is said to have resulted.85 The term 
liability is all encompassing and far broader than debt. It includes all forms of 
liability, whether liquidated or unliquidated and whether arising in contract or in tort 
or by restitution or for damages for breach of statutory duty.
86
   It therefore follows, 
that the definition of corporate insolvency in CAMA is not only inadequate but 
inefficient. The creditors’ main concern after giving a loan or supplying goods and 
services to the company is whether they will be paid on time.
87
 Once payment is due 
and the company is unable to pay as agreed, insolvency could be said to have 
resulted. The implication therefore is that once insolvency encroaches, the director 
(in technical terms) is now using the creditor’s money which could have been used to 
pay off its debt to trade. The common law has now imposed a duty on the directors 
to consider the interests of creditors when the company is insolvent. 
 It is therefore submitted that the wrongful trading provision will serve to enhance 
and strengthen creditors’ interest in Nigeria if it is incorporated into the Nigerian 
laws. Choosing section 214 as a model for import into corporate business in Nigeria, 
as the arguments above have shown, will be the most efficient way both to 
implement stricter rules on civil liability of company directors for continuing to trade 
contrary to the interests of creditors, as well as to impose such liability at an earlier 
point in time, which can be assessed more accurately. Further, it would reduce the 
burden of the liquidator since there would be an alternative procedure against a 
director, instead of relying on section 506 of CAMA, which has proved to be 
cumbersome. In doing so, however, efforts should be made to exercise due care by 
ensuring that some of the identified problems of the section, such as the basis of any 
liability, persons potentially liable under the section, persons entitled to bring 
                                                          
83
 The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘solvent’ as ‘able’ to pay all one’s debts or liabilities’ and 
conversely ‘insolvent’ as ‘unable’ to pay one’s debt or discharge one’s liabilities. 
84
 R. Goode, n. 54 at 4-24. 
85
 Ibid. 
86
 Ibid. 
87
 See R.P. Austin and I.M Ramsay, Fords Principles of Corporation Law, 14
th
 ed., Lexis Nexis 
Butterworth, NSW, 2010, 20, 60. 
159 
 
proceedings, defences to be relied upon by the director and the standard upon which 
directors’ conduct is judged, issue of funding and enforcement are clearly clarified 
and streamlined. Indeed, section 214, being one of the key findings in this study, 
provides a strong foundation and basis for future reforms of Nigerian laws, 
especially in the area of creditor protection. 
As with the imposition of contribution on directors pursuant to section 214 of the 
Companies Act, directors who fail to protect the interest of creditors face the risk of 
other sanctions in the UK. Thus under the Directors Disqualification Act 1986 
(CDDA) directors found to be unfit by the courts or whose conduct is inimical to the 
interest of the creditors pursuant to the wrongful trading provisions may be liable to 
disqualification orders. The effectiveness of this measure is still not clear as many 
unfit directors still superintend the affairs of companies.
88
 For as Davies pointed out, 
the disqualification provisions of the successive Companies Act seemed to make 
little impact.
89
 He further argued that notwithstanding the importance of the 
disqualification provisions for dealing with corporate wrongdoings of different 
nature, especially as it concerns directors, its consequences in practice were 
limited.
90
 
Similarly in Nigeria, it is uncertain whether directors’ disqualification is an effective 
remedy for creditors. Although, there is no separate legislation like the Company 
Directors Disqualification Act,
91
 section 257 of CAMA contains provisions dealing 
with disqualification of directors.  Section 257 states as follows:- 
(1) The following persons shall be disqualified from being directors- 
(a) an infant, that is , a person under the age of 18years; 
(b) a lunatic or person of unsound mind; 
(c) a person disqualified under sections 253, 254 and 258 of this Act; 
(d) a corporation other than its representative appointed to the board for 
a given term. 
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There is also disqualification of a director in section 258 in relation to such director 
becoming bankrupt or ceasing to be a director by virtue of share qualification as 
provided in section 251.  
Whilst most of these provisions are general in nature, and do not really touch on 
issues relating to creditors protection or substantive questions on the conduct of 
directors while performing their duties, only the disqualification imposed in section 
254 appears to be relevant. That section pertains to conviction by the High Court of a 
person occupying the position of a director pursuant to section 506 of CAMA on 
fraudulent trading. Thus if in the course of winding up of a company it appears that a 
person has been found guilty of any offence for which he is liable, whether he has 
been convicted or not under section 506 of the Act or has otherwise been found 
guilty while an officer of the company, or whether he has committed fraud in 
relation to the company or is in any breach of his duty to the company, the court 
shall make an order disqualifying that person for a period not exceeding 10 years 
from holding the position of director in any way, whether directly or indirectly.
92
 
The specified offences are in connection with the promotion, formation or 
management of a company.  A breach of an order made under this section is an 
offence which may attract on conviction, a fine of N500 or imprisonment for a term 
of not less than six months or more than two years, or both.
93
   
It can be argued that the disqualification provisions under CAMA are not punitive, 
but rather they are intended to protect the public and to prevent the corporate 
structure from being used to the financial detriment of investors, shareholders, 
creditors and persons dealing with the companies. However, the effectiveness of 
these provisions remains to be seen in view of the problem of proof associated with 
the criminal intent of fraud. Apart from that, Nigeria does not have any specific 
legislation like the CDDA in the UK dealing with the disqualification of directors. 
Consequently, the manner and procedure involved in deciding problems arising 
thereon would therefore emanate from case law, which is lacking, and probably from 
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the articles of association of individual companies that are different from one 
another.
94
   
The finding from this discussion is that the CDDA appears to be a more useful and 
effective tool in minimising the abuse of directors of limited liability companies than 
the provision in CAMA which lacks clarity both in definition and procedure. If 
anything, the deterrent effect of CDDA makes it imperative that directors should 
exercise caution when dealing with company affairs. This is obviously an area of law 
that calls for reflection and reforms in Nigeria. 
Having considered aspects of the legislation in the two jurisdictions, discussion now 
focusses on the approaches of the courts in the UK and Nigeria. 
5.6 Common Situations for Lifting the Corporate Veil 
Veil-piercing jurisprudence in the UK and in Nigeria is largely based on facts and 
circumstances and tends to defy neat categorisations.
95
 However, generalisations 
may be useful to give an insight on the operation of the doctrine in these 
jurisdictions. A number of factual situations illustrate the problem of lifting the 
corporate veil in the UK. These include where the company is formed or used to 
avoid contractual obligation to third parties or is a sham or used as a device to 
perpetuate fraud.
96
 The corporate veil can also be lifted where an agency situation 
arises. Other conduct of a misleading nature that creates an injustice could also 
trigger veil piercing.
97
  
The veil-piercing test in Nigerian law is phrased similarly to that in the UK and at 
first glance appears nearly identical. Under the Nigerian law, the corporate veil will 
be pierced if it is necessary to achieve justice.
98
 However, the courts in Nigeria, as 
those of the UK, also exhibit reluctance to disregard the corporate form. English 
courts in particular have remained distinctively conservative in their approach and in 
most cases have tended to preserve the corporate veil. Nonetheless, the concept of 
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corporate personality will be sustained only so long as it is invoked and employed 
for legitimate purposes. The courts in the UK and Nigeria will not sanction a 
perversion of the concept to improper uses and dishonest ends. 
Whilst the starting point for discussion on corporate personality is obviously the case 
of Salomon v Salomon, any analysis of the veil piercing approaches in the UK and 
Nigeria must begin with an examination of fraud which has been recognised by the 
two jurisdictions as key justification for the disregard of the corporate form. 
5.6.1 Fraud 
Fraud is relevant to both the UK and Nigeria in their veil piercing approaches. The 
importance of fraud as basis for piercing the corporate veil is underscored by the fact 
that most of the decisions examined make direct or indirect reference to fraud. 
Indeed, fraud is the only predictive category within the English corporate veil cases 
as is in most of the commonwealth. In most cases, the courts have used the terms 
‘device’, ‘facade’, ‘sham’, 99  ‘mask’, ‘cloak’, or ‘simulacrum’, 100  to describe the 
abuse of the corporate form through fraudulent practices. These common law usages 
have been described by Farrar as question begging, as a category of illusory or as 
circular reference.
101
  
As a piercing factor, fraud has been left generally undefined and unrestricted by the 
courts; nevertheless, a few generalisations have been made. Apart from the evasion 
of contractual obligations, most of the English cases that fall within the fraud 
category have generally involved misappropriation of corporate assets or other 
outright fraudulent conduct.
102
 The courts have also expanded on a few occasions the 
scope of fraud to encompass misrepresentation. This is evident in the case of Re 
Darby, ex p Brougham
103
 involving two notorious fraudsters in the UK at the time 
called Darby and Gyde, who had set up an elaborate scheme to defraud public 
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investors through concealment of their identity. Indubitably, the two classic 
examples of the fraud exception in the UK are Gilford Motor Company Ltd v. 
Horne
104
 and Jones v. Lipman.
105
 The facts of these two cases have been elaborated 
in chapter 3. What is important is that the courts in the case of Gilford Motors 
described the company set up to avoid a legal obligation as a sham and therefore 
refused to recognise the separate legal personality of the company whilst granting 
Gilford the injunction it sought against both Mr Horne and the defendant company. 
On the other hand, the court awarded specific performance against both Mr Lipman 
and the company following their attempt to deny the plaintiff their remedy.  
Similarly to the UK, some of the cases of fraud in Nigeria involve evasion of 
contractual liability. Nigerian courts have lifted the corporate veil where such 
conduct is brought before it for scrutiny.
106
 However, there exist differences in the 
systems in terms of what fraud consists of. Courts have discussed and applied the 
idea of fraud in the two jurisdictions in different ways because of their peculiar 
commercial environments. Indeed, the trend in the UK and in other developed 
nations differed from that of Nigeria, at least in few cases wherein in the latter 
private limited companies were incorporated with fraudulent intentions, such as 
scams which are contrary to accepted business practices. As could be seen above and 
in chapter three, UK courts have taken a narrow and conservative approach to 
questions relating to lifting the veil on grounds of fraud, limiting themselves to 
matters of contract whilst ignoring fraudulent conduct arising from tort. On the other 
hand, Nigerian courts take a broader view of fraud in terms of lifting the veil of the 
corporation which the UK could consider applying.  
 
Within the Nigerian context, most of the issues constituting fraud not only concern 
contract but relates to matters denoting deceit, misrepresentation, commingling of 
company’s assets and outright misappropriation of company funds.107 This is evident 
in the cases of misappropriation and diversion of company funds as well as cross 
border transfer of corporate funds to satisfy the interest of the corporate controller. 
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The latter was clearly manifest in Access Bank PLC v. Erastus Akingbola and 
others,
108
 where the managing director transferred huge sums of money from his 
company account to his solicitors in the UK to enable them buy choice properties for 
him. Of course, the court rose to the occasion and lifted the veil in order to find him 
personally liable for such misconduct. In both Federal Republic of Nigeria v. 
Mohammed Sheriff & 2 others
109
 and Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Alhaji Murnai 
& Another,
110
 the respondents who were at various times managers and directors of 
their respective banks were found personally liable for granting credit facilities and 
diverting their banks funds to companies which they had substantial interest in 
violation of relevant banking regulations. 
 
Fraud of corporate controllers in Nigeria particularly of these private companies also 
involves deceptive conduct that has emerged domestically and internationally and 
has been carried out on a wide scale. This scheme, known as ‘419’ scam or fraud 
named after section 419 of the Nigerian criminal code,
111
 involves the use of the 
corporate form to engage in advance -fee – fraud, in which a victim is persuaded to 
pay money upfront for financial reward or for the  supply of goods or services which 
never materialise from the sham company. Through cross border contact and series 
of correspondences with the ‘corporate controllers’ and their companies and false 
letters of credit, victims are meant to pay some money through the western union 
money market or special bank accounts in the mistaken belief that the business deal 
or transaction is legitimate. Once the money is paid, the corporate controller 
disappears.
112
 
 
One of the victims of this scam, a prosperous business woman, received a letter 
purportedly written from her relation in London introducing her to a business partner 
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who will help her import some goods at a cheap rate from Italy. Relying on the 
strength of the letter and without confirming its contents from the said relations, she 
met the ‘business partner’ at a designated address claimed to be the company’s place 
of business. Following discussions with the said business partner, an offer was made 
to her for the purchase of goods from Italy through his company at a highly 
discounted rate on the condition that she pays for the purchase of the goods in 
advance. The woman promptly complied in the mistaken belief that as soon as the 
goods arrive in three weeks promised, she would make huge profits from the sales. 
One week after, she received a letter by post containing the bill of lading and other 
documents that would enable her facilitate the clearing of the goods at the Lagos 
port. On the expected date of arrival of the goods, she went to the port with her 
clearing agent to clear the goods but was shocked to hear from the custom officials 
that all the documents given to her were forged and that no goods arrived at the port 
on her behalf. She fainted. After being resuscitated, she reported the matter to the 
police. On investigation, it was discovered the ‘business partner’ introduced to her 
was fake and could not be traced; the address purportedly used for the transaction 
had no company domiciled there under the name used even though the company was 
duly registered with that address. 
 
In yet another incident, one Maurice Ibekwe, owner of the company called Okwelle 
holdings Nigeria Limited was eventually arrested by the Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission
113
 after several failed attempts for allegedly obtaining the sum 
of three hundred thousand dollars (US S 300,000) from one Munch Klause, a 
German national and head of Munch Systemorganisation company, following a 
business transaction which never materialised. 
114
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Other examples may also suffice. In Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Adedeji,
115
 an 
Ikeja High Court sitting in Lagos-Nigeria sentenced a Lagos businessman, Mr 
Adedeji Alumile alias Ade Bendel to six years imprisonment for obtaining the sum 
of $600,000.00 under false pretence from an Egyptian General in 2003. Justice 
Muniru Olokoba who handed down the verdict while delivering judgment in a one 
count charge preferred against the accused person also ordered Ade Bendel to refund 
the Egyptian. According to the charge preferred against him by the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission, Adedeji  who claimed to be the owner of a company 
called Worldwide, had, alongside with one Olufemi Ajayi gone to the Egyptian’s 
office to deceive him to part with the sum to enable them to buy chemicals that could 
be used to clean some paper notes. 
 
It turned out that the company called Worldwide never existed and no chemicals 
were ever bought. By the time the Egyptian realised himself, the duo of Adedeji and 
Ajayi had run away, a situation which prompted the Egyptian to lodge a complaint to 
the EFCC that culminated in the charge against Akindele and the company 
Worldwide. Adedeji had pleaded not liable to the charge, arguing that the company 
Worldwide, which had dealt with the Egyptian should rather be held accountable. 
The court did not agree with this view as it went ahead to personally find him liable 
for the offence. The company Worldwide charged alongside Akindele, was therefore 
discharged.  
 
In his judgment, Justice Muniru Olokoba said “the offence is an international 
embarrassment to the nation and the court does not have mercy with such offence. 
To serve as a deterrent to the present and the upcoming generation not giving the 
accused a full weight of the law is inappropriate...” 116  
 
What has emerged from the case of Ibekwe and Akindele above is that 
notwithstanding the fact that the accused persons used their companies (namely 
Okwelle Holdings Nigeria Limited and Worldwide) named as parties in the cases to 
defraud their victims, the court still went behind the veil of the corporation to find 
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them personally liable for the various fraudulent acts. These are clear examples of 
lifting the corporate veil whilst demonstrating the distinctiveness of the nature of 
corporate fraud in Nigeria where corporate controllers in a bid to escape liability, set 
up companies for the purposes of carrying out a scam. 
 
With a lack of effective disclosure and weak regulatory activities of the Corporate 
Affairs Commission, it becomes difficult to trace these fraudsters. Even where they 
are caught and charged to court for trial, the prevalent criminal justice system 
characterised by proof beyond reasonable doubt and attendant delays are too weak to 
support efficient and prompt delivery of justice. For instance, in Adedeji’s case, 
which was one of the very few that conviction was secured, it took a period of four 
years to conclude, and this was only after many interlocutory applications and 
appeals. Civil claims against such corporate controllers and their sham companies 
suffer the same fate largely because of the ready defence that the company is 
different from the person who controls it. Following this scenario, the chances of 
resolving the dispute appear far-fetched. This ultimately results in a lack of 
investors’ confidence in the corporate form whilst reducing foreign direct investment 
in Nigeria.  
The shape and form of the fraud exception, in spite of its acceptability as a strong 
ground for lifting the corporate veil in the UK , seems to have become confused and 
this is demonstrated in the decision of Creasey v Breachwood Motors Ltd
117
 where 
opportunity for the court to utilise the fraud exception was raised. Yet the court 
refused to accept it and instead went ahead to lift the corporate veil on the basis that 
to do so was necessary in order to achieve justice. This was without regard to the 
unambiguous statement of the Court of Appeal in Adams v. Cape Industries Plc that 
“...save in cases of which turn on the wording of particular statutes or contracts, the 
court is not free to disregard the principle of Salomon v Salomon merely because it 
considers that justice so requires.”118 It is submitted that the failure to apply the fraud 
exception in Creasey resulted from a misunderstanding of the fraud exception. The 
reason for the failure of the fraud exception argument in the case turned merely on 
the timing of the incorporation of the sham company. 
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From the discussions above, it can be argued that questions about what constitutes 
fraudulent conduct and how it can be proved in the UK and Nigeria appears to be 
somewhat different and problematic. The same applies to when and how the 
company and its officers can or should be made liable for such conduct. Of course, 
fraud is a vague concept. Within the company law context, as elsewhere, fraud is a 
difficult expression to define.
119
 Certainly, fraudulent conduct goes far beyond 
deliberate attempts to deceive and extends to many transactions which are, strictly 
speaking within the law but may nonetheless be condemned as sharp practices.
120
 
Since we have seen that the doctrine of separate legal personality when combined 
with limited liability offers considerable scope for fraudulent behaviour, a finding of 
fraud should be made once the elements are seen to exist. It should therefore be 
irrelevant that the company is an existing company with its own business, as long as 
it has been used as a tool to effect the fraud. The UK could well consider applying 
the expanded notion of fraud prevalent in Nigeria as the analysis has shown.  
5.6.2 Contract and Tort Claims 
In the UK, the general view is that the door to tort claimants appears to have been 
closed in view of the Court of Appeal decision in Adams v. Cape Industries PLC
121
  
denying liability for such claims.
122
 In the case of Nigeria, no distinctive authority 
like Adams foreclosing tort claims exists. However, most tort victims prefer out of 
court settlement instead of embarking on lengthy litigation and incurring further 
legal cost to no end amidst the uncertainty of the outcome of such suits. This is 
particularly important as tort cases involving the piercing doctrine provides the 
victim no direct relationship with the company unlike the parties involved in contract 
cases. To this extent, courts treat the cases differently because the categories of 
persons involved are not the same.  However, the fundamental difference between 
the two are often misunderstood and misapplied by the courts with the result that 
they indiscriminately cite and purport to apply, tort precedents in contract and vice 
versa leading to unjust results.
123
 In any event, it is submitted that there is the need to 
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maintain adequate insurance to cover a foreseeable extent of damages for tort 
creditors particularly as the tort victim did not choose to deal with a corporation and 
accept the consequences of limited liability. 
With respect to contract creditors, the analysis that can be drawn from chapter two in 
respect to the UK and Nigeria is that they deserve less sympathy from a court when 
asking it to pierce. After all, they chose to do business with the company whose 
owners have, as a rule, limited liability. Ultimately, if the contract creditor wanted to 
look to the owner for repayment, it could have bargained for personal guarantee. 
However, as we have seen above and in previous chapters, limited liability can be 
denied to a corporate controller if the agreement is voided on grounds of fraud. 
Therefore, a corporate controller is liable to pay and indemnify the contract creditor 
in such circumstances. Beyond that, it is submitted that in view of the manifest abuse 
of the corporate form by small private companies, particularly in Nigeria, 
shareholders of such companies should in the course of their operation, be 
mandatorily required to set up an endowment fund within the company from a 
percentage of its profit in order to satisfy default in contractual obligation, instead of 
the current regime where the creditors are compelled to pursue their claims through 
the non-existent or empty assets of some of these companies. This would certainly 
make shareholders more responsible and make it difficult to increase shareholders 
wealth at the expense of the creditors.  
Further to the above, it has been suggested by Anderson that creditors can also be 
protected in general by forcing companies to obtain what she called ‘mandatory debt 
insurance’ for their creditors against losses.124 However, it has to be pointed out that 
mandatory insurance against creditor losses by companies in general may be hard to 
implement. While it may be easy to set up such a scheme for professional businesses 
such as auditors
125
 or lawyers, doing so for other types of businesses is not easy 
considering its significant cost. Fixing the appropriate level of insurance and 
ensuring that it is obtained are problematic because of the fear of the insurer that it 
may expose him to unnecessary losses to risk, particularly where he stands unaware. 
                                                          
124
 Helen Anderson, ‘Directors Liability to Creditors- What are the Alternatives?,”(2006) Bond Law 
Review: Vol. 18: Issue 2, Article 1, 20. 
125
 Ibid. 
170 
 
Finally, imposing such mandatory debt insurance may result in small traders being 
forced out of business,
126
 stifling economic development. 
This brings us back to the same position that a cheaper and perhaps more efficient 
way to provide security to creditors is by way of charges over company property or 
personal guarantees by directors. 
5.7 Administration and Judicial Systems  
The operation of corporate personality in Nigeria compared to the UK suffers from 
administrative and judicial problems. As seen above, there is an effective and 
efficient system of corporate regulation in the UK accompanied by appropriate 
sanctions. The UK Companies House maintains a dedicated website enabling a 
person or persons to check the existence and details of any company and to report to 
the appropriate authority of any act of misconduct ranging from causing harm to 
customers or suppliers as well as breaking the law (e.g. fraud or any significant 
irregularity on the part of the company or corporate controller).
127
 With this in place, 
it is easier for a person dealing with a company to obtain information about the 
company from the Companies House and to report any act of misconduct observed 
without delay.  
The situation seems to be different in Nigeria. The Corporate Affairs Commission 
(CAC) set up under section 1 of CAMA to administer the Act, including the 
regulation and supervision of the formation, incorporation, registration, management, 
and winding up of companies under or pursuant to the Act, is very weak and 
ineffective. The only visible function carried out by the commission is the 
registration of companies. Issues pertaining to monitoring, supervision and 
compliance with the requirements of the Act are left undone. The Commission lacks 
the necessary staffing and technology to effectively carry out its assignment. Unlike 
the UK, there is no dedicated website listing the companies registered by the 
Commission for reference by persons wishing to deal with companies in Nigeria 
either as a creditor or an investor. Most of the members of the Commission are 
                                                          
126
 See Ross Grantham, ‘Directors’ Duties and Insolvent Companies’ (1991) 54 Modern Law Review, 
576, 579. See also Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, 
(1991) 50. 
127
 This information can be sourced in http://www.gov.uk/companies-house, accessed 10 January 
2013 
171 
 
political appointees and lack the necessary will, capacity and independence to deal 
with issues or problems arising from the performance of their duty. This can be 
explained by the fact that the Act gives the President of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria the powers to appoint the chairman as well as the members of the board of 
the Commission.
128
 Following the prevailing practice in Nigeria, such appointments 
are done more for political patronage and not on merit. The result is that such 
appointees see their appointments as a measure of deriving benefit from the system 
and protecting their members, most of whom are company owners and part of the 
fraudulent abuses complained of. 
Again, the Commission runs a centralised administration in terms of policy directive 
and execution even when it has offices in the thirty six states of the Federation. 
Having a high level of bureaucracy, coupled with manual operation through 
numerous files, a simple enquiry either for registration of a company or issues 
relating to an existing company takes weeks and months before an outcome will 
emerge.
129
  
Finally, there is no doubt that the existence of an efficient judicial system is an 
essential requirement to the success of any corporate regime. Unfortunately, in 
Nigeria this has not been the case. Under section 251 of the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, only the Federal High Court is vested with the 
jurisdiction to handle issues relating to Company matters. Such cases may proceed 
from this court to the Court of Appeal and then to the Supreme Court.  From 
findings,
130
 the court has not done well in dealing with cases that come before it. 
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There have been delays arising from the congestion of cases, while most judges still 
write in long hand and the institutionalised corruption
131
 in the system has not 
allowed judges to decide cases purely on the merit. This has resulted in cases lasting 
for many years in court with many frivolous applications and acquittals which are 
difficult to comprehend. In Ariori v. Elemo
132
 for instance, proceedings commenced 
in 1960 and took 23 years to reach the Supreme Court. The need to overhaul the 
machinery of justice in Nigeria to deal with these issues is therefore imperative.  
In Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Dr (Mrs) Cecilia Ibru,
133
 the accused person who 
was a former Managing director of Oceanic bank of Nigeria owned by the Ibru 
family, was arraigned in court by the EFCC for manipulation of credit facilities and 
for using a company, Waves Project Nigeria Limited owned initially by her children 
and later transferred to her domestic aide to launder N15 billion which was taken out 
off the bank coffers and taken abroad. Following a plea bargaining arrangement 
entered with the EFCC and accepted by the court, she was given a lenient sentence 
of 18 months in prison on a three-count charge which will run concurrently, making 
the effective time she will spend in prison to six months. The presiding judge, Dan 
Abutu, J., further ordered that she be returned to the hospital from where she was 
coming to court. The consequence of the order of the court was that she ended up 
serving no sentence as she remained in the hospital throughout the six months 
period. 
Ibru’s case no doubt exposes the weakness of Nigerian Judiciary. Nonetheless, her 
conviction and subsequent loss of assets following the plea bargain she entered with 
EFCC confirmed the fact that the courts in Nigeria can lift the corporate veil to find 
the corporate controller liable even when, on the facts, the fraudulent misconduct 
was committed in the performance of official duty and deemed to be the ostensible 
act of the company.  
Another case illustrating the pervasive corruption and weakness in the Nigerian 
judicial system is Federal Republic of Nigeria v. James Onanefe Ibori and 
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others.
134
Here, the first accused a former governor of Delta State of Nigeria and five 
others, three of whom are limited liability companies namely Mer Engineering 
Nigeria Limited, Bainenox Nigeria Limited and Sagicon Nigeria Limited were 
discharged and acquitted on the grounds that the prosecution failed to make out a 
prima facie case against any of the accused persons in respect of all the 170-count 
charge of corruption preferred against them by the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC). Justice Marcel Awokulehim who delivered the ruling did not 
even allow the case to proceed to trial in spite of the enormity of the charges against 
the accused persons and his companies as well as the public outcry over the colossal 
sum of money involved. With respect to the first accused (Ibori) in particular, he was 
charged with allegedly transferring various sums to a company, Silhouttte Travels 
Limited in which he had substantial interest. These sums formed part of funds 
allegedly withdrawn from the account of oil-rich Delta State Government of Nigeria 
and which were derived from an illegal act with the aim of concealing the origin of 
the money and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 14(3) of the 
Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2004. 
Unfortunately for Ibori, it did not take long for him to be caught. Following 
collaborative efforts of the EFCC and the British government, he was arrested in 
Dubai, where he had fled after his acquittal to avoid re-arraignment for fresh charges 
by EFCC and brought to London to face trial on money laundering charges in the 
UK on similar facts. Thus in Queen v.James Onanefe Ibori & ors
135
 Ibori pleaded 
guilty to the ten offences relating to conspiracy to launder funds from the state, 
substantive counts of money laundering and one count of money transfer by 
deception and fraud and was sentenced to 13 years in prison by the Southwark 
Crown Court.
136
 He was also asked to forfeit properties in the UK which were 
bought from the proceeds of the laundered funds. According to Pitts, J. of the 
Southwark Crown Court, “the confiscation proceedings may shed light on the 
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enormity of the sums involved.” 137According to the metropolitan police, the amount 
involved is about $250m (£157m) of Nigerian public funds.
138
 
The sentence of Ibori in London on corruption charges puts a question mark on the 
corruptibility of Nigeria’s legal personnel and its justice system as well as the 
attitude of its government in comparison to that of the UK. As pointed out by 
Andrew Mitchell: 
James Ibori’s sentence sends a strong and important message to those 
who seek to use Britain as a refuge for their crimes. Corruption is a 
cancer in developing countries and the [UK] coalition government has 
a zero tolerance approach to it. We are committed to rooting out 
corruption wherever it is undermining development and will help its 
perpetrators like Ibori to justice and return stolen funds to help the 
world’s poorest.139 
    
The above demonstrates that the courts in the UK are more efficient and speedier 
than Nigerian courts. This position is further epitomised in Akingbola’s case 140 cited 
in chapter four. But what is relevant to this study is the fact that even though Ibori 
transacted through agents and companies under his control some of which were 
joined as parties in this case, the court in the UK did not hesitate to impose personal 
liability against him. This the Nigerian court failed to do in spite of the fact the case 
lasted longer there than the one heard in the UK.  
Moreover, while the UK courts have put in place alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) 
141
 mechanisms as a means of resolving civil and commercial disputes 
without resorting to lengthy litigations, the civil procedure rules in Nigeria follow 
the old method which encourages adjudication thereby wasting time and money. 
5.8 Conclusion 
The chapter has revealed significant commonalities and differences in terms of 
lifting the corporate veil in the UK and in Nigeria. In relation to common grounds, 
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fraudulent, illegal or improper conduct are important factors. For the fraud exception 
to apply, it must be shown that the corporate form is being used in such a way as to 
deny the plaintiff some pre-existing right. However, there still exist some measures 
of differences on what constitute fraud, and the way and manner that courts in the 
UK and Nigeria deal with corporate fraud. Courts in Nigeria appear to be broader 
and expansive in dealing with issues of fraud than the UK as it considers cases 
arising from fraudulent companies operating to defraud creditors through scam 
related activities, deception and misappropriation of company funds by corporate 
controllers. The UK may well consider expanding the scope of what constitutes 
fraud exception in its jurisdiction to include some of these issues. 
From the findings of the study, it would appear that the UK has some significant 
measure of improvement and greater dynamism than Nigeria in the area of creditor 
protection and disqualification of directors. Through case law and legislations, it has 
now become clear that directors’ duties have been expanded to include those to the 
creditors of companies, particularly when the company is insolvent or approaching 
insolvency. The wrongful trading provision in the Insolvency Act is a pointer to this 
development. It appears that the dynamic approach of English law in this regard 
allows for a more fact-specific assessment of the situation, and may result in the 
imposition of civil liability on company directors at an earlier point in time. Nigeria 
does not have any separate insolvency legislation different from the Companies Act, 
as found in the UK. However, it has a provision in the Companies and Allied Matters 
Act dealing with something akin to the fraudulent trading provision in the UK 
Insolvency Act as was discussed in chapter four. However, there has been no case 
reported on that referring or utilising the section to date. The implication is that 
while the UK has moved a step higher in its pursuit of creditor’s protection through 
the wrongful trading provision, Nigeria seems to be lagging behind. 
Should Nigeria seek to improve its laws with a view to strengthening creditors’ 
protection and directors liability, as this work would suggest, the wrongful trading 
provision obviously may constitute a good model for import. The wrongful trading 
provision when added to the UK strategies to disqualify or impose civil liability 
upon unfit directors moderates the risks creditors face when the company 
experiences financial difficulty.  
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Disclosure mechanisms for private companies in both the UK and Nigeria appear 
weak. However, the existing regulatory and judicial enforcement schemes in the UK 
are more effective than those found in Nigeria. It is therefore important that Nigeria 
takes urgent action in these areas in order to ensure effectiveness and efficiency in 
the operation of the corporate personality principle in its jurisdiction. 
On the whole, the benefits attached to corporate form should be matched with 
commensurate personal liability on those who manage and run the company to the 
detriment of creditors’ particularly in cases of fraud and mismanagement of the 
company. This calls for reform in this area of the law. 
Although Nigeria has a lot to learn from the UK in terms of improvement of its laws, 
there is still a lot to be done. The next chapter will discuss further recommendations 
on how to deal with the issues of corporate fraud and abuses by corporate 
controllers. Of immense concern in this regard is the need to apply equitable 
measures to trace and disgorge the assets of fraudulent corporate controllers and 
thereby satisfy the claims of creditors. This is particularly important in a developing 
country such as Nigeria where the assets of corporate controllers are easily placed 
beyond the reach of creditors. 
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CHAPTER 6    THE INTRODUCTION OF THE ‘RESPONSIBLE 
CORPORATE PERSONALITY MODEL’ 
6.1 Introduction 
The concept of the company as a separate legal person, which is a legal fiction, can 
only be justified to the extent that it serves social and economic aims. However, the 
pervasive influence of the concept of corporate personality, the effect of its 
application, and the way in which it reflects the intention of parliament, all point to 
the need for its re-examination. Veil piercing approaches so far have remained 
flawed. This is because they have failed adequately to protect the interest of 
creditors. 
Although the courts have utilised various veil piercing approaches to extend liability 
to shareholders and directors, such approaches cannot serve as a vehicle for 
meaningful reform. The reason, as pointed out in Chapter 3, is because 
commentators and judges have stuck to the English common law methods of 
formulating a wide range of categories under which cases are classified for purposes 
of veil lifting. The categorisation approach, as was submitted in chapter 3, lacks the 
flexibility of concepts that would have enabled the courts to deal with matters 
dispassionately, based on the facts of each case without following exactly the same 
pattern.
1
 This is also true of other proposals for imposing liability on corporate 
controllers. While some of these proposals have remained persuasive and influence 
scholarly debate, comparative analysis suggests, that the existing approaches to the 
problem of corporate fraud and abuses are neither adequate nor capable of 
confronting the complex nature of abuse of corporate form in Nigeria. A major gap 
still exists in the recovery of the proceeds of fraud and abuses from controlling 
shareholders and directors who use the corporate form for illegitimate ends.  
This chapter therefore attempts to fill the gap by proposing the adoption of the 
responsible corporate personality model in Nigeria. Responsible corporate 
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personality aims at forcing corporate controllers to disgorge their ill-gotten gains and 
the proceeds of corporate abuse and fraud, by applying the equitable doctrine of 
constructive trust, which Cardozo has described as “the formula through which the 
conscience of equity finds expression”.2 The essence of applying this model is not 
only to strip away the gain made by the defendant, but to put the plaintiff in the 
position he would have been in had the wrong not been done by denying corporate 
controllers the benefit of misappropriated assets through unjust enrichment. The 
imposed obligation does not seek to institute a new state of affairs between the 
parties or to facilitate a transformation of their rights. It seeks simply to restore the 
state of affairs that formerly existed between them.
3
 This is the essence of the law of 
restitution which is epitomised by the equitable doctrine of constructive trust. This 
novel approach which departs from the conventional methods of veil piercing 
appears more efficient and realistic for a developing country such as Nigeria, 
because it offers the potential to reach the assets of corporate controllers and those 
transferred to third parties. 
Whilst the model may not be capable of eliminating corporate fraud and abuses 
entirely, its effect would be to deny corporate controllers the benefits of fraud 
through the application of equitable measures is a massive deterrent measure to curb 
the malaise of fraud in corporations. The proposed model would radically change the 
jurisprudence of piercing law in Nigeria from the orthodox approach, which is weak 
and inadequate, to a more functional standard, which would waive statutory limited 
liability, whenever the corporate controller participated in fraud, deception, or the 
transfer of company assets, either to himself or to entities with which he has interest, 
or whenever he had misled creditors as to the assets which were available to satisfy 
the debts of the business.   
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the rationale for the 
adoption of the ‘responsible corporate personality’ model. The second part concerns 
itself with the components of the model. The third part examines its implications for 
tackling corporate fraud and abuses in Nigeria.  
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6.2 Flawed Veil Piercing                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Corporate fraud and abuses constitute an anathema to company law.
4
 The problem 
affects all jurisdictions in a variety of ways.
5
 However, there seem to be differing 
opinions on how to deal with the problem. Veil piercing, an equitable remedy used 
by the courts to make corporate controllers account for their actions, has been lost 
over time. This is because courts have reached different conclusions about whether 
veil-piercing affords legal and/or equitable relief. As early as the turn of the 20
th
 
Century, Wormser observed that this apparent confusion stemmed from the fact that 
courts, whether of law, equity or bankruptcy, do not hesitate to penetrate the veil and 
to look beyond the juristic entity at the actual and substantial beneficiaries.
6
 Yet 
under the common law courts, veil piercing has been characterised by controversies, 
ambiguities, and even a seeming degree of randomness because claims to the court 
will often be futile or achieve no result due to rigidity in doctrinal standards.  
To date, no uniform test has emerged on how to hold the corporate controller liable 
for his actions whether for perpetrating a fraud, wrong or injustice that caused wrong 
or injury to the claimant. In most cases, the decisions of courts on veil piercing 
issues are merely declaratory in nature with no consequential orders on how to deal 
with the substantive problem, i.e., reaching the assets of these corporate controllers 
and recovering the gains of the fraud and abuse from them. The courts have refused 
to stray very far from the traditional principles of corporate common law in 
analysing claims to pierce the veil of limited liability companies. There is also the 
question of a lack of coherence in the approaches leading to calls for the abolition of 
limited liability.
7
  
The piercing doctrine has been obscured to the point where as one commentator has 
pointed out, “it is now lost in a fog.” 8  This is unfortunate, considering the 
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tremendous advancements that have taken place in business law since the unveiling 
of the limited liability company.  
As an exception to limited liability, veil piercing has been misapplied as well as 
being misconceived. Depending on one’s approach, veil piercing has been applied 
only as a means of discarding limited liability. The reason for this is not farfetched. 
Limited liability has been framed as loss allocation, and that path seems to have been 
followed by subsequent empirical studies on veil-piercing.
9
 Under this scenario, the 
orthodox approach defines the scope of shareholder liability, based on the extent of 
its distributive impact on various types of creditors/claims, corporations, and 
shareholders.
10
 This efficiency-based rationale for limited liability, which tends to 
govern veil piercing with primary focus on contract and tort creditors, appears to 
have lost sight of other fundamental aspects of private law, such as property and 
unjust enrichment.
11
 This perception is deeply flawed when one considers the fact 
that veil piercing emerged as an equitable procedure to remedy the problem of 
unenforceable judgments. The earliest forms of shareholder liability appeared 
designed as incidental provisional relief available only in the absence of other 
reliefs.
12
 Imposition of liability on a shareholder did not ultimately depend on 
whether an initial claim lay in contract, property, tort, or unjust enrichment against a 
corporation.
13
 Therefore, veil piercing was not originally linked to corporate liability.  
6.2.1 Scholarly Patches of Veil-Piercing 
Amidst the problems identified above, various proposals, as indicated earlier, have 
been put forward to rehabilitate the veil piercing doctrine. These proposals have 
offered several different adaptations of the traditional veil piercing standards in an 
effort to rectify the apparent problems. A careful analysis of these proposals reveals 
two diametrically opposing views, namely, those offering suggestions on how to 
mitigate the veil doctrine problem, and those calling for its outright abolition.  
For Huss, codifying the common law test as identified in chapter three might serve 
as a useful legislative guidance and offer better statutory interpretation to constrain 
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the courts with a view to applying the veil doctrine in a consistent manner.
14
 Though 
advocating for the abolition of the doctrine as being unprincipled and uncontrollable 
with predictability costs serving no policy goals, Bainbridge nevertheless supported 
the simplification of the test, by distilling the totality of existing factors into their 
essential ingredients.
15
 However, it will be difficult to suggest that piercing serves no 
policy goals as suggested by Bainbridge. Piercing may at least serve as a deterrent in 
the minds of corporate controllers who risk exposing their assets to personal 
judgment.
16
 As argued by Marcantel, shareholders of close corporations have greater 
incentive to watch each other to prevent fraud and they may also less frequently 
undercapitalise than they would otherwise, for fear of exposure to piercing.
17
 In any 
event, it is here argued that the deterrent effect could only be enhanced through 
making application of the piercing doctrine more predictable. The present doctrine 
lacks this quality.  
Nonetheless, John Matheson and Raymond Eby (hereafter Matheson-Eby model 
standard), and in an attempt to create predictability and consistency, have advocated 
the creation of a conjunctive test which limits judicial discretion to the waiver of 
limited liability, based on the wrongful conduct of the corporate controller. 
18
The 
crucial elements of the Matheson - Eby proposal is that a plaintiff in a veil piercing 
proceeding should first demonstrate that the member used the company to commit 
fraud or was siphoning corporate funds or assets.
19
 Secondly, the member must have 
caused the company to transfer assets or incur obligations to the member or entity in 
which the owner has a material interest for less than reasonably equivalent 
value.
20
Under this scenario, a member engaging in such a transfer is liable to the 
creditors for the amount transferred in excess of a reasonably equivalent amount.
21
 
Finally, the third test involves what Matheson and Eby call insolvency distribution.
22
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To demonstrate insolvency, which is a crucial element of the test, it must be shown 
that the company made a distribution of assets to a member, in recognition of and as 
a return on the member’s membership interest and the distribution caused the 
subsequent insolvency of the company that the member knew or must have 
reasonably foreseen.
23
  
Thus, the test identifies the owner’s own wrongful actions as the source of the 
owner’s loss of limited-liability protection in the circumstances discussed above.24 In 
this case, the owner shall be responsible for all of the company’s debt.  
However, this model runs into problems with its narrow definition of fraud. The 
standard limits fraud to a demonstration of a member’s material misrepresentations 
of the assets of the enterprise. The definition of fraud under this model therefore falls 
short of accommodating other cases or forms of fraud. The result is that too many 
injured parties, such as victims of the advanced fee fraud cases in Nigeria (aka 419) 
discussed in chapter 5, misrepresentation involving contract claims,
25
 
misrepresentations relating to the company’s performance and misrepresentation that 
someone besides the company will guarantee the debt,
26
 as well as outright 
misappropriation of company’s funds to defeat creditor’s claims will all be left 
without a remedy. Fraud has also been found when a company was organised merely 
to protect shareholders from the claims of creditors.
27
  
The model also makes no mention of non-fraudulent cases resulting in a wrong or 
injustice; neither does it preserve the equitable nature of the veil piercing remedy by 
permitting adequate flexibility. Even in terms of fraud itself, the model fails to 
provide a remedy for injured parties who are victims of constructive fraud and have 
suffered a wrong or injustice, but are unable to prove actual fraud. Constructive 
fraud for instance, would apply where a conduct though not actually fraudulent, has 
all the actual consequences and all the legal effects of actual fraud.
28
 Species of 
constructive fraud may include representations made by a member by his words or 
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conduct, either directly or through the limited liability company, which cause injury 
to an individual or entity following reliance thereon by the injured party. In the case 
of Williams v Natural Life Foods Ltd.
29
 the main question before the court was 
whether or not the director of a company could be held personally liable for the 
financial loss caused by the negligent advice of ‘the company’ in which he was a 
director. The loss occasioned in this case emanated from a defective franchisee 
prospectus that promised higher returns than were actually enjoyed by the appellants. 
The House of Lords, relying on the ‘legal person’ doctrine concluded that since there 
was no assumption of responsibility by the director for the advice of his company, 
the director could not be held personally liable. The aggrieved party was advised to 
look solely to the company for the satisfaction of his claim. The outcome could have 
been different if the director had assumed personal responsibility to the appellants. 
Before Williams, the New Zealand’s Court of Appeal had adopted the same 
reasoning in Trevor Ivory Ltd v Anderson
30
 on similar grounds. 
Halpern, Trebilcock and Turnbull have suggested a pro rata liability rule where 
shareholders in default are each liable for the amount of money invested in 
purchasing the equity plus a proportion of unsatisfied claims arising from the 
default.
31
 These unsatisfied claims are calculated in such a manner that it would be 
equal to the proportion of the shares which are outstanding in the name of each 
investor. The optimal benefit derivable from this proposal, according to these 
commentators, is that it will be in the shareholder’s interests to ensure that the 
company does not undertake projects which increase the risk to earnings. As the risk 
increases, the insurance provided by the equity holder becomes more important, and 
the value of the equity falls.
32
 The implication is that this has the potential to reduce 
equity participation by shareholders who may demand adequate compensation to be 
induced in order to hold the shares of the company. Sollars supports a version of 
proportional liability wherein each shareholder is to be liable for the excess of 
liabilities over the corporation’s assets to the extent of the proportion of her shares in 
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relation to the total number of shares outstanding.
33
 However, such liability of the 
shareholders would only be to the victims of tort or other so-called involuntary 
creditors because, according to him, creditors who interact contractually with the 
company have the opportunity to adjust their terms so as to compensate them for 
expected losses.
34
 Thus, the liability to which voluntary creditors are exposed can be 
altered by contract from the legal default. 
In terms of ending the externalisation of risk onto tort creditors by extending 
vicarious liability to all shareholders, Hansmann and Kraakman offer the best known 
proposals.
35
 According to them, an unlimited liability regime would be efficient 
provided that shareholder’s liability is pro rata. They contend that a pro rata liability 
which limits a shareholder’s exposure for tort losses to the shareholder’s 
proportionate share of ownership, retains the benefits of limited liability, including 
information costs savings, diversification, and share fungibility.
36
 In the same vein, 
they argue that such unlimited shareholder liability forces the firm to internalize the 
risks created by its activities, thereby inducing socially efficient levels of monitoring 
to avoid risk as well as capitalization and insurance to cover unavoided risks.
37
 
Hansmann and Kraakmann further contend that the new transaction and 
administrative costs that this regime would create would not be serious and, in all 
likelihood, would be offset easily by the social costs it would prevent.
38
 
So thorough and provocative is their critique of limited liability that Hansmann and 
Kraakmann have all but defined the debate in the last few decades.
39
 While 
conceding that it is at least preferable to joint and several liability, which could 
require individual members to be held liable for all the debts of the company 
regardless of their shareholding, critics of this proposal argue that it might prove 
more costly and less effective than Hansmann and Kraakmann acknowledge.
40
 
Mendelson, for example, argues that pro rata liability is insufficient to deter 
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shareholders from engaging in excessively risky activities since they could use their 
control to extract greater than a pro rata share of benefits from the firm.
41
 Leebron 
argues that the solution lies in the amendment of legislation that can provide tort 
creditors with special priority in insolvency proceedings.
42
 He argues that this would 
ultimately facilitate the shifting of additional tort risk to creditors.  
For Leebron, there are four reasons to be given for increasing the liability of those he 
called ‘financial creditors’ i.e. contractual creditors such as banks, lenders or 
financial houses.
43
 The first is that creditors, unlike tort victims, can easily diversify 
this loss, since their exposure will only be the amount of the loan. Second, if the 
creditor’s liability is increased, it will have the potential to decrease the externality 
created by limited liability for companies with debt. By this arrangement, if tort 
claimants had priority over financial creditors, only the risk of harm in excess of a 
firm’s entire capital, not just its equity capital, could be externalised. A third reason 
for granting priority to tort claimants would be to restore capital structure neutrality, 
at least in so far as tort risks are concerned. Finally, it would incentivise creditors to 
monitor corporate tort risks, since change of priority would mean that the cost of 
corporate torts would fall first on debt holders and not tort victims. 
However, monitoring risk may be too cumbersome and expensive to achieve in 
practical terms. Again, shifting additional tort risk to financial creditors will further 
increase their burden, particularly in situations of company insolvency where there is 
a possibility that creditors could lose everything that they have invested. 
6.2.2 Beyond Loss Allocation Orthodoxy: Responsible Corporate Personality 
Despite the efforts made by previous scholars to suggest improvements to the 
system, they are still premised on loss allocation analysis. They fall short of 
providing an effective, comprehensive system capable of weighing the pertinent 
factors and assessing fraud, abuse of limited liability and the denial of the gains of 
the fraud from the corporate controller which may be suitable for a developing 
country such as Nigeria. The focus of constructive trust lies on whether the ultimate 
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holder should retain the proceeds flowing from title to a misappropriated asset. 
Constructive trust is established upon proof that the retained proceeds constitutes 
unjustified enrichment.
44
 This is different from trying to determine the attributes that 
attract liability for a shareholder or corporate controller. 
Therefore, until the conceptual path linking veil- piercing and limited liability in 
terms of loss allocation without disgorging the gains made by corporate controllers is 
discarded, it will remain impossible to find a cogent remedy to the problem. This is 
because pure veil-piercing should enable a claimant to reach the personal assets of 
the corporate controller, instead of merely imposing liability with no delineation of 
recovery.
45
 The ultimate effect of veil-piercing therefore, would not only be the 
displacement of limited liability for the corporate controller, but to recover the gains 
of the unjust enrichment through the disgorgement of his asset. The potential of this 
measure is that it lays emphasis on recovery of the gains of the fraud instead of loss. 
Due to the problems identified above, courts found it difficult to deal with this under 
the existing system.  
The present approach which is tied to limited liability does not allow a creditor to 
reach the personal assets of the corporate controller in order to recover his debt. This 
is because all the proposals share a conceptual deficiency. To date, it is difficult to 
see any of the proposals that have classified veil-piercing options from the direction 
of a substantive claim on enforcement of judgment against a shareholder/corporate 
controller, emanating either from property or unjust enrichment.
46
 The lack of 
commentary in this area of law appears curious, particularly when it is considered 
that shareholder liability has historically been conceived as a property –based mesne 
process.
47
This situation may not be justified, particularly in a country like Nigeria, 
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where the benefit derived from fraud manifests in the acquisition of numerous assets 
and setting up entities different from the company where the fraud was perpetrated.  
Against this background, corporate law must find other ways or means of dealing 
with the disgorgement of the benefit of fraud. To do this, the responsible corporate 
personality model re-conceives veil-piercing as constructive trust, which has over 
time appeared to have been detached from its equitable nature and remedial 
structure. Restitution law has for centuries provided the courts the means to enforce 
judgments by making unjustifiably enriched parties to disgorge misappropriated 
assets. Thus, unjust enrichment is a fundamental element of constructive trust.
48
  The 
attraction of this equitable procedure lies in its remedies which are more flexible, 
elastic, progressive, and by far more extensive than those in contract or tort. Thus, 
the constructive trust in its very nature can be employed when an initial remedy in 
either equity or law, is unavailable. Within this context, the constructive trust’s 
principles and rationales operate independently of the nature of the creditors claim 
against the company or shareholder in the original claim.  
A major component of constructive trust is the location of benefit of misappropriated 
assets. This unlike loss allocation procedure and veil piercing investigates whether 
the retention of assets is justified in the circumstance of the case. This inquiry, which 
is not restricted to a shareholder, follows and traces a disputed asset to its ultimate 
holder.
49
 Therefore, once a constructive trustee is designated, the claimant is 
endowed with proprietary rights to the assets. Such proprietary rights take priority 
over general unsecured creditors, regardless of whether the constructive trustee is 
insolvent or not. The details of constructive trust and other components of 
responsible corporate personality will be dealt with below. 
6.3 Constructive Trusts 
The proper role of equity in commercial transactions is a topical question. 
Increasingly, claimants have had to seek recourse to equity for an effective remedy 
when the person in default, typically a company, is insolvent. Claimants also seek to 
obtain relief from others who were involved in a transaction, such as directors of the 
company or its bankers or its legal or other advisers. They seek to fasten fiduciary 
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obligations directly onto the corporate controllers, officers or agents or advisers, or 
to have them held personally liable for assisting the company in breaches of trust, 
fiduciary obligations, or fraudulent acts of the officers/ agents.
50
 Such action can also 
arise against corporate controllers when they are implicated in fraud. Equity has 
always given relief against fraud by making any person implicated in the fraud 
accountable in equity. In such circumstances, the courts would give relief to the 
injured party by declaring the defendant chargeable as a constructive trustee.
51
 In the 
case of a defaulting director, the imputation of a constructive trust will ensure that he 
does not benefit from his wrongdoing.
52
 Unfortunately, constructive trusts have been 
under-utilised in company law largely due to lack of attention to readily identifiable 
principles entitling relief in this form.
 53
      
Constructive trusts are the creation of equity.
54
 The doctrine of constructive trust 
emerged as a flexible remedy for maintaining effective justice between parties.
55
 
Simply put, a constructive trust is an equitable remedy imposed to prevent unjust 
enrichment.
56
 Considered to be the most important contribution of equity to the 
remedies for prevention of unjust enrichment, the constructive trust as a remedial 
institution empowers the courts to make an order declaring a defendant to be holding 
a disputed asset on trust for the claimant.
57
  
Constructive trust is also a property concept by which the claimant can obtain an 
equitable proprietary interest in a property held by a defendant. It is a species of 
equitable remedy akin to injunction or decree of specific performance.
58
 Unlike an 
express trust, which arises out of intentional creation of the relationship, a 
constructive trust is imposed by the court whenever it is considered just to do so as a 
remedy to prevent unjust enrichment. Such imposition by the court arises as a result 
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of the conduct of the trustee independently of the intention of the parties.
59
 No 
element of consent is therefore necessary; the court in this circumstance simply 
declares that a defendant holds a disputed asset for the benefit of a claimant.
60
 It is 
also distinct from an express trust because it is not a fiduciary relationship
61
 which as 
Millett LJ pointed out in Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew
62
 is built on a 
position of trust and confidence and gives rise to an obligation of loyalty to the 
fiduciary. The fiduciary relationship is thus created in circumstances whereby one 
party has undertaken to act for, or on behalf of, another in relation to some particular 
matter or matters e.g. property, although fiduciary relationships are not confined to 
undertakings with respect to property.  
The doctrine of constructive trust emerged as a remedy of great flexibility for doing 
effective justice between parties.
63
 Yet, like veil-piercing, it has its own problems, 
having been denigrated as a troubled child of equity because it is been seen as 
somewhat confusing in contemporary times.
64
 As Millett pointed out, this confusion 
arises not only from the ambiguous meaning of the expression ‘constructive trust’, 
but also because it only describes the trust itself yet also sometimes describes a 
particular proprietary remedy.
65
 Moreover, it is difficult to ascertain clearly whether 
it is substantial or remedial.
66
  
A constructive trust essentially arises whenever the circumstances are such that it 
would be unconscionable for a legal title owner to assert any beneficial interest 
which denies the interest of the rightful holder of the beneficial interest. Thus, 
constructive trust arises when circumstances which are ex hypothesi known to the 
legal owner that affects his conscience.
67
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More importantly, a constructive trust arises when a defendant is implicated in a 
fraud. Equity has always given relief against fraud by making any person sufficiently 
implicated in the fraud accountable in equity. In such a case, he is liable to account 
personally to his beneficiary for his actions as trustee.
68
 In the case of a defaulting 
director who had acted in breach of his fiduciary duty, this will involve the recovery 
of company assets or their equivalent value in keeping with the traditional obligation 
of a defaulting director to effect restitution to his company which in a commercial 
case is the first remedy for consideration.
69
  
Fiduciaries are those who have a single-minded loyalty to their principals, such as 
directors of companies and agents. A de jure or de facto company director is plainly 
a fiduciary for the company and treated as a trustee of the company’s property under 
his control. Whether a shadow director is one depends on whether he has undertaken 
to act for the company in a particular matter. A fiduciary relationship is ultimately 
founded upon a legitimate expectation that the fiduciary will not use his or her 
position in such a way which is adverse to the interests of the principal.  
The fiduciary must act in good faith, and must not make an unauthorised profit out 
of his position in which his duty and his own interest may conflict. If the fiduciary 
makes an unauthorised profit by use of his position or engages in a fraudulent act, he 
is liable to account for the profit to his principal, and this is said to be a ‘liability to 
account as a constructive trustee’.70  
6.3.1 Constructive Trust and Corporate Veil-Piercing Scenarios 
Courts often impose constructive trust where traditional remedies prove inadequate 
or unavailable. Thus, constructive trust as a remedy may be applied in a variety of 
situations where equity demands. More importantly, it serves as a potential claim to 
correct a wrong that may not fit squarely within any other cause of action. 
The constructive trust is not restricted to unjust enrichment. For, as Birks who had 
earlier espoused it later confirmed, obligations can warrant restitution.
71
 This brings 
to the fore the scope of civil law which is divided between the dual goals of 
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compensation and restitution.
72
 Within this context, as pointed to by Birks, civil law 
is divided entirely between the twin objective of achieving compensation and 
restitution- both of which translate into obligations as found in contract or tort and 
unjust enrichment.
73
  
This analysis is fundamental to the question of the link between veil-piercing and 
constructive trust. Thus, restitution functions to complement, and not supplant 
compensation which is ordinarily found as a remedy for breaches of contract or tort. 
Restitution therefore becomes necessary only when the initial remedy in equity or 
law seems unavailable. Indeed, this is the precise function performed by the 
constructive trust. 
The constructive is thus detached from and applies independently of the underlying 
claim. As the nature of the underlying claim is irrelevant, the application of a 
constructive trust does not depend on whether a substantive claim is grounded in 
contract, property, tort, or unjust enrichment, or concerns a voluntary or involuntary 
creditor.
74
 A claimant seeking to benefit from constructive trust must show that he 
has been deprived of an asset through some wrongful means. This position was 
illustrated in State of Michigan v. Little River Brand of Ottawa Indians
75
 for 
instance, where the court reiterated that a party seeking to have a constructive trust 
imposed bears the burden of establishing fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, 
undue influence, duress, or some other circumstance that would make it inequitable 
for the holder of a legal title to retain the property. In this connection, all that matters 
for purposes of invoking constructive trust is whether the process by which the asset 
was misappropriated warrants equitable relief. 
The process of invoking constructive trust applies to the defendant’s enrichment. As 
a subset of restitution, constructive trust concerns the propriety of benefits, and not 
losses.
76
 The central focus of constructive trust is therefore to strip the defendant of 
benefit unjustly gained at the claimant’s expense. The nature and extent of the harm 
caused is not really relevant since the retention and enjoyment of the 
misappropriated asset is sufficiently wrongful on its own. 
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A unique feature of constructive trust is that it is not a party –specific inquiry. 
Because the primary focus is on the status of the misappropriated asset, such asset 
can be traced from the wrongdoer to its ultimate custodian.
77
 Except where the 
transfer was made bona fide, any other person or party holding the asset qualifies as 
a constructive trustee and even if altered or substituted, the asset will still be subject 
to a proprietary claim that can result in disgorgement.
78
  
Thus, the structure of constructive trust seems to suit the classic veil-piercing 
scenarios. The constructive trust, unlike a loss allocation analysis which sifts through 
different types of creditor/claims, corporation and shareholders to find an exception 
to a general rule focusses on whether a corporation’s inability to satisfy a judgment 
results in an unjustifiable allocation of benefits. The principles of constructive trust 
avoid the pitfall of trying to justify a remedy by resorting to the attributes of the 
original claim.
79
 To this end, greater emphasis is placed on the consequences the 
victim of the wrong stands to suffer and the potential available remedy to him, for 
example, either in restitution or damages to satisfy the wrong done to him. What is 
more, the inquiry is sufficiently flexible to accommodate any transfer of benefit from 
a corporation to its shareholder. To this extent, the constructive trust is not intended 
to reach the personal assets of most of the shareholders or bona fide recipients 
without notice of adverse claims, but only those who had elected to profit from the 
company in an unjustified manner.  
6.3.2 Liability of Corporate Controllers as Constructive Trustees 
A limited liability company is of course not a trustee of its own funds: it is their 
beneficial owner; but because of the fiduciary character of their duties directors of 
limited liability companies are treated as trustees of those funds of the company 
which are in their hands or under their control, and if they misapply them they 
commit a breach of trust.
80
 Thus, where a director commits a breach of duty, a 
constructive trust would be imposed. This would result in the loss of the corporate 
shield by the director as well as the potential effect of disgorgement of his assets for 
fair distribution to creditors. Therefore, the director upon whom constructive trust is 
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imposed cannot rely on the corporate form to escape liability since he is deemed to 
hold the benefit of the breach in trust for the company. In fraud cases, imposition of 
constructive trusts commonly arises in the following situations:
81
 
a.) Where a person in a fiduciary position makes an unauthorised profit; 
b.) Where a person is in “knowing receipt” of trust property”; 
c.) Where there has been rescission of a contract entered into as a consequence 
of fraud. 
In the UK, a claimant relying on constructive trust to make a claim must demonstrate 
a pre-existing fiduciary relationship or some fraudulent conduct on the part of the 
defendant. As explained by Millett LJ in Paragon Finance plc v D B Thakerar & 
Co,
82
 obligation on the trustee which may give rise to a claim can come in two 
situations: first, where a defendant assumes fiduciary duties prior to the specific item 
or property by a lawful transaction preceding the breach of trust; and second, where 
the trust obligation arises only from unlawful transactions, such as breach of trust. 
The implication of the two ‘Paragon’ categories is that, while in respect of the first, 
trusteeship arises by operation of the law and confers on the beneficiary a proprietary 
claim, the second category is no more than a way of expressing a liability to account 
in equity particularly where the person is implicated in fraud.
83
 Consequently, where 
directors of a company in breach of their fiduciary duties misapply the funds of their 
company, they are regarded as constructive trustees for the misapplied funds and 
liable to the company under the first set of Millett LJ’s two classifications.  
The company has a choice to claim that the director as trustee should restore the trust 
asset, whilst it may still pursue a proprietary claim to trace the asset or its identifiable 
substitute which will operate against the whole world except a bona fide purchaser 
for value.
84
  On the other hand, only a personal claim for account of profit can arise 
for the second paragon’s case. This has obvious implications for the claimant who, 
unlike class 1 of the paragon’s case, has to compete with other unsecured creditors of 
the company. The views of Millett LJ above seems to be the way constructive trust is 
perceived in the UK and this has influenced later decisions. Unauthorised profits for 
purposes of holding a director liable to account for the gains made may be articulated 
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under the current law in the UK as secret profits and bribes and misuse of corporate 
opportunities.  
6.3.2.1    Secret Profits and Bribes 
Secret profit and bribe is a misuse of a person’s position in the company. Although 
not directly company assets or property, a corporate controller who while acting for 
the company in any transaction makes such an unauthorised profit, has abused the 
corporate form and cannot therefore escape liability for his actions.  
The basis for this is that a corporate controller as a fiduciary must act in the best 
interest of the company and should not do anything which is capable of having 
adverse consequences on the company and the interest of its stakeholders such as the 
creditors. As secret profits and bribes constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, equity 
will not allow such corporate controller to take the benefit of such ill-gotten gains 
which influence the company to act in a particular way thereby causing its potential 
insolvency.
85
 To this extent, a constructive trust would be imposed to protect the 
company and by implication its creditors to avoid the directors using the company 
for illegitimate ends. The inherent vice of depriving the principal, without his 
knowledge or informed consent, of the disinterested advice which he is entitled to 
expect from his agent, free from the potentially corrupting influence of his own is 
one which should be abhorred.
86
  
Further, the corporate controller would be required as a personal duty to account to 
the company for the value of the bribe received as a fiduciary less the profit or 
benefits made from it. The recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Sinclair v 
Versailles
87
confirms this point. Sinclair had departed from Attorney General for 
Hong Kong v Reid
88
 which ruled that such bribes should be accounted for including 
the profits made thereon (proprietary claim) but upheld the opinion expressed in the 
old case of Lister v Stubbs
89
 decided at the Court of Appeal well over a century ago 
that such a claim was personal. However in Nigeria the law does not seem to tackle 
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this problem effectively. This may be because bribe and secret profits are not seen as 
money or assets belonging to the company.  
Although Sinclair remains the current position of the law in the UK as far as secret 
profit and bribes by the fiduciary are concerned, it is submitted that the decision in 
Reid is preferred as it is more encompassing in meeting the demands of equity. This 
view is predicated on the ground that asking the fiduciary simply to account for the 
bribe money less the profit made with it will amount to denying him the benefit in 
part. If the property representing the bribe increased in value, the fiduciary should 
not be entitled to retain any surplus in excess of the initial value of the bribe as he 
was not allowed by any means to make a profit out of a breach of duty.  
It is therefore submitted for the purposes of reform of the law, that where a corporate 
controller is found to receive bribe or made secret profits through misuse of his 
position, constructive trust should be imposed on him not only to make him lose his 
corporate shield but to also disgorge the assets or money subject matter of the bribe 
money plus the profit made through the investment of the bribe. In addition, he 
should be subjected to disqualification proceedings from holding that office. This 
will act as a deterrent to corporate controllers who might want to misuse their 
positions in future to receive bribes and secret profits and thereby undermining the 
existence of the company. 
6.3.2.2    Misuse of Corporate Opportunity: UK Current Law  
A director is required not to put himself in a position where his duty and his interest 
may conflict. He, as a trustee, must not therefore profit from his trust.
90
Thus under 
the ‘secret profits’ rule, proof that the trustee had acted with any fraudulent intent or 
lack of probity is not required.
91
Consequently, where for example, a trustee 
speculates in a commercial venture from which he stands to benefit, he will be liable 
for any losses and must disgorge all profits, even if he has acted in good faith. The 
similarity of a trustee duty to that of a company director who owes a fiduciary duty 
to the company cannot be mistaken. A director, when performing his duties to the 
company, must act as a prudent man would in relation to their business whilst being 
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loyal to the company by acting throughout in good faith for the benefit of their 
company.
92
 A director who makes profit by virtue of his position without the 
company’s consent will be required to account for such profits to the company. 
Further, unauthorised profit by a fiduciary may also result for instance, where a 
director of a company diverts a corporate opportunity of the company for his own 
benefit. Courts in the UK are not prepared to countenance a fiduciary exploiting an 
opportunity for his own benefit and are more concerned with penalising him for 
having taken up the opportunity of entering into profitable transactions on his own 
behalf than to ascertain whether or not there has been a conflict between his duty of 
loyalty to his principal and his own self-interest.
93
 Thus the corporate opportunity 
doctrine prevents a director from diverting to his own advantage a commercial 
opportunity that could have been exploited by the company. In Bhullar v Bhullar,
94
 
the Court of Appeal  was invited to answer the question of whether  directors’ who 
acquired premises on their own account in breach of their fiduciary duties, held the 
property on trust for the company, irrespective of whether the company might or 
might not have had an interest in acquiring the property. The court held that the 
directors of the family business were under a fiduciary duty to communicate the 
existence of the opportunity to acquire the nearby property to the company since 
they were in fiduciary relationship with the company by virtue of their capacity and 
the acquisition of the property would have been commercially attractive to the 
company.  
In light of Bhullar’s case, a director could not carry on competing business with his 
company or turn the company’s assets , opportunities or information to his own 
profit unless there was consent.
95
 It further epitomises the age-long fundamental 
principle of company law that directors of a company are under a strict duty not to 
place themselves in a position where there is potential conflict between their duties 
to the company and their interests or duties to others. This obligation on the part of 
directors has been codified in section 175 of the Companies Act 2006 and 
expounded most memorably by the House of Lords several decades ago in the case 
of Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver to include a duty by the director to account for 
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profits from such breach of duty made from improper use of corporate opportunity.
96
 
Again, this may increase company assets and so help the creditors indirectly. It also 
enhances the deterrent effect of that prohibition of conflict of interest. 
The corporate opportunity doctrine therefore makes a director liable to hold any 
profits on constructive trust for the company if those profits were made from an 
opportunity which the company could or would have exploited but for the actions of 
the director in diverting the opportunity for his own personal benefit. In the 
circumstance, the company may have the right to damages (to be paid off) for such 
improper appropriation of the opportunity with respect to the director’s breach of his 
contract of employment or claim for an account of profits for breach of duty. 
However, the two actions cannot be maintained for the same transaction as the 
company must elect which remedy to pursue.
97
 It may also proceed to obtain an 
injunction to prevent the use of the knowledge or opportunity. Angry shareholders 
may bring their own legal action for their benefit in derivative claims, though such 
claims must be maintained in the name of the company subject to the leave of the 
court.
98
 The range of possibility of actions by the company may also include criminal 
prosecution in case of fraud or bribe under the Fraud Act 2006 and Bribery Act 2010 
respectively. In addition, where the company becomes insolvent, the director as 
pointed out in Chapters 3 and 5 may be declared unfit to hold such position in 
relation to the management of a company pursuant to the Company Directors’ 
Disqualification Act 1986.
99
   
The strict duty to account in the UK for improper profit is not closed as it was 
restated in Gencor ACP Ltd v Dalby.
100
 The only escape from potential 
accountability is the obtaining of the prior approval of the company’s shareholders 
after full disclosure of all the facts and circumstances.
101
  
In any event, whilst a director does owe a fiduciary duty to the company,
102
 that does 
not ipso facto make him a trustee as he is not constricted by a trustee’s obligations to 
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safeguard and protect trust assets.
103
  A director is not precluded from dealing with 
the company’s assets for bona fide commercial purposes. He can freely deal with 
such assets provided it is within the company’s powers. To require otherwise would 
mean to severely compromise corporate expansion or indeed undermine it. However, 
where a director misapplies company assets such as money which comes under his 
control, he will become liable upon the same footing as if he were a trustee.
104
 The 
imposition of liability on a director within this context raises some fundamental 
questions as to the obvious perception of constructive trust: for example, is 
constructive trust institutional or remedial? This is particularly important as various 
jurisdictions and jurists have taken diametrically opposing views as to how remedies 
can be founded on constructive trust. 
105
Whilst these arguments relate to the proper 
delineation and role of constructive trust in identifying who is a trustee and how a 
constructive trustee can be used as a remedy to impose liability against someone for 
unlawful transactions, it is nonetheless important to stress that a company director 
who misappropriates company’s assets under his control is still liable and should be 
accountable in equity.
106
 The institutional constructive trust or remedial constructive 
trust paradigm reflecting whether if constructive trust is imposed due to a pre-
existing fiduciary duties or as a remedy consequent upon some unlawful transaction 
in relation to directors will be discussed below.     
As with the company’s assets, a director is not a trustee for the company’s 
shareholders,
107
 to the extent that share dealings can take place between them 
without the necessity of disgorging profits. A director is also not in a fiduciary 
relationship with any third parties who deal with the company.
108
This obviously 
raises some problems as to how the law will deal with a situation where the fiduciary 
acts fraudulently at the expense of someone who is not necessarily in a fiduciary 
relationship with them, like a creditor. Put differently, how can a claimant victim of 
commercial fraud or transaction lacking in probity seek redress from a defendant 
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who is not his trustee and who is not in a fiduciary position with them? What can the 
courts do to help a claimant when there is no contractual or tortious link to help the 
claimant, especially in modern company practices where shareholders, directors, 
nominees and agents feel that the doctrine of separate legal personality of the 
company protects them for their actions?  The answer to these questions are some of 
the issues constructive trust seeks to answer by trying to impose  liability on 
corporate controllers through the extension of right of action to persons who 
otherwise may be regarded as outsiders to company affairs, such as creditors who 
nevertheless may be having one form of transaction or the other with the company. 
This duty may also include an implied responsibility or obligation by the directors to 
the creditor, which, as pointed out in chapter 4, arises when the company is in 
insolvency or near insolvency. To this extent, the imposition of constructive trust to 
disgorge the assets of the corporate controller in a period of company’s insolvency is 
one step along in helping to solve the problem of creditors. The basis for this 
assertion is that although money recovered from the directors are funds going to the 
company, they are meant for distribution to creditors.
 
This is particularly important 
as the burden of risk borne by the creditors during insolvency are quite enormous 
owing to the doctrine of separate  legal personality which insulates corporate 
controllers from any liability in relation to the debt of the company.
 109 
6.3.2.3    Liability of Knowing Receipt 
In terms of knowing receipt in relation to corporate entities, a constructive trust may 
be constituted in situations where persons receive trust property that has been taken 
in breach of trust. To be liable, those who receive the property must do so for their 
own benefit. The essential requirements of knowing receipt were clearly stated by 
Hoffmann LJ in El Ajou v Dollar Land Holding Plc.
110
 The claimant must show: 
firstly, a disposal of his assets in breach of fiduciary duty; secondly, the beneficial 
receipt by the defendant of assets which are traceable as representing the assets of 
the claimants; and thirdly, knowledge on the part of the defendant that the assets 
received are traceable to a breach of fiduciary duty. 
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In considering the requirement of knowledge, the Court of Appeal in Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele,
111
sought to determine 
firstly, and within the context, the meaning of knowledge, and secondly, whether it is 
necessary for the recipient to act dishonestly for him to be caught by the test. Whilst 
the courts answer to the second question was in the negative in that dishonesty was 
not a requirement for knowing receipt, for the first question Nourse LJ concluded 
that the single test of knowledge for knowing receipt is that the recipient’s state of 
knowledge must be such as to make it unconscionable for him to retain the benefit of 
the receipt. Consequently, the court dismissed the claim of the liquidators under both 
the knowing assistance and knowing receipts heads of constructive trust brought 
against the defendant.  
The above views of Nourse L.J. remains ultimately the test under the English law, 
though there have been calls for a strict liability test subject only to a change of 
position defence.
112
  
The change in the defendant’s position following his receipt of the enrichment was 
accepted by the House of Lords in Lipkin Gorman (a firm) v Karpnale Ltd
113
 as a 
defence at common law to the claimant’s claim for restoration. According to Lord 
Goff, where an innocent defendant’s position is so changed that he will suffer an 
injustice if called upon to repay or repay in full, the injustice of requiring him to 
repay outweighs the injustice of denying the (claimant) restitution.
114
 The position 
taken in Lipkin Gorman was followed by the majority of the High Court of Australia 
in David Securities Pty. Ltd v. Commonwealth Bank of Australia.
115
  
A change of position post – receipt defence would arise where, in certain 
circumstances, the wealth received innocently has been lost. A typical example is 
where the claimant mistakenly pays D a certain amount. D in good faith purchased a 
lottery ticket which he could not have purchased had he not received the mistaken 
payment. It turned out however that the ticket is a losing ticket. A claim by C for 
restoration can be deflected by D on the ground that he (D) has changed his 
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position.
116
 Thus the ultimate aim of change of position defence is one of balance of 
justice between the claimant and the defendant which recognises the fact that 
although the defendant has been enriched, the claimant’s claim is nevertheless 
denied because of the injustice its success would inflict upon the defendant.  
The effect of liability of knowing receipt for the purposes of this study is that 
constructive trust stands as a bar for the utilisation of the separate legal personality of 
the company by the corporate controllers to escape liability for breach of fiduciary 
duties or to defeat claims for recovery of company assets which has been 
fraudulently transferred to third parties. With the imposition of a constructive trust, 
such assets would be traced and recovered from the third party unless there is 
supervening events which makes recovery impossible such as defendant’s good faith 
loss of the advantage received (i.e. disenrichment)
117
 to the extent of the initial 
receipt which enables him to argue that he should be excused from making 
restitution to that extent.
118
  
Nonetheless, it is submitted that the existing law on liability of third parties 
following the knowing receipt claim is defective. Under the existing law such a 
claim can only be maintained by the company against the corporate controller based 
on the fiduciary relationship the latter owes the former. It excludes creditors from 
maintaining action under that head because of absence of fiduciary relationship. 
Further, where the company is solely managed by the controlling shareholder or 
director, it becomes difficult for such claim to be taken in the absence of any other 
existing fiduciary.  
It is further submitted that this defect in the current law call for urgent attention. It is 
here proposed that this existing state of affairs should be changed such that 
constructive trust should be imposed to recover assets of the company fraudulently 
transferred to third parties wherever it is found without the requirement of 
establishing fiduciary relationship or making it a condition precedent for the 
existence of such claim. With this in mind, such claim would be made flexible 
enough to accommodate all those who may have transaction with the company 
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including the creditor. The only requirement for such outsiders who are not 
fiduciaries is for the claim to be maintained in the name of the company under the 
conditions enunciated in right of action below. This will not only make recovery 
easier and faster but will obviate the difficulty claimant’s face in court to deal with 
the recovery of company assets from third parties under the knowing receipt head. 
Finally, where it is proved that a controlling shareholder or director indeed 
transferred company assets to a third party and such assets have been dissipated, the 
shareholder or director’s personal assets should be disgorged to satisfy the claim. 
This will not only deter such fraudulent corporate controllers from embarking on 
such behaviour but will go a long way towards boosting the asset base of the 
company for distribution to creditors, particularly during insolvency.     
6.3.2.4    Fraudulent Contracts 
With respect to contracts induced by fraud, it is important to note that constructive 
trust would arise in favour of the victim where funds are stolen or are transferred 
pursuant to a void transaction. On the other hand, if the contract is voidable, for 
example, by reason of the fact that it has been induced by fraudulent 
misrepresentation under which assets are transferred by the victim, both legal and 
equitable ownership in the assets are transferred. If the victim had full knowledge of 
the fraud and elects to affirm the transaction, no constructive trust will arise. The 
victim would then have to seek rescission of the contract.
119
  In Cundy v Lindsay,
120
 
a rogue persuaded a vendor to deliver goods on credit by fraudulently 
misrepresenting his identity. The vendors brought an action in conversion against the 
appellants, innocent purchasers of the goods from the rogue. The Queen’s Bench 
Division held that the contract was merely voidable and that title had therefore 
passed to the rogue. Though that title was liable to be divested by the vendor’s act of 
rescission, the right to rescind the contract of sale had been lost on the appellant’s 
good faith purchase. Both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords found the 
contract to be void and the appellant liable in conversion.   
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For the victim to obtain rescission in this circumstance, he needs to be able to give 
restitution in integrum, i.e. to be able to return the parties to the position they were in 
prior to the performance of the contract. However, rescission may be barred by 
delay, for example, where there has been substantial performance in implementing 
the contract, and an intervention of third-party rights.
121
 
Once there is notification of avoidance of the contract for fraud, the fraudster 
becomes a constructive trustee of the property. Since rescission is an equitable 
remedy and is discretionary, it can be applied against fraudulent misrepresentation 
by corporate controllers who rely on the shield of the corporate form to induce 
creditors to enter into fraudulent contracts. 
6.4 Constructive Trust: The US and Canada Model 
Under the US and Canadian model, the constructive trust is seen as an instrument for 
remedying unjust enrichment.
122
 This is different from the institutional proprietary 
approach adopted in the UK. Thus a constructive trust may be imposed whenever the 
constructive trustee has been unjustly enriched at the expense of the constructive 
beneficiary. All that the claimant has to show is that the constructive trustee has 
received some benefit which, as against the constructive beneficiary, he cannot justly 
retain.
123
 This view reflected in paragraph 60 of the American Restatement of 
Restitution states as follows: 
Where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable 
duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly 
enriched if he were permitted to retain it, a constructive trust arises.  
This provision underlies the attitude of American judges in respect of constructive 
trust of whose leading exponent is Justice Cardozo.
124
 
A remedial constructive trust is imposed at the discretion of the court. Whilst the 
institutional constructive trust recognises the existence of a fiduciary relationship or 
the necessity of some previously existing fiduciary duty, that has been breached, or 
some proprietary rights that had been established prior to the action that led to the 
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unjust enrichment, a remedial constructive trust requires neither a subsisting 
proprietary interest nor any established fiduciary duty. Remedial constructive trust is 
therefore based on broad equitable principles that are being developed under the 
banner of restitution, that of unjust enrichment.
125
 Once an element of unjust 
enrichment is found, remedial constructive fraud can be imposed to give a claimant 
proprietary remedy even where no proprietary interest hitherto existed.  
Thus, under the US and Canadian model, in a case of unjust enrichment, and 
irrespective of any fiduciary relationship with the claimant, the court has  discretion 
to grant relief by way of constructive trust if it concludes that other proprietary and 
personal remedies are inadequate. In the event of the court proceeding to decide as 
such, the constructive trust ultimately will be deemed to have arisen at the time when 
the duty to make restitution first arose rather than when the duty is enforced.
126
 This 
has the effect of giving the court the flexibility to deal with the claimant’s action 
against the trustee in a more expansive manner rather than what is obtained in the 
more limited institutional approach. A claimant seeking rights over a corporate 
controller needs not be a fiduciary to seek any remedy. This ultimately saves him the 
difficulty of proving proprietary restitution which Etherton describes as a notoriously 
difficult area because according to him, the law of unjust enrichment has been 
developed explicitly as a subject of English law only recently and is far from 
settled.
127
 
The concept of remedial constructive trust has not been followed by many judges in 
the UK.
128The remedial constructive trust’s features of subjectivity, retrospective 
effect and the courts discretion are seen as undermining an overriding need for 
certainty in commercial transaction, and interfering with the rights of third parties, 
particularly creditors. Indeed, the very essence of the English institutional approach 
to constructive trust is based on a pre-existing proprietary interest as explained by 
Millett LJ in Paragon Finance plc v D B Thakerar & Co.
129
 Constructive trust is not 
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seen as a remedy arising from the discretion of the court but as a trust in its true 
sense which comes into being between the parties by the operation of the law even 
before a claim is made.
130
 
Nonetheless, Oakley has pointed out that while English law does not regard 
constructive trust as a remedy in the way it regards injunction, it would be difficult to 
say that a claimant seeking the imposition of constructive trust is not seeking a 
remedy.
131
 Lord Browne -Wilkinson in the Westdeutsche case (Westdeutsche 
Landesbank Girozontrale v Islington Borough Council)
132
 recognised this fact when 
he stated thus: 
Court by way of remedy might impose a constructive trust on a 
defendant who knowingly retains property of which the plaintiff has 
been unjustly deprived. Since the remedy can be tailored to 
circumstances of the particular case, innocent third parties would not 
be prejudiced and restitution defences, uch as change of position, are 
capable of being effect. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
The implication of the Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s view above is that while the 
English courts still insist on the institutional character of constructive trust because 
of its certainty, it undoubtedly uses it as a remedial instrument. In Metall und 
Rohstoff AG v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc
133
 the Court of Appeal was satisfied 
that there is a good arguable case that circumstances may arise in which the court 
would be prepared to impose a remedial constructive trust.
134
 Lord Browne-
Wilkinson has even, in Westdeutsche, considered the fact that the remedial 
constructive trust might be a suitable basis for developing proprietary restitutionary 
remedies whilst upholding the fact that an unconscionable conduct applied in other 
countries as the very basis of remedial constructive trust is the underlying test for the 
recognition of an institutional constructive trust.
135
 An unconscionability test for 
“knowing receipt” was favoured by Nourse L.J. in Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindel.
136
 However, Virgo regards unconscionability 
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which is dependent on the views of judges too vague a concept to be used as a 
principle in its own right.
137
  
Despite these efforts to find a mix between institutional and remedial constructive 
trust, recent decisions in the UK tend to follow the institutional approach as 
demonstrated in Millett LJ in Paragon’s case.138  
The lack of flexibility in the institutional constructive trust approach as applied in the 
UK company law underscores the rigidity of the principles of corporate personality 
and the difficulty faced by the courts to widen the scope of recovery available to 
claimants who are victims of wrongs but do not have pre-existing fiduciary 
relationship with the company. It is therefore submitted that the courts in the UK 
should consider imposing a constructive trust against corporate controllers once there 
has been a finding of unconscionable conduct on their part notwithstanding whether 
or not (as in US) the claimant has a pre-existing fiduciary relationship with the 
company.  
6.5 The Nigerian Position 
Unlike in the UK and other common law jurisdictions such as the US and Canada, 
the idea of constructive trust is not in much use in company law in Nigeria. There 
has also been a significant dearth of case law on this subject. A search of the law 
reports generally revealed that few cases on constructive trust existed and those cases 
that did exist related to issues pertaining to land and conveyancing. None could be 
found in company law. An example of this can be found in Anthony Ibekwe v Oliver 
Nwosu,
139
 which was decided by the Supreme Court on appeal from the Court of 
Appeal. In that case, constructive trusteeship principles were applied in favour of the 
respondent against the appellant in respect of a land transaction between the parties.  
Although the case borders on issues related to land, its relevance to this study is the 
recognition by the court of the essential elements of constructive trust as applicable 
in Nigeria. According to the Supreme Court, a constructive trust is an equitable 
remedy that a court imposes against one who has obtained property by wrong doing. 
The court further asserted that it is imposed to prevent unjust enrichment and creates 
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no fiduciary relationship. It is also termed implied trust, involuntary trust, trust ex 
delicto, trust ex maleficio, remedial trust, trust in invitum, or trust de son tort.
140
 The 
implication of these statements is that Nigeria appears to be leaning towards the 
remedial or non-fiduciary relationship approach applied in the US and Canada, as 
distinct from the institutional approach which results from operation of the law, 
favoured in the UK. 
However, as in the UK, there are still provisions in the Companies and Allied 
Matters Act (CAMA) 2004 dealing with directors’ fiduciary relationship to the 
company, 
141
directors’ trusteeship of the company’s moneys, properties and 
accounting for all the moneys over which they exercise control as well as the no-
conflict rule, secret profit,
142
 corporate opportunity and misappropriation of company 
assets and money, which are all recognised in the Act.
143
 Yet the imposition of 
constructive trust against corporate controllers has remained unutilised both by the 
courts and litigants. The reason, as pointed out earlier, may be ignorance on the part 
of litigants with regard to the efficacy of constructive trust remedies and perhaps the 
rigid adherence by the courts to the orthodox loss allocation prevalent in the separate 
legal personality of the company. The small number of claims against corporate 
fraud and abuses can also be accounted for by the nature of business ownership in 
Nigeria, which as pointed out in previous chapters, is largely in the hands of 
individuals and families. The effect is that victims of wrongs, particularly the 
creditors, continue to suffer at the hands of fraudulent corporate controllers who are 
themselves the wrongdoers. 
A case in point is Co-operative Bank Ltd v Samuel Obokhare & ors.
144
 In that case, 
the appellant obtained judgment against the respondent’s company (named as 3rd 
respondent) in a previous case to the tune of N25, 778.11k (twenty five thousand 
Naira). When it began the process of executing the judgment, the 1
st
 respondent and 
the Managing Director of the company (3
rd
 respondent) transferred the assets, 
including stock-in-trade and vehicles to another premises under the name of a new 
company (2
nd
 respondent) of which he was also the Managing director. With the 
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move by the 3
rd
 respondent, the appellant became helpless hence the second action 
leading to this appeal. 
Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal dismissed the suit and upheld the 
contention of the respondents disclaiming liability. The grounds for dismissal were 
that the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 respondents were not parties to the previous suit and that the 1
st
 
respondent, being the director or agent of the 3
rd
 respondent company was not liable 
for the liability of the company debts. 
While the court could be said to have held rightly that the 1
st
 respondent is not liable 
for the debt of the company in view of the separate legal personality doctrine, it is 
difficult to agree with the judgment that the fraudulent action of the 1
st
 respondent in 
transferring the assets of the 3
rd
 respondent to the 2
nd
 respondent to deny the 
appellant the fruit of his litigation does not deserve a remedy. This is an instance in 
which constructive trust could have been used in order to help the appellant. If 
anything, the court should have imposed the constructive trust against the appellant 
in respect of the transferring of the 3
rd
 respondents’ assets and the same extended to 
the 2
nd
 respondent for purposes of tracing the property for disgorgement in order to 
satisfy the judgment creditor.   
In the light of the above, it is proposed that the application of constructive trust in 
Nigerian corporate law will help stem the tide of corporate fraud and abuses through 
the provision of alternative remedies that seem to be lacking or have remained 
unavailable within existing veil piercing principles which have failed to provide 
useful results, as in the case above. The benefits of the responsible corporate 
personality model using the constructive trust for Nigerian corporate law can be seen 
in a number of ways. First, it would enable corporate controllers to exercise prudent 
investment decisions as well as the scrupulous maintenance of accounts, which are 
pivotal for the growth of business.
145
 Secondly, by means of constructive trust, the 
entitlement of the true owner, i.e. the company, the assets misappropriated is 
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preserved in equity.
146
 Thirdly, where corporate property is unjustifiably transferred 
to a shareholder, director or other party, i.e. a third party in breach of fiduciary duty 
or fraudulent act, the company may be able to recover the property or the value of 
that property from its recipient in circumstances where the recipient acted as a 
constructive trustee.
147
 This will in turn help the creditors as the assets recovered will 
increase the pool for distribution. Above all, the model will give certainty to 
Nigerian corporate law by stripping corporate controllers of gains made through 
unjust enrichment, instead of trying to allocate loss which is prevalent in the present 
veil-piercing policy and has failed to yield any dividend, has adversely affected 
creditors and is characterised by confusion and uncertainty. Adopting a constructive 
trust model will act as a deterrence measure by stripping the gains made by the 
corporate controller and will go a long way towards dissuading those who may like 
to use the corporate form to perpetuate fraud. 
Rather than applying the UK fiduciary based institutional constructive trust which is 
narrow and limited in scope for the purposes of making claims, it is submitted that 
Nigeria should better adopt the US - Canadian remedial model which de-emphasises 
a pre-existing fiduciary relationship as a sine qua non to the imposition of a 
constructive trust. The American approach built on the principle of unjust 
enrichment, is in any event, a more appropriate starting point for the enquiry into 
whether a constructive trust should be imposed than is the English search for a 
fiduciary relationship, since it focuses attention on the relevant issues, namely, the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the obtaining or retention by the defendant of 
the gain or property in question. The relaxation of the requirement of fiduciary 
relationship as a basic requirement for maintaining action will also facilitate claims 
against third parties which are the predominant means of defrauding companies in 
Nigeria.   
6.6 Tracing  
Tracing has always remained an effective instrument towards the realisation of the 
constructive trust remedy because it enables a claimant to demonstrate what has 
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happened to his property, identify its proceeds and the persons who have handled or 
received them, and justifies his claim that the proceeds can properly be regarded as 
representing his property.
148
 Indeed, tracing will often interact with a constructive 
trust claim.
149
 A corporate controller who misapplies or transfers corporate assets to 
himself or third parties or to other ventures or companies can have such assets traced 
for the purposes of disgorging it from him. A property could be traced both at 
common law and in equity. However, tracing at common law has a limited threshold 
as it is impossible to trace property into mixed funds. Equitable tracing therefore 
becomes more advantageous because it allows tracing into mixed funds.  
The essence of tracing is that it enables the claimant to show that the asset to which 
he has proprietary interest is in the hands of the defendant, even though the 
defendant may not have the property in its original character. Where therefore the 
defendant has received the original property transferred to him by the plaintiff, there 
would be no difficulty in tracing or following it. 
The main advantage of tracing to the claimant is that his proprietary claim will not 
be defeated by the insolvency of the defendant. Thus, if a defendant mixed the 
property or assets of the claimant to which the claimant has a proprietary interest 
with his own, and afterwards became insolvent, the defendants trustee in bankruptcy 
would be in no better position than him vis-a-vis the claimant in a claim for 
recovery. Secondly, as shown in AG for Hong Kong v Reid,
150
 where the wrongdoer 
has made profit out of the trust money, the claimant is allowed to make recovery 
beyond his original loss. The same reasoning was also applied by the House of Lords 
in Foskett v Mckeown
151
 where the claimants sought to enforce their rights against a 
third party. 
Nonetheless, when tracing property, a bona fide purchaser for value without notice 
will receive the court’s protection.152 
Therefore under the new model being proposed, the court is not only empowered to 
make appropriate orders for personal liability against the fraudulent controlling 
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shareholder or director but for the recovery of the misappropriated company assets or 
money wherever they are found. In that case, such shareholder or director would be 
disentitled from relying on the corporate shield to escape liability or to hold the said 
asset or property as his own. Again, although fiduciary relationship may often arise 
in tracing, it has to be pointed out that under the new scheme being proposed, 
fiduciary relationship is not required. This is intended to eliminate obstacles in 
tracing claims where, under the existing UK laws, the existence of a pre-existing 
fiduciary relationship has become a condition precedent.  
6.7 Right of Action 
A claim for company money or assets which have been misapplied by a director 
might be pursued in equity as well as in law. Consequently, the company as the 
beneficial owner of the trust could seek constructive trust, on the basis that the 
director is a fiduciary to the company.  
A liquidator can also take action to impose constructive trust against the trustee 
where the company is approaching insolvency or already insolvent. Whether such 
action is taken by the company as a going concern or at insolvency by the liquidator, 
it has the potential effect of disgorging the gains made by the corporate controller 
and by so doing maximising the return to the company for the benefit of the 
creditors.  
However, where the company is unable to take action against wrongdoers who 
commit fraud because they are in control of the company, a minority shareholder can 
bring a derivative claim against the wrongdoer on behalf of the company. This, as 
noted earlier, is one of the exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle.
153
  
The question that arises is whether a creditor who stands to lose if a company is run 
down or its officers or directors have committed fraud or abuse affecting his interest 
can maintain an action on behalf of himself or the company. The simple answer at 
present would be ‘no’ with regard to the fact that outsiders or so-called third parties 
such as the creditor have no fiduciary relationship with the company. In any event, 
the right of the creditor to enforce the rights of the company may be said to rest upon 
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the fiduciary relation which the officers owe to the corporation, and indirectly to the 
creditors. However, creditors might maintain action in equity when the corporation is 
unable to do so particularly where there is no other person to do so, for example in a 
one-person enterprise where the sole shareholder/director is the wrongdoer.  
On this point there is currently no authority in the UK or Nigeria entitling a creditor 
to take action against a shareholder or director directly or indirectly for any 
wrongdoing directly or on behalf of the company. However, there seems to be 
judicial approval in the US for a creditor to take a derivative action against a director 
for breach of duty when a company is insolvent. In North American Catholic 
Educational Programming Foundation, Inc v Gheewalla,
154
 the main issue for 
determination was whether a creditor of a company operating in ‘the zone of 
insolvency’ could bring a direct claim against its directors for alleged breach of 
fiduciary duty and allied fraudulent matters.  
The Delaware Supreme Court expressly stated that, whilst creditors of a company 
that is either in the zone of insolvency or actually insolvent cannot, as a matter of 
law, directly sue directors of the company for breaches of the directors’ fiduciary 
duties, creditors of an insolvent company can make derivative claims against 
directors on behalf of the company for breaches of fiduciary duties or fraudulent 
acts, just as shareholders can when a corporation is solvent. The court predicated its 
decision on the grounds that when a company is insolvent, its creditors take the place 
of shareholders as the residual beneficiaries of the company. This is likely to be the 
case in UK as well, since English law recognises that if a company is insolvent 
directors owe duties to creditors. However, the point of departure between the two 
jurisdictions appears to be the extension of right of action given the creditors to 
maintain derivative claims against directors during insolvency which is lacking in 
the UK. Nigerian laws do not recognise that directors owe duties to creditors during 
insolvency at all either in case law or statute let alone the right to sue.  
It is submitted that UK’s recognition of right to creditors during insolvency without 
standing to sue is no right at all. A possible counter argument for this denial may be 
that allowing creditors to sue directors during insolvency may open up a floodgate of 
actions which might undermine corporate rescue. The simple response to that 
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counter argument is that giving creditors right to maintain claims against directors is 
on limited grounds, and, instead of affecting corporate rescue, it will rather enhance 
recovery as recoveries under these actions are for the benefit of the insolvent 
company for distribution to all the creditors and not the particular creditor or group 
of creditors suing. This is a welcome development in company law. Both UK and 
Nigeria should borrow from the Delaware position. 
In the light of the above, it is proposed that the UK and Nigeria should consider 
applying the principles enunciated in North American Catholic Educational 
Programming Foundation, Inc v Gheewalla by giving standing to creditors to make 
claims against directors for breach of fiduciary duties in a derivative manner when 
the company is insolvent analogous to the derivative claim made by the shareholders 
when the company is solvent. Such derivative claims can be brought against any 
director (including former and shadow directors) and other persons implicated in the 
breach such as a third party.
155
 However, a third party for the purposes of this claim 
applies only to persons who have assisted the director in breach of their duties as in 
the knowing receipt claim discussed above. As with all derivative claims, the 
claimant would be required to seek the permission of the court in order to commence 
the action.
156
 The permission requirement is purely for the purposes of determining 
the standing of the claimant to issue proceedings and not meant to engage him in 
what may look like a ‘trial within a trial’.157 
The permission stage or procedural aspects involves two hurdles. First, the court 
must dismiss the claim unless a prima facie case can be made out showing that there 
is a serious question to be tried.
158
 Such a prima facie case would particularly be 
relevant if it appears in the best interest of the company that the action be brought, 
prosecuted, defended or discontinued. Secondly, the court must be satisfied that the 
claim was brought in good faith among other factors.
159
 Under the new scheme being 
proposed, and because of the diversity of situations in which the constructive trust 
had been employed, it is submitted that there would be no need for the court to 
consider questions of whether the act would likely be authorised or ratified by the 
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company before or after it occurs, since the timing of the institution of the claim by 
the creditor is when the company is at the ‘zone of insolvency’ or already 
insolvent.
160
 This ultimately marks a little shift from the normal shareholders 
derivative claims which is usually taken when the company is solvent. A creditor, 
just like the shareholder, cannot bring the action or intervene on behalf of himself 
and all other creditors as being proposed if his conduct is such as to disqualify him, 
as it would be, for example, he was party to the wrong about which he complains.
161
   
Further, since the remedy sought lies in unjust enrichment, the claimant must plead 
some underlying cause of action, such as fraud, breach of fiduciary duty or another 
act entitling the claimant to some relief i.e. the recovery of specific property (either 
in money or assets), otherwise the action may be defeated by the separate legal 
personality of the company, which shields the corporate controller from personal 
liability.    
When this is done, the court, upon making a finding of wrongful acquisition or 
detention by the defendant of property to which the claimant is entitled would, 
impose constructive trust to disgorge the property forming the basis of the claim 
from the defendant.  
This is a fertile area of possible reform in both the UK and Nigeria in respect of the 
separate legal personality of the company.   
Nonetheless, there could still be concern as to how the intervention of the creditors 
through right of action against controlling shareholders or directors will impact on 
their relationship with the liquidator in view of the fact that the latter has been 
assigned the role to bring or defend action during insolvency on behalf of the 
company as well as distribute company assets in the UK and Nigeria respectively 
under the Insolvency Act 1996 and Companies and Allied Matters Act 2004.
162
 It is 
submitted that this concern is not likely to exist as the right of action sought to be 
given the creditor does not seek to supplant the role of liquidators during insolvency 
but merely to complement it. Where for instance the liquidator has taken action 
against a fraudulent shareholder or director, no right of action exist for the creditor in 
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the circumstances envisaged. It will also amount to res judicata if he proceeds to do 
so.
163
 Consequently, it is only when the liquidator has failed to take action that the 
right of the creditor to do so arises.  
With respect to recovered assets consequent upon the action, it is submitted that on a 
practical level, any recoveries under these actions are for the benefit of the insolvent 
company for distribution to all creditors, not to those who initiated the misfeasance 
proceedings to the exclusion of others. Thus the creditors’ right of action ends with 
the determination of the suit. Once the suit is determined, the task of distribution of 
company assets shifts to the liquidator in line with prevailing insolvency rules such 
as the pari pasu principle discussed in chapter 5, which requires creditors to be 
treated equally. The creditors would earn no more than what is available for 
distribution. These claims may therefore be of limited value to creditors seeking 
recourse against directors of insolvent or near-insolvent companies except that it 
would widen the scope of recovery, maximise the assets of the company available 
for distribution whilst imposing further liabilities on corporate controllers. This takes 
us to the next issue of cost of litigation. 
A major drawback of creditors’ derivative claim is cost. Cost may be a hindrance to 
taking creditors derivative claim. First, the cost of taking the derivative claim may be 
too much for the creditor to bear. This may be frustrating and is likely to lead to 
unwillingness by creditors to claim against corporate controllers or lead to the 
outright abandonment of claims already initiated. Second, a creditor who is taking 
such a derivative claim on behalf of the company would want to be reimbursed. 
However, the company may not have enough resources to reimburse him or would 
not want to further deplete its assets for distribution. This may lead to a lack of 
interest on the part of creditors to take a derivative claim, there being uncertainty on 
the refund of the cost of the litigation. The effect would be that the company will not 
have an opportunity of recovering such lost assets fraudulently taken by corporate 
controllers. It is therefore submitted that in order to make effective the proposed 
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right of action to creditors, the cost of litigation in respect of creditors derivative 
claim should be made part of the debt of the company to be paid when all creditors 
are paid. This will act as a major motivating factor for creditors to embark on such 
derivative claims and enhance recovery. 
Finally, to avoid abuse of court process, the company should not reimburse latter 
claims or allow a multiplicity of claims against the same controlling shareholder or 
director where a claim is already before the court against him. This will ensure 
discipline and effective utilization of the proposed creditors’ right of action. 
6.8 Remedies  
The benefit inherent in transforming a defendant into a constructive trustee leaves 
the claimant /beneficiary with a two-fold remedy options. First, the constructive 
trustee may be held personally liable for actions that amount to a breach of trust. 
Secondly, the claimant/beneficiary may exercise proprietary rights to the 
misappropriated assets.
164
 With these two remedies available, it is now left to the 
claimant to make an informed decision on how to maximise recovery through 
appropriate election of the available choices. 
The asset’s value is determinative when a constructive trustee is solvent since the 
aim is to recover benefits from the constructive trustee. Holding the constructive 
trustee personally liable if the misappropriated property has depreciated allows the 
original value to be recovered.
165
 If the misappropriated property has appreciated, the 
original value and its identifiable fruits can be recovered by allowing the 
claimant/beneficiary to exercise proprietary rights over them.
166
 
Where for instance the trustee is insolvent, a clear choice is presented to the 
claimant/beneficiary. The claimant/beneficiary may likely choose to rely on the 
remedy of personal liability of the constructive trustee if the percentage reduction in 
the value of the property is smaller than the percentage that is likely to be paid out by 
the trustee in bankruptcy to the general creditors.
167
 However, it may be in the 
beneficiary’s interest to both recover the property and claim damages for the fallen 
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value. If the claimant/beneficiary does not or cannot claim for both the property and 
fallen value, the claimant/beneficiary’s proprietary rights will take priority over 
general unsecured creditors.
168
 The priority is justified on three grounds. First, 
constructive trust represents a pre-bankruptcy claim on misappropriated asset that 
must be forfeited by a current holder who only possesses bare legal title.
169
 Second, 
priority, from a relative entitlement standpoint, serves to protect the superior 
constructive trust claim that the claimant/beneficiary possess outside of the 
defendant’s bankruptcy. Third, priority, from the corrective justice perspective, 
denies general unsecured creditors the ability to benefit unjustifiably from an asset 
that would otherwise not be available for distribution.
170
 
6.9 Conclusion 
In light of the weaknesses identified in the existing veil piercing regime, this chapter 
proposes a responsible corporate personality model in the UK and Nigeria based on 
the imposition of constructive trust against corporate controllers for unjust 
enrichment. The proposed model focuses on recovery of ill-gotten gains or otherwise 
misappropriated assets of the company from those who own, run or manage its 
affairs for distribution to creditors instead of loss allocation prevalent in the existing 
veil piercing regime. Consequently, profits or benefits improperly made by corporate 
controllers whether in tort or contract would become the subjects of constructive 
trust with liability to account to the company or a proprietary claim by the company, 
or shareholders or creditors on its behalf.  
The model can be applied in a variety of situations where equity demands, and 
should be kept in mind as a potential claim to correct a wrong that may not fit 
squarely within any cause of action. By focussing on gain instead of the laundry list 
of factors which has characterised the existing veil-piercing regime, the proposed 
model provides the courts with definitive guidance and eliminates uncertainty in the 
steps to be taken in imposing liability on corporate controllers. 
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By providing a wide range of choice during insolvency, constructive trust provides 
claimants with the opportunity to optimise equitable reliefs as opposed to the 
orthodox veil piercing claims that are pooled with general unsecured creditors. 
The proposed model attempts to further extend the scope of exceptions available in 
Foss v Harbottle by giving creditors of insolvent companies the right to maintain 
actions against fraudulent corporate controllers when the company is unable to do so. 
Again, rather than focusing on fiduciary relationships, the courts should focus more 
on gains as they have in the US. This are additions to the corporate law jurisprudence 
in the UK and Nigeria not only intended to give impetus to the recovery of gain 
made by corporate controllers particularly in a one-person company where the 
wrongdoer may be in control but to widen the scope of recovery generally.  
Constructive trust as applied to the veil-piercing scenarios is well suited for a 
developing country such as Nigeria where the tendency is for corporate controllers to 
misapply corporate assets and funds and use the same to invest in other ventures 
beyond the reach of creditors. It will also mark a new milestone in the quest to find 
the solutions to the problems associated with the rigid adherence to the separate legal 
personality of the company.  
The next chapter concludes the thesis and sets out various measures to preserve 
equity and combat abusive behaviour by fraudulent corporate controllers hiding 
behind the shield of limited liability.  
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CHAPTER 7    CONCLUSION  
7.1 Introduction 
The general rule that a company is a separate legal entity limits creditor’s rights to 
the company assets only and lies at the core of corporate jurisprudence in the UK 
and Nigeria. This thesis assessed the far reaching consequences that the application 
of this principle has had on creditors with regard to abusive and fraudulent behaviour 
of controlling shareholders and directors, while also highlighting the need for ways 
of dealing with the problem through equitable and flexible means.  
The thesis contends that the conceptual framework of the corporate form and the 
rigid application of the principle of separate legal personality as espoused in 
Salomon’s case have both undermined the interest of creditors and wider society. It 
argues that existing laws have not only been inadequate for dealing with the problem 
but have failed to restore investors and creditors’ confidence in companies, thereby 
eroding economic growth and expansion in Nigeria and the UK.  
An essential element of the separate legal personality of the company is the transfer 
of uncompensated risks from shareholders and directors to creditors in the event of 
business failure. In most cases, this has been found to have arisen from the 
opportunistic behaviour on the company’s part due to actions by its controlling 
directors or shareholders. With regards to the directors, the most common form of 
opportunism is a waste of corporate assets or misuse of the same through fraud or 
abuses by those who, when exercising their functions, do not comply with the 
standard of a diligent and conscientious director, namely those who violate their duty 
of care or the duty of loyalty owed to the company. In addition, if the company 
continues to do business even though it is already insolvent or, according to 
reasonable expectations, will become insolvent in future, directors may still benefit 
from opportunism since they continue to receive salary payments and enjoy other 
privileges linked with their position. With respect to shareholders, the lack of 
personal liability for the company’s debt (limited liability) will serve as a powerful 
incentive to cause the company to act opportunistically, either in the form of a 
subsequent distribution of assets or by taking on riskier business projects. This is 
undesirable as shareholders who reap the benefits of the corporate form ought to 
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equally take corresponding losses. It is therefore argued in this thesis that controlling 
shareholders and directors who act in an opportunistic manner, or who 
misappropriate company assets through fraud and abuses, should be held personally 
accountable for their actions and assets recovered from them should enhance the 
pool of resources available to creditors.   
To achieve this end, the thesis proposes a change of the existing common law 
approach to a more equitable approach, which instead of rationalising the abuse of 
the corporate form, focuses more on disgorging the assets of controlling shareholders 
and directors who have misused the corporate form for illegitimate ends or for 
improper purposes. This approach arguably, offers a more realistic and practical 
solution to the abuse of the corporate form and obviates the difficulties faced by the 
courts in dealing with existing veil piercing mechanisms. By adopting a comparative 
analysis of the problem within the framework of the UK and Nigeria, the thesis 
provides impetus for Nigeria to learn lessons and examine the problems of the 
separate legal personality of the company and limited liability for its members in the 
UK and other common law countries with relatively long periods of legal 
advancement in the commercial and corporate fields. 
7.2 Restating Key Arguments 
This thesis has undertaken an analysis which is consistent with appropriate 
methodology and the core aims of the thesis regarding the protection of creditors and 
the need for an appropriate balance between legitimate and illegitimate uses of the 
company. The doctrinal content of company law with regards to the separate legal 
personality of the company has been assessed by reference to the same themes as had 
been adopted for analysis of the structure of the law, namely: the effect of 
incorporation and registration; the position of shareholders and directors as well as 
those who deal with the company; contractual basis; regulation; administration and 
disclosure; liability and failure including take-over and winding up processes. These 
issues are juxtaposed with existing law and legal commentaries in chapters 3-6 
regarding the appropriate legal measures to tackle corporate fraud and abuses, the 
role of sanctions, appropriate institutional and regulatory reforms and the need for, 
and role of, international co-ordination in jurisdictional and enforcement issues. 
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These considerations formed the basis for the propositions on appropriate reforms 
made in the thesis with regards to the identified problems of the corporate form. 
In chapter 2, this thesis has formulated a theoretical framework and provided the 
frame of reference for the analyses and arguments in the subsequent chapters. What 
is theorised in this thesis is the artificial entity theory. This theory, unlike other 
theories of the corporation, postulates the notion that the company is an artificial 
person whose existence comes into being by the constitutive act of the state through 
laws and regulations. The notion of the company is what the law wants it to be. The 
company was equal in law to a natural person, at least as long as it acted intra vires. 
The artificial entity theory was chosen because it sufficiently explains the underlying 
organisation characteristics of a legal person and explains the relationship between 
the organisation and its members. It is this principle which separates the company 
from human beings who control its affairs, which in turn removes the latter from the 
liabilities of the company. The theory also provides justifications for the company to 
own its properties, be liable to its debts and have the capacity to enter into contracts 
and maintain actions in court of law in its own name.  
Thus, a key argument is that artificial entity theory as well as its variant of 
concession theory, addresses to a considerable degree the inadequacies of other 
theories, particularly in the way it recognises the separate existence of the company 
from its members and the role of the state in providing regulations for the existence 
of the company and responses to the problems of the corporate form. The problems 
as indicated in chapter 1 include the negative impact of the strict application of 
Salomon’s case, the misuse of the corporate form by controlling shareholders and 
directors, and the inadequacies of existing laws aimed at dealing with fraud and 
abuse of the corporate form.  
The artificial entity theory further provides  legitimacy for dealing with the problems 
and answering the question raised in the thesis, namely: whether there are exceptions 
to the separate legal personality of the company and if they are adequate to provide 
solutions to the problems of the corporate form; whether further  measures should be 
taken to make corporate controllers personally liable in the event of abuse of the 
corporate form and thirdly; or whether there is need in certain circumstances to 
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introduce further measures to make controlling shareholders liable beyond agreed 
contributions. 
The artificial entity theory therefore formed the basis for the evolution and 
subsequent operations of English company law which were extended to other 
common law countries, including Nigeria. The potential in the theory lies in its far 
reaching implications for understanding the nature of a corporation and the 
regulatory powers of the state in corporate matters. The separate personality and 
property of the company is sometimes described as a fiction. However, as discussed 
in chapter 3 the fiction is the whole foundation of English company and insolvency 
laws which are based on common law.  
The nature of the company as an artificial entity set out in chapter 2 was espoused in 
the celebrated case of Salomon v Salomon. Despite the reverence with which the case 
has been held by legal doctrine and its subsequent importance in defining the 
doctrine of separate legal personality, the case, when examined closely, actually 
allows for and highlights the mutability of separate legal personality. This relates to 
only those cases which are true exceptions to the rule in Salomon v Salomon, i.e. 
where a person who owns and controls a company is said, in certain circumstances, 
to be identified with it in law by virtue of that ownership and control. Thus where the 
company has been abused for a purpose that was in some respect improper, the veil 
of the company could be lifted to hold those who are responsible for the fraud or 
abuses to account for their actions.
1
  
With the theoretical and analytic framework formulated, the first task of this thesis as 
shown in chapter 3 therefore is to determine how the UK has responded to the 
application of the separate corporate legal personality and limited liability since the 
Salomon’s case.  Chapter 3 confirms the findings in chapter 2 that in spite of the 
shield of protection given to shareholders and directors by virtue of the principles 
enunciated in the Salomon’s case, the corporate veil can be lifted to find personal 
liability in limited circumstances such as in cases of fraud or impropriety. 
Nonetheless, the thesis finds that what constitutes fraud still remains elastic; the UK 
approach to corporate veil has been remarkably rigid; and fraud or impropriety 
therefore remains within the province of the court to determine.  
                                                          
1
 See the recent case of Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited and others, [2013] UKSC 34 
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It has thus been argued in chapter 3 that the UK’s response to the effect of Salomon’s 
case has been anything but satisfactory. In spite of an acceptance that rigid 
application of Salomon’s case could lead to unjust results, the courts in the UK have 
been reluctant to lift the corporate veil to hold the persons managing the company 
responsible for their actions. Instead, the courts have without well-defined criteria 
formulated metaphors such as ‘sham’, ‘facade’, ‘device’, ‘fraud’, or evasion of 
contractual obligation as grounds for lifting the veil of the corporation. The matter 
has not been helped by commentators who have adopted this categorisation approach 
in determining grounds upon which the veil of the company could be lifted. This 
thesis argues that the categorisation approach, whether of ‘sham’, ‘fraud’, ‘device’, 
‘façade’, single economic unit, agency or otherwise, has not resolved the problem of 
separate corporate legal personality, and has actually led to more difficulties and 
confusion with the courts making conflicting decisions. The fact that the UK veil 
piercing doctrine does not consider the notion of justice as exemplified in Adams 
case has further led to considerable difficulties.  
Although Adams case is the first systematic consideration of disparate body of 
English case law on this subject since Salomon, it has narrowed the scope of veil 
piercing approaches in the UK to circumstances where the court is entitled to pierce 
the corporate veil and recognise the receipt of the company as that of the 
individual(s) in control of it, as long as the company was used as a device or facade 
to conceal the true facts, thereby avoiding or concealing any liability of those 
individual(s). For years after it was decided, Adams was regarded as having settled 
the general law on the subject. Nonetheless, what constitutes façade was not defined 
in the case. It would have to be inferred that the corporate veil could only be 
disregarded where it was being used for deliberately dishonest purposes or where an 
abuse of the separate corporate legal personality has been used to evade the law or to 
frustrate its enforcement.
2
 This implies that a court, before lifting the corporate veil, 
should find evidence of an unlawful purpose or some other impropriety such as fraud 
or deliberate concealment of the identity and activities of corporate controllers.
3
  The 
company may be a ‘façade’ even though it was not originally incorporated with any 
deceptive intent, provided that it is being used for the purpose of deception at the 
                                                          
2
 See Gilford Motor Co v Horne [1933] Ch 935 and Jones v Lipman [1962] 1WLR 832 
3
 B.R. Cheffins, Company Law, Theory, Structure and Operation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 316. 
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time of the relevant transactions.
4
 Adams case thus provides a particularly stark 
example of the application of the Salomon principle.
5
 It brings to the fore the denial 
of corporate protection to tort claimants or involuntary creditors and thus limits veil 
piercing jurisprudence in the UK to contracts. This thesis argues that this may be 
unfair to tort claimants, some of whom may have genuine claims against the 
company even though they had no pre-existing contractual relationship with it. It 
therefore welcomes the recent Court of Appeal decision in Chandler v Cape plc
6
 
which imposed for the first time liability on a company for breach of duty of care to 
an employee of its subsidiary. This landmark case tends to open up recourse for tort 
victims in certain circumstances and therefore tends to support  the thesis proposal 
not only for the denial of separate legal personality for companies in a group but an 
arrangement where companies operating in a group would be treated as an enterprise 
or collective whole. This ultimately will act as a means of promoting justice in 
respect of the group’s action and commitment to victims of its activities, particularly 
tort creditors.  
It is further argued that the UK’s cautious approach in imposing liability on 
controlling shareholders and directors, and not reaching their assets, demonstrates 
the inadequacy of the existing common law approach. Further, the existing approach 
of veil piercing having failed there is need to adopt a more equitable and flexible 
approach to the problem instead of holding tenaciously to present standards. The 
standards with their references to metaphors such as ‘façade’ and ‘sham’ are simply 
not clear. 
Having seen in chapter 3 that the courts’ intervention have failed, there have been 
legislative interventions aimed at holding the directors liable during insolvency and, 
in some cases disqualifying them through the wrongful trading provision in the 
Insolvency Act and disqualification of directors’ laws. This thesis recognises that the 
wrongful trading provision as set out in section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986, is a 
bold attempt by UK Parliament to deal with the problem of abuse of the corporate 
form through the imposition of liability on delinquent directors who continue to 
                                                          
4
 See the dictum of Munby J in Ben Hashem Al Shayif [2009] 1 FLR 115 and also the analysis 
provided by Sir Andrew Morritt VC in Trustor AB v Smallbone (No 2) [2011] 1 WLR 1177 
5
 J. Dine & M. Koutsias, Company Law, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 29. 
6
 [2012] EWCA Civ 525; See also M. Petrin, ‘Assumption of Responsibility in Corporate Groups: 
Chandler v Cape plc, [2013] 76 (3) MLR 589-619 
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trade while the company is insolvent. Section 214 requires that the court can, on 
application by a company’s liquidator, declare that a director has engaged in 
wrongful trading and therefore must contribute to the assets available to creditors.  
Unlike the fraudulent trading provision before it, it does not require proof of intent to 
defraud or dishonesty. However, under the new regime of wrongful trading, 
Parliament simply extended the familiar concept of fraud to cover situations where 
directors are merely negligent or reckless.  
The wrongful trading provision in spite of its good intentions has inherent problems 
which need to be redressed. As pointed out in chapter 3, the wrongful trading 
provision lacks clarity in so many respects, making it difficult to implement. It, for 
instance, has no clear provision on funding and also limits the right of action to the 
liquidators only, extending no right of action to creditors. This has limited the 
number of claims that go to court as the liquidator may show apathy or 
unwillingness to pursue claims against erring directors because of the huge cost 
involved. Similarly, the wrongful trading provision lacks clarity in relation to 
specification of the time when insolvency is triggered or the steps to be taken by the 
director in such an event. This has created confusion and uncertainties in the minds 
of directors, some of whom may only speculate on the proper course of action to 
take. Similarly, determining the time when a company is insolvent becomes a tricky 
exercise which the courts face unless it is clarified by the law. 
The thesis whilst drawing examples from other jurisdictions such as Australia where 
similar provisions exist, argues that in order to make the wrongful trading provision 
meaningful and effective, there should be clarity on the issue of funding of claims, 
timing of insolvency and steps to be taken by directors when insolvency sets in. In 
order to obviate the problem of cost which the liquidator may face in bringing claims 
under the wrongful trading provisions, the scope of recovery should be widened to 
give the UK Secretary of State for Trade and Industry the power to initiate claims or 
allow creditors to bring action either as individuals or a class. Clarity in the wrongful 
trading provision is required to make directors personally accountable for corporate 
debts in order to make them responsive to creditors.  
In chapter 3 it is also shown that a director may be disqualified from holding the 
office of a director or senior management position in a limited liability company for 
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periods ranging from two to fifteen years if he has been declared unfit by the court or 
engaged in fraudulent or wrongful trading or violated a varying number of statutory 
prohibitions or requirements designed to protect creditors pursuant to the Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986. The essence of disqualification as provided in the law is 
to protect the public interest from the unfit conduct of delinquent directors hence 
disqualification of directors cuts in two ways: as an ex post sanction for past 
violations and as a pre-emptive mechanism for creditor protection. The problem with 
this legislation, as demonstrated in the chapter, is that the law provides no clarity of 
what is ‘unfit’ for the purposes of determining when to disqualify a director. 
Unfitness can therefore be the subject of wide and varied interpretations which are 
not dependent on law but facts. It is arguable whether this legislation has achieved its 
purpose as most disqualification orders come too late after debts have been incurred 
whilst some disqualified directors continue to serve in companies because of lack of 
effective monitoring process. It is therefore proposed that disqualification 
proceedings may be meaningful if they are instituted early before serious harm is 
done to the company. On the other hand, what is ‘unfit’ for the purposes of 
disqualifying a director should be clearly stated. Again, it is important that an 
effective mechanism should be put in place to monitor and put a check to the re-
emergence of disqualified directors from reappearing in the management of 
companies before the due date of their disqualification order. 
Having established in chapter 3 that the doctrine of separate corporate legal 
personality is not absolute and examined the UK responses as reflected in the state of 
its veil piercing approaches, chapter 4 then turns to explain how the doctrine has 
been recognised, interpreted and applied in Nigeria. Although Nigeria has had a very 
long relationship with the UK dating from the initial contact in the second half of the 
nineteenth century and has accepted UK laws including company law, the doctrine 
of corporate separate legal personality as exemplified in the case of Salomon v 
Salomon applies in current Nigerian law by virtue of section 37 of the Companies 
and Allied Matters Act 2004.   
It is shown that Nigerian courts have been influenced by English decisions on this 
matter. This is evident from the courts’ reluctance, as in the UK, to lift the corporate 
veil except in limited circumstances. The rigid adherence to the doctrine expressed in 
the Salomon’s principle coupled with the unpredictability in determining 
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circumstances when corporate controllers have abused the corporate form or 
committed fraud or any act of misconduct against the company and creditors 
demonstrates the problems faced by the courts. However, Nigerian courts have 
shown a willingness to lift the corporate veil where fraud is involved.  
Nonetheless, there has been a paucity of cases on this subject. This could be 
attributed not only to the low commercial environment in Nigeria, but also 
institutional problems and an ineffective regulatory system. This could be seen in the 
lapses in the activities of the Corporate Affairs Commission, the weak judicial 
system and a lack of adequate legislation that would tackle relevant problems and 
enable the court to act when faced with the issues of corporate fraud and abuses. A 
clear example is the fact that Nigeria does not have an insolvency legislation similar 
to the UK’s. Thus, the courts lack the necessary legal framework or guidelines on 
how to deal with the problems. In addition, the courts have been faced with long 
delays in hearing cases to the extent that some cases last such a long time before they 
are determined. There is also the problem of corruption in the judicial system which 
may make it possible for cases of abuse of corporate form to be compromised or 
unduly delayed thereby thwarting justice. The result is that controlling shareholders 
and directors rely on the absence of relevant laws and weak regulatory and judicial 
systems to escape liability.  
This thesis proposes that Nigeria should, like the UK, consider enacting separate 
insolvency legislation different from the existing Companies and Allied Matters Act 
2004 (CAMA). This has become pertinent because CAMA fails in many respects to 
provide new areas of corporate law such as insolvency. The thesis advocates the 
general overhaul of the Nigerian regulatory landscape as it relates to corporate 
matters, including the judicial system, administrative and disclosure mechanisms in 
order to make them more effective in dealing with the problem of corporate fraud 
and abuses. It is recommended that as a precondition for incorporation or registration 
of any company, its promoters should be required to produce a certificate from the 
Ministry of Trade to the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) confirming that in 
view of the risks involved in the enterprise, or for other reasons, the formation of the 
company is justified. The proposed framework can be used as a basis to hold the 
civil and political officials of the ministry personally liable if they abuse the issuance 
of such certificate. This would prevent uncontrolled registration of companies, most 
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of who could be said to be non-existent in terms of real corporate activities. There is 
also the need to amend the extant company law; for example, the CAMA may 
contain provisions stipulating periodic mandatory investigations into the affairs of 
the companies, at least on a quarterly basis. This could be done by establishing a 
corporate monitoring unit in CAC to serve as an actual supervision department of the 
Commission. It is further recommended that the mechanism of investigation into the 
activities of companies sought to be adopted by the CAC should also evolve a 
system whereby delinquent or fraudulent directors are punished or sanctioned in a 
manner akin to what obtains in the UK under the Director’s Disqualification Act. 
This may not only enable early detection by the Commission of fraudulent activities 
of controlling shareholders and directors before the company collapses but also 
protects the interest of creditors and will go a long way in imposing appropriate 
sanctions against such corporate controllers. 
Further, there ought be a provision in CAMA that where the court is satisfied that a 
person who controls a company by means of majority shareholding or being able to 
determine the composition or policy of the board of directors has abused the 
corporate form with the result that the rights of creditors have been delayed or 
defeated, the court may declare the controlling person to be personally liable for all 
or some of the debts of the company. The judges will probably use this power only 
in extreme cases but the knowledge that it might be applied may operate as a 
deterrent. In particular cases of fraud, a provision in CAMA is recommended to the 
effect that where a company has been used to commit fraud exceeding N1, 000, 000 
(£4,000)
7
 the company shall be compulsorily wound up. This new provision is 
required in the Act notwithstanding section 408(e) of CAMA that provides for the 
winding up of a company if in the court’s opinion it is just and equitable. The 
proposed provision arguably provides sufficient deterrent against corporate 
controllers for the abuse of the corporate form.  
In addition, the courts should adopt a liberal and flexible approach in dealing with 
issues concerning the abuse of the corporate form instead of the existing rigid 
standards under the common law. The effect is that specific facts of cases would be 
                                                          
7
 On the basis that the full weight of the law should be triggered by the seriousness of an act, this 
amount is a substantial amount in Nigeria because the National mininmum wage, for example, is N18, 
000 under the National Minimum wage Act. 
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determined on grounds of equity instead of lumping cases together based on 
categories and thereby sending out conflicting decisions on similar facts. 
In chapter 5, the thesis undertakes a comparative analysis of veil piercing approaches 
in the UK and Nigeria. Following from the examination in chapters 3 and 4 of 
respective veil piercing approaches adopted in the UK and Nigeria, chapter 5 sets up 
the original contribution of the thesis in chapter 6. The chapter shows areas Nigeria 
needs to learn lessons from UK particularly in the areas of insolvency laws, 
disclosure mechanisms and creditor protection whilst also demonstrating areas 
Nigeria’s expansive and wider interpretation of fraud is different from what obtains 
in the UK. 
While the concepts of corporate personality and limited liability in the UK and 
Nigeria examined in this thesis have some common themes such as the rigid 
application of the Salomon’s principle, differences exist in the commercial sectors 
and regulatory backgrounds of the two jurisdictions.  
As a foundation for analysis in chapter 5, the thesis has highlighted the existing 
incorporation requirements in the UK and Nigeria, including the formation of 
companies with little or no capital which is prevalent among closed or private 
companies. Even though it is difficult to determine the level of sufficient capital 
needed to establish a business, where a company is established without initial capital 
or with low capital ratio, undercapitalisation potentially affects subsequent activities 
and operations. Notwithstanding that low or minimum capital requirement arguably 
can encourage entreprenuers with good ideas a relatively easy route to set up 
businesses and transform those ideas for their benefit and that of the society, it raises 
concerns of fraud among single member companies. In such companies a controlling 
shareholder may, for fraudulent purposes, incorporate with initial capital aware to be 
inadequate to meet the expected liabilities of the business. Despite the problems this 
poses, undercapitalisation is not made a ground for lifting the corporate veil or veil-
piercing in the UK and Nigeria. The prevalent position in the US is different. The 
thesis argues that the omission of this important factor in the consideration of 
grounds for lifting the corporate veil has serious implications given the risk and 
adverse consequences undercapitalisation poses to small trade creditors. The thesis 
argues that this major omission needs to be redressed and proposes the need to 
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ensure adequate capitalisation of companies on incorporation. In the alternative, a 
minimum standard may be set such that the interest of creditors is covered before a 
company is allowed to enter the market. This will ultimately deter unscrupulous 
shareholders from using the company as a means of fraud and protect creditors from 
companies who may wish to enter the market without capital. 
In continuing the analysis of the responses of the UK and Nigeria to the problems of 
the corporate form, chapter 5 has examined directors’ duties in relation to creditors' 
interest, highlighting differences between the two jurisdictions. The UK has made 
greater advancement than Nigeria in terms of creditors protection both in case law 
and legislation, particularly when a company is approaching insolvency or already 
insolvent. In the UK, the corporate veil could be lifted to hold a director liable if he 
fails to consider creditors interest during insolvency. While the case law in the UK 
holds tenaciously to this indirect duty placed on directors which are framed widely 
enough to include conduct which shall not be detrimental to creditors during 
insolvency, the wrongful trading provision in the Insolvency Act appears to be a 
legislative re-enactment of this position. Chapter 3 shows that the courts and 
legislature in the UK have begun to widen the scope of directors’ duties to include a 
duty owed to creditors by directors’ during insolvency. Nigeria lacks similar case 
law and legislation to support director’s duties to creditors. Chapter 5 argues that 
Nigeria has a lot to learn from the progress made in the UK in relation to creditors’ 
protection, particularly through the wrongful trading provision, director’s 
disqualification mechanisms and case law analyses. Nigeria should consider having 
similar legislative measures for protecting the interest of creditors. 
Chapter 5 demonstrates that fraud is a common feature of and the only predictive 
ground for veil piercing approaches in both the UK and Nigeria. However, the 
judicial approach and interpretations of fraud differs due to the peculiar commercial 
enviroments that exist between the two countries. While fraud is limited in the UK to 
instances of evasion of contractual obligations as demonstrated in the leading case of 
Adams v Cape Industries, fraud as interpreted and applied in Nigerian courts, goes 
beyond issues of contract and extends to matters of deceit, misrepresentation, 
diversion of company assets and misappropriation. A unique feature of fraud in 
Nigeria’s approach is the use of the corporate form as a protection for controlling 
shareholders and directors who deliberately set up companies for scam or fraudulent 
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intention in what is otherwise referred to as ‘419’ scheme. It has therefore been 
argued that the notion of fraud should be expanded to include other unconscionable 
conduct including activities which may be regarded as sharp practices. In addition, 
once a finding of fraud is made, the corporate veil may be lifted to find the corporate 
controller liable if the company has been used as a conduit to perpetrate the fraud. 
Veil piercing processes in relation to contract and tort claims in the UK and Nigeria 
have also been examined. The corporate veil is commonly lifted in contract more 
than in tort. Following the decision in Adams v Cape Industries Plc which seems to 
foreclose consideration for claims in tort, it is difficult to lift the corporate veil on 
grounds of tort. Adams case demonstrates that English law does not provide for the 
liability of the parent for the debts of the wholly owned subsidiary even when there 
is manifest wrong on victims of tort. The implication is that subsidiary companies 
may, therefore, be set up as a bulwark against risk of loss even though as Chandler v 
Cape plc
8
 has shown, liability may be imposed on a parent company for breach of 
duty of care to an employee of its subsidiary in relation to health and safety matters 
in which it was seen to have assumed responsibility. There is no authoritative case 
law like Adams or Chandler on this subject in Nigeria. However victims of tort are 
known to prefer out-of-court settlement. The thesis supports the maintenance of 
adequate insurance for victims of tort to cover foreseeable damages even though no 
contract is maintained by tort victims with the company. For contract claims, a 
charge over company property or personal guarantees by creditors is favoured as 
efficient mechanisms for the protection of creditors because of the certainty of 
contractual terms. 
Chapter 5 shows that disclosure mechanisms, regulatory and administrative 
processes aimed at combating fraud and abuses in companies are relatively weak in 
Nigeria when compared to the UK. Disclosure for the purposes of effective creditor 
protection would only be achieved if the following perquisites are fulfilled: the 
information is easily available, e.g. via the internet from the company’s homepage or 
commercial register; the information is reviewed periodically, every three months; 
the information is standardised and all companies employ the same framework, 
standardised methodologies and calculations, and reporting formats; and if the 
                                                          
8
 Ibid. 
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information is easily understood and can easily be acted upon accordingly. The 
thesis therefore argues that the CAC in Nigeria should rely on these principles and, 
as found in the UK, set up a companies’ website where existing companies existing 
are listed. The website should be set up in such a manner that it would be able to 
give, and possibly even assess information about companies operating in Nigeria 
without the unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles associated with the present system.   
Whilst effective disclosure and other measures outlined above are fundamental to 
corporate existence and maintenance of the corporate form, the thesis argues that the 
measures would only be meaningful if those who fraudulently mismanage a 
company to the detriment of creditors are not allowed to benefit from their action. 
This is particularly important as the authorities reveal that most judgments in the 
common law systems are declaratory in nature without consequential orders to effect 
recovery of the company assets or mitigate the harsh realities of the effect of the 
corporate form on creditors. This raises issue of applying equitable measures to 
disgorge the assets of controlling shareholders and directors whenever they are found 
culpable in order to meet the contractual and other obligations the company owe to 
creditors.  
The thesis as contained in chapter 6 has therefore been that responses to corporate 
fraud and abuses conceptualised in the existing veil piercing remedies are neither 
adequate nor capable of confronting the complex nature of problems associated with 
the corporate form. The existing veil piercing approaches have remained 
fundamentally flawed whilst most of the legislations on the subject, in spite of their 
good intentions, require urgent reforms in order to achieve any meaningful result. 
7.3 Restating the Proposed Corporate Personality Model  
It is clear from the cases and commentaries that the law relating to the lifting the veil 
doctrine is unsatisfactory and confused. Those cases and commentaries appear to 
suggest: firstly, that it is difficult to invoke the doctrine of lifting the corporate veil 
successfully; secondly, there is doubt as to whether the doctrine should exist; and 
thirdly, it is impossible to discern any coherent approach, applicable principles, or 
defined limitations to the doctrine. The lack of coherent principles in the application 
of the doctrine is evident in judicial pronouncements in major common law 
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jurisdictions.
9
 The result is that there is no consistent principle on when to lift the 
corporate veil nor has the principle itself provided any guidance on when it can be 
used. It can therefore be said that the principle is fraught with ambiguity with few 
predictable results. Nevertheless, scholarly arguments and proposals on how to 
mitigate the negative effects of the corporate form on creditors and the misuse of 
limited liability have followed the same trend. Proposals have been framed along the 
path of loss allocation analyses and fail in several respects to articulate an effective 
mechanism to deny the proceeds of fraud or gains made from it from controlling 
shareholders and directors. Owing to this conceptual deficiency, the problems of 
corporate fraud and abuses have remained unabated as it is difficult to reach the 
assets of corporate controllers either by the company or creditors. This is a major 
task for this thesis, demonstrating the distinctiveness of its approach to the issues.  
Unlike previous proposals, the approach adopted in the thesis is predicated on two 
major principles: that a person, for instance, a controlling shareholder or director as a 
constructive trustee, shall not benefit by his own fraud and shall not benefit as a 
result of his own crime.  
In order to achieve this, the thesis proposes the adoption of the ‘responsible 
corporate personality model’ built on the concept of unjust enrichment to deal with 
the problem of corporate fraud and abuses. The model conceives gain made by a 
controlling shareholder or director through fraud or abuses as constituting an 
unjustified enrichment which must be disgorged. Unlike previous proposals, the 
constructive trust-based model puts in place a mechanism to trace the proceeds of 
fraud and abuses wherever they are located, even to third parties, and gives wider 
rights of action to creditors in order to bring claims against controlling shareholders 
and directors to recover a company’s misappropriated assets when that company is 
approaching insolvency or insolvent. 
                                                          
9
 See the following cases: Clarke J in The Tjaskemolen[1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 465, 471 (UK); Chief 
Nye John D. Georgewill v Madam Grace Ekene, (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt. 562) 454, 459 ratio 8 (Nigeria); 
Briggs v James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 549, 567 (Australia); Constitution Insurance 
Co of Canada v Kosmopoulos [1987] 1 SCR 2, 10 (Canada); Attorney- General v Equiticorp 
Industries Group Ltd (In Statutory Management) [1996] 1 NZLR 528 (New Zealand); Cape Pacific 
Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd, [1995] (4) SA 790 (A), 802-803 (South Africa); 
Secon Serv Sys Inc v St Joseph Bank & Trust Co, (1988) 7
th
 Cir, 855 F2d (US); Allied Capital Corp v 
GC-Sun Holdings LP, (2006) 910 A2d, 1020, 1042-1043 (Delaware US). 
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Thus, under this model proposed a creditor could maintain a claim against a 
controlling shareholder or director in a derivative manner on behalf of the company 
so as to recover misappropriated assets of the company wherever they are found. The 
creditors right of action against a controlling shareholder or director is akin to a 
derivative claim which a minority shareholder or director may utilise to assert his 
own right against those in control when a company is solvent. Consequently, a 
creditor instituting such a claim must obtain the permission of the court to proceed. 
A creditor bringing a claim against a controlling shareholder or director under the 
proposed model need not be a fiduciary to the company to do so. The question of 
being in a fiduciary relationship with the company which the creditor lacks has been 
an obstacle to the creditors’ claims in the UK and indeed in the whole of the 
Commonwealth world including Nigeria. The departure from the requirement of 
fiduciary relationship as a basis of enforcing claims against a controlling shareholder 
or director by a creditor is a novel approach which is not presently in existence in the 
UK and Nigeria. The model attempts to remove this obstacle as a means of 
enhancing recovery and maximising benefits for distribution to creditors. 
It is clear that the legal personality principle restrains creditors from suing 
shareholders and directors in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits and double 
recovery while simultaneously guaranteeing that the principle of pari pasu applies to 
claimants. Nevertheless, the proposed model argues that the right of action given to 
creditors is for the benefit of the company. Thus any recovery made is for 
distribution to the whole body of creditors and not for the particular creditor or 
creditors who brought the claim although the claimants will be entitled to the 
reimbursement of their expenses which will be charged as part of the general debt of 
the company. The model supports the principle that the distribution of company’s 
assets belong to the liquidator acting on behalf of the company and not to the 
creditor, no matter the role played in the recovery of the assets. Its major concern 
remains largely the need to widen the scope of recovery of misappropriated assets by 
stripping the controlling shareholders and directors of the gains they made through 
fraud and abuses. However, as it argues that in recognition of the enormous cost such 
creditors’ claims can take, the model proposes a scheme where the creditors cost of 
litigation should be included as part of the debt of the company to be paid or 
reimbursed when all creditors are paid. In addition, where a creditor or liquidator has 
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taken action against a particular controlling shareholder or director, it abates all 
subsequent action by any other creditor or the liquidator on the same subject as 
continuance of such claim may be defeated by the principles of issue estoppel or 
estoppel per rem judicata.   
From the above analysis, it is clear that the responsible corporate personality model 
has as its main features the recovery of misappropriated assets from controlling 
shareholders and directors, maximisation of benefits for distribution to creditors and 
extending the right of action to creditors. It therefore proposes the extension of the 
rule in Foss v Harbottle so as to incorporate certain rights of action by creditors 
against controlling shareholders and directors, particularly when the company is 
unable to do so. The model also attempts to strip from controlling shareholders or 
directors gains made by them through their fraudulent actions or unjust enrichment, 
and the model removes the burden of proving fiduciary relationship before a 
claimant can bring a claim. Thus, once the court is convinced that there is an 
unconscionable conduct on the part of the director or shareholder, the court will 
impose constructive trust against him in order to recover the proceeds of gain made 
and make him liable for his actions.  
With the courts focus on stripping the gains made by those in control of companies 
instead of the laundry list of factors in the existing veil piercing approach, the 
difficulties the courts face in imposing liability against controlling shareholders and 
directors following the strict application of the Salomon’s principles is greatly 
reduced if the proposed model is applied. The novelty of the responsible corporate 
personality model lies in its integrated approach to removing all obstacles affecting 
effective recovery of company’s assets for the benefit of creditors such as fiduciary 
relationship, limitation of right of action to the company and the rigid approach to 
the doctrine of separate legal personality and limited liability. By applying 
constructive trust to veil-piercing scenarios, the model marks a departure from the 
tepid responses to problems of fraud and abuses of the corporate form under the 
existing approaches. 
The application of the responsible corporate personality would signify a major 
milestone in finding a solution to the problem of corporate fraud and abuses in a 
developing country like Nigeria through its capacity to trace misappropriated 
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company assets wherever they are located. Its extension of right of action to creditors 
means, in effect, that creditors can effectively enforce claims against controlling 
shareholders and directors notwithstanding the lack of a fiduciary relationship with 
the company. The implication is that, in Nigeria where single-member companies are 
dominant, the controlling shareholder or director cannot use his position to frustrate 
claims by the creditor based on the principle of corporate personality. Again, the fact 
that the controlling shareholder or director knows that the misappropriated assets 
could be stripped off from him has the effect of deterring him from fraud and 
abuses.The proposed model can assist Nigeria’s economic development by restoring 
investor and creditor confidence in the corporate form.  
Clear from this analysis, at least from a practical angle, is that the responsible 
corporate personality model is a pragmatic approach to dealing with the problem 
inherent with the rigid application of the Salomon’s principles and the negative effect 
of fraud and abuses associated with it. The model is also likely to be highly 
predictive of judicial outcomes. Unlike the current intuitive and ad hoc 
understanding of the cases and commentaries under which it is difficult to determine 
when the court could accept or refuse to hold shareholders and directors liable 
through the veil-piercing approaches or the extent of damage to be imposed, the 
responsible corporate personality model gives clear guidance to the courts. Through 
effective balancing of interests of the company and all the actors involved (namely 
the shareholders, directors and creditors), the courts will be in a position to apply 
equitable measures and hence produce efficient results in this important area of 
corporate law which is often abused at the moment.  The new approach therefore 
provides enough security to honest shareholders and directors whilst ensuring that 
the interest of creditors are protected and not in any way undermined under the guise 
of the separate legal personality of the company.  
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